

THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

Vol. XXI

May, 1941

No. 2

EXPANDING FRONTIERS OF SETTLEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA—A PROJECT FOR FUTURE STUDY*

The part of America in which Latin culture predominates is, in general, not densely populated. In fact, Latin America which makes up about nineteen per cent of the land area of the earth is occupied by only about six per cent of the world's population. For students of mankind, including historians and geographers, no problems are more fundamental than those related to an understanding of these facts of human distribution. Why are there not more people in Latin America? Why are there so few frontiers of expanding settlement? Why are most of the pioneer colonists of the southern continent recruited either directly from overseas, or in such numbers from the older zones of settlement that the latter suffer a decline in population?

Of great significance to the problem of population density are the few regions of expanding frontiers of settlement. Excluding the West Indies, where island conditions create special problems, there are four parts of mainland Central and South America where pioneer expansion is taking place essentially without support from foreign immigration and also without the accompaniment of depopulation in the older settlements—in other words, there are four frontiers which are not hollow. These regions include the highlands of Costa Rica, the highlands of Antioquia in Colombia, Middle Chile, and the three southern states of Brazil.

The factors which have combined to produce the phenomenon of expanding settlement in these four regions are not

* Presented before the Section on History and Geography of the Eighth American Scientific Congress, May, 1940.

easily identified. No simple answer will explain the prevailing emptiness of Latin America, nor the existence of four exceptional regions of vigorous population increase. An approach to an understanding of these things will require the study of various aspects of the problem by students using the points of view of different disciplines.

A word of explanation may be necessary regarding the geographical survey of the distribution of people which revealed the existence of this problem. Many people, especially non-geographers, continue to associate geography with the theories of environmental determinism. Most geographers today would wish to avoid being classified either as supporters or opponents of the principle that human destiny is controlled by the physical environment; nor would they be willing to agree that geographical studies are in any way restricted to the problems of the relation between man and his physical environment. Experience in the study of the density and distribution of people indicates that the significance of the elements of the physical environment, or the land, is determined, not by the inherent qualities of these elements, but by the particular attitudes, objectives, and technical traditions of the people—in other words, by the human culture. Nevertheless, no human society can continue to exist permanently in any part of the earth unless a workable connection is formed between the system of living and the resources of the land. What those connections are is a matter determined more often by the traditions of the inhabitants than by the “whispered solutions” offered by a personified nature. A geographical study of population in Latin America, then, neither presumes nor denies the critical importance of the qualities of the land itself in the explanation of the existence of these four areas of expanding settlement; but it does recognize that in so far as the elements of the land are of critical importance they have become so because of the particular characteristics of the human society.

A COMPARISON OF THE FOUR AREAS OF EXPANDING SETTLEMENT

A preliminary study of the distribution of people, carried out in this spirit, reveals the existence of a problem—a prob-

lem which demands the attention of various students of mankind, and one which might well be placed on the agenda of future congresses. Why should expanding settlements have developed in these four regions, and nowhere else? At present we can only outline the picture of the existing situation and something of the historical background. We can compare the four regions in terms of the numbers and characteristics of the people, the nature of the land, and the main outline of the course of settlement.

Population

The numbers of people involved in each of these four regions of expanding settlement are not great in comparison with the total population of Latin America. In highland Costa Rica the expanding settlements include a little more than 450,000. The density of rural population in the highland basins, however, is greater than in any of the other four regions under discussion, said to reach 500 per square mile in the vicinity of Cartago. The two Departments of Antioquia and Caldas in Colombia are occupied by about 2,000,000 people. Because only large statistical units are available, it has been impossible to estimate the density of population in the occupied areas, although it is probably comparable to that of the highland basins of Costa Rica. The rural population of the northern part of Middle Chile (between Coquimbo and Concepción) is about 1,500,000, and in the vicinity of Santiago there is a rural density of 448 per square mile. Another 900,000 people occupy the pioneer zone of expanding settlement in the southern part of Middle Chile (between Concepción and Puerto Montt). In Brazil, the total population of the three southern states is about 5,000,000, of which 3,000,000 are in Rio Grande do Sul, and 1,000,000 each in Santa Catarina and Paraná. The densities in the zones of concentrated settlement in southern Brazil are probably about 100 to 150 per square mile. In all four regions the rate of net population increase is high, probably more than 20 per thousand.

Of the four regions under discussion, three are occupied by a people of unmixed European ancestry. Costa Rica and Antioquia were settled by colonists from Spain. The southern part of Brazil is made up in part of so-called Luso-Brazilians,

that is, Brazilian-born people of Portuguese origin, and partly of European colonists who immigrated into Brazil during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These Europeans include Germans, Italians, Poles, and smaller groups of other European nationalities. According to Brazilian authorities there are perhaps 900,000 people among the 5,000,000 in the South who have at least one German ancestor.¹ The colonies of Germans and Italians seem to show the greatest vigor of expansion. The people of Middle Chile, on the other hand, are predominantly mestizo—that is, composed of a mixture of Indian and Spanish blood. In the southern frontier region, however, a small group of German colonists forms an important nucleus of expanding settlement. From these facts one must not draw the conclusion that expanding settlements are to be explained as a result of a predominantly European, especially German, population. There are areas of pure European settlement, including several colonies of Germans, located in various parts of Latin America, where pioneer expansion is not taking place. Why should these four regions, among all the other regions of settlement, have developed this characteristic?

The Land

These four regions include a wide variety of kinds of land. There is a marked resemblance in terms of climatic conditions and surface character between Costa Rica and the Antioquia region of Colombia. In both these places the settlements are located in small isolated intermont basins in the highlands, at elevations between 3,000 and 4,000 feet above sea level. Access to the intermont basins of Costa Rica, in which Cartago and San José are situated, was by no means easy, for the slopes are steep and the valleys narrow. At present a railroad connects these centers to the Caribbean by way of the valley of the Río Reventazón, and to the Pacific by way of the valley of the Río Tarcóles. Similarly the Colombian town of Medellín, center of Antioquia, was for centuries noted for its isolated position. From Puerto Berrío on the Magdalena travel to Medellín was over a rough cart road 120 miles long; the road from Medellín to the Colombian town of Cartago, in the Cauca

¹ Conference with Prof. Carlos Delgado de Carvalho.

Valley, and thence to the Pacific port of Buenaventura was much longer, but not so steep. Even today the only complete rail connection is to Puerto Berrío: the railroad from Buenaventura has penetrated the Antioquia region, but has not yet reached the thriving center of that region—the city of Medellín.

The expanding settlements of both Costa Rica and Antioquia are located in that altitude zone known as the *Tierra Templada*. Temperatures average in the 60's, and the range between the warmest and coldest times of the year is negligible. Rainfall is abundant: at Cartago and San José it falls chiefly in summer; at Medellín it comes in two rainy seasons each year, with drier periods between.

The physical setting of Middle Chile differs considerably from that of the other regions. In this part of South America the arable land is narrowly restricted to the string of more or less connected basins known as the Central Valley lying between the Andes on the east and the Coastal Range on the west. The northern part of Middle Chile, between Coquimbo and Concepción, enjoys that "Mediterranean" type of climate which is characterized by winters which are mild and rainy, and summers which are cool and dry. The vegetation of northern Middle Chile was an open scrub forest and brushland. An abrupt change takes place at the latitude of Concepción. Here the dry summers give way to a climate with rains at all times of the year, and the open scrub forest is replaced by a heavy wet forest with only a few scattered grassy openings, or meadows, perhaps human in origin.

Southern Brazil, also, differs from the other three regions. The high plateau which stands at an elevation of almost 3,000 feet at São Paulo continues southward across Paraná, Santa Catarina, and the northern half of Rio Grande do Sul. The Great Escarpment, which marks the eastern edge of the plateau all the way from Baía to Rio Grande do Sul, is a densely forested zone of block mountains and angular valleys rising from sea level to the edge of the unbroken highland, between 2,000 and more than 3,000 feet in altitude. The escarpment and its cover of forest turns westward just north of the city of Porto Alegre in Rio Grande do Sul, forming the

southern edge of the highlands. On the plateau top the land between the deeply intrenched stream valleys is gently sloping with broad, rounded contours. Much of the plateau of the southern states is formed by the dark-colored rock known as diabase, from which is derived the *terra roxa*.

Significant climatic differences exist between São Paulo and the southern states. Along the coast there is little difference in temperature or rainfall during the summer months between Santos and Porto Alegre; but the coastal region south of Santos does experience winter temperatures which drop below 50°. On the highlands, the northern limit of frosts is to be found in a fairly wide zone including the southern part of São Paulo state and the northern part of Paraná. The division of the year into rainy summers and dry winters which is characteristic of most of São Paulo state, gives way to year-round rains, with a slight maximum in winter, in the southern states. These changes begin to make their appearance in São Paulo state south of the cities of São Paulo and Sorocaba.

As in the case of the data concerning the population, so also with this general picture of the nature of the land, we must avoid jumping to plausible conclusions regarding the importance of the facts in relation to the problem of the expanding settlements. Not until people with particular ways of living have confronted the physical conditions of the land are we able to identify the elements of the stage setting which are significant.

The Course of Settlement: Costa Rica

The first settlement on the highlands of Costa Rica was made at Cartago in 1560. The first outward movement of expansion appeared early in the eighteenth century, when people from the basin at the head of the Río Reventazón, in which Cartago is located, moved into the intermont basin immediately to the north, founding San José in 1736.² The original settlement at Cartago seems to have followed the pattern of most of the early Spanish colonies in America: the first

² Leo Waibel, "White Settlement in Costa Rica," *Geographical Review*, XXIX (1939), 529-560; Chester Lloyd Jones, *Costa Rica and Civilization in the Caribbean*, University of Wisconsin Studies in the Social Sciences and History, No. 23, Madison, 1935.

objective was wealth in the form of already accumulated stores of gold and silver; the second objective was a dense native sedentary population which could be converted to Christianity and could be utilized as a source of labor. If the Spanish conquerors sought the highlands, it was not the more comfortable conditions alleged to exist there which attracted them, but rather the presence of dense Indian populations. In the basin in Costa Rica where Cartago was founded there was no store of gold, but there were apparently some seven or eight thousand sedentary Indians, who were promptly divided among *encomiendas*. But these Costa Rican Indians proved of little value as workers. Here the Spaniards found only poverty—such poverty, in fact, that the colonists were reduced to the necessity of performing their own agricultural work or starving. The result was twofold: Costa Rica remained so poor during the colonial period that when Central America fell to pieces after independence, no one cared to claim this territory; and, most unusual in Spanish America, the settlers of the isolated intermont basins had gradually developed into communities of small farmers, working their own small properties primarily for subsistence.

The accelerated rate of expansion noted after 1821 seems to be associated with the widespread adoption of coffee as a money crop. Yet, even before the coffee period began, the small farmers had developed a sufficient density of population around Cartago to support a strong movement of pioneer expansion, first to San José, later up the slopes of the volcanoes back of San José, and down the valleys which drain the intermont basins. By 1821 there were some 60,000 people in the highlands, which made this perhaps the densest rural population of any part of Spanish America at that time. Following 1821, after coffee began to bring unheard of prosperity, the rate of population increase jumped up. Free land offered by the government to those who would plant coffee resulted in an acceleration of settlement expansion, but the net rate of population increase was high enough so that the density of the original settlements did not decline. The population was not reinforced by any important current of immigration, remaining over ninety per cent pure European.

Expansion continues to the present time. Settlements have gone up the highland borders of the densely populated basins as far as the slopes permit; settlement has also descended the valleys into the *Tierra Caliente*. Waibel estimates that there is still an ample supply of land in the intermediate altitudes which are suitable for coffee into which pioneer expansion may yet penetrate.

Antioquia

The original settlement of Antioquia in Colombia seems to have been unusual. Although gold-seekers invaded the difficult mountain country in the Cordillera Central early in the colonial period, the present population of this region is mostly descended from a group of colonists who settled in the valley basin of the upper Río Porce in the 17th century. The people who founded Medellín in 1675 are said to have been made up in part of converted Jews. Many Hebrew customs and traits can be observed even today among the extraordinary people of this region. Apparently there was never any question of utilizing the Indian workers. Those who desired to found large estates went either to the highlands of Cundinamarca where the dense populations of sedentary Chibcha made the land valuable, or they went to the Cauca Valley where sugar cane could be grown with Negro slave labor. The settlers in Antioquia occupied small farms which they worked themselves. So intense was the feeling against race mixture that a project to build a new and better road between Medellín and Cartago was abandoned for fear that easier accessibility to the mountain valleys from the Cauca Valley would bring an influx of people who were considered undesirable. Visitors who penetrated the region during the last century described the inhabitants as an alert, virile, efficient people.³ During the wars which followed the collapse of Bolívar's "Greater Colombia," Antioquia was the stronghold of the conservative party.

The tendency to send out new colonists first appeared about 1800. This was long before coffee entered the economic life

³ F. von Schenck, "Reisen in Antioquia," Petermanns Mitteilungen aus Justus Perthes' Geographischer Anstalt, XXVI (1880), 41-47; and XXIX (1883), 81-93, 213-220, and 441-453.

of Colombia; it was at a time when the only exports from the region were gold and silver, and when farming was largely for subsistence. Manizales was founded in 1848, and during the second half of the last century many new towns were established along the west-facing slopes of the Cordillera Central south of Manizales.

The actual numerical increase in Antioquia is extraordinary when we understand that it has not been supported by immigration. In 1808 there were some 106,000 people in the Department of Antioquia; by 1884 the number had increased to 463,000; and by 1918 the two departments of Antioquia and Caldas into which the original Department had been divided, had a population of 1,200,000. Today the two departments have nearly 2,000,000 inhabitants.

The introduction of coffee into Antioquia accompanied a transformation of the economic life. Even as late as 1880 the people of this region were still cherishing a carefully guarded isolation, their agriculture almost exclusively devoted to the production of their own necessities. During the First World War, however, and in the decade which followed it, the people of Antioquia suddenly embraced a new economic life. On their small properties they planted coffee, and over the railroad line to Puerto Berrío, they exported it. Now the Antioquia region produces more than half of Colombia's coffee. In addition, textile factories in Medellín make use of cotton grown in other parts of Colombia, and sell to markets throughout the nation. From isolation to a predominant position in the commercial life of Colombia is a major change, and with it has come a very considerable degree of economic prosperity.

Middle Chile

The third region of expanding settlements is in Middle Chile. Here the course of settlement has been very different from that of the first two regions. On the relatively small area of arable land in the northern part of Middle Chile, the Chilean rural population, mostly composed of tenants on the large haciendas, reached approximately its present density between 1860 and 1870. The number of people in the provinces between Coquimbo and Concepción, omitting the cities of Val-

paraiso and Santiago, was about 1,425,000, according to the census of 1885; in 1920 the same provinces had a rural population of 1,497,000; and in 1930 the rural population was about 1,500,000. Yet from 1885 to 1930 the population of the country as a whole about doubled. This static density of rural population lies at the heart of a nation which has pushed out its frontiers, from which there has been a small current of emigration, and which in recent years has absorbed its continued growth through the increase of the industrial population of its large cities.

During the colonial period the Spaniards attempted to occupy the forests of the country south of Concepción, the so-called *frontera*.⁴ But they were repulsed. Whether the Spaniards were defeated by the Araucanians, or by their own lack of knowledge of forest living, may be debatable; but the first effective penetration of Chile's woodlands was made after 1850 by German colonists. Once the ways of living in the forest had been demonstrated, many of the rural people of northern Middle Chile, broken loose from the haciendas by the War with Peru and Bolivia, migrated to the *frontera*, and established themselves on small farms on newly cleared lands. The Province of Valdivia, for instance, which had only 8,800 inhabitants in 1835, increased to 53,000 in 1875, and to 133,000 in 1907. In the provinces carved out of the old frontier the population in 1930 had almost reached 900,000. While relatively few of the upperclass Chileans are involved in this movement, about one in every five of the inhabitants of the central valley in northern Middle Chile has moved southward into this pioneer zone.

At present only a very small area of unoccupied land remains which is suitable for pioneer settlement. The Chilean frontier is restricted by the small area of arable land available; present increase of Chilean population is leading to the rapid growth of the industrial cities.

Southern Brazil

The expanding settlements of southern Brazil, like those of Chile, but unlike those of Costa Rica and Colombia, have

⁴ George M. McBride, *Chile, Land and Society*, American Geographical Society of New York Research Series, No. 19, New York, 1936.

been based on the moderate prosperity brought by general farming, rather than the somewhat speculative prosperity of a specialty crop, like coffee. The first settlers who came to southern Brazil were *bandeirantes* from São Paulo. Being chiefly interested in the grazing of animals, for important sources of gold were not discovered in the south, and being definitely ill at ease in the forested lands, these Portuguese settlers chose the open grasslands and left the woods to the Indians. When, after 1822, the government of independent Brazil wished to establish colonists in southern Brazil, partly as a defense measure, they found the forested areas unclaimed, or, if the forested areas were already divided into large properties, the owners were quite willing to sell small lots to the newcomers. Beginning in 1824 a number of German, Italian, and Polish colonies were established, with government aid, inland from Porto Alegre, inland from Florianópolis, and around Curitiba in Paraná. The first two colonial centers were in the forests of the Great Escarpment in Rio Grande do Sul and in Santa Catarina; the Paraná colonies first occupied the highland country around the growing city of Curitiba, and were later established at various places in the interior of the state.

Most of these colonies have prospered. Among the small farmers a net rate of population increase of 23.9 per thousand is reported—as compared with a rate of increase of 6.9 per thousand among the tenants on the large estates. Settlement has extended westward across Rio Grande do Sul; the colonies in Santa Catarina have expanded up the slopes of the Great Escarpment, with an overflow into Paraná. A variety of farm products, especially hogs, butter, and, from the Italian colonies, wine, now reach the nearby markets. With an abundance of good land for settlement, the expansion continues.

But not all the European colonies in these states have continued to grow. At first the German settlers of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina had a very difficult time—so that the emigration of new settlers from Germany was temporarily prohibited. Some of the Polish colonies in western Paraná have not been successful. Nor can we fail to point out that German colonies established farther north in the state

of Espírito Santo have developed the characteristic shifting and temporary patterns of settlement, the hollow frontier, found in most parts of Brazil.

Two conditions leading to successful colonization in Brazil can be identified. First is the protection from the speculative wealth of coffee planting afforded by the presence of frosts in the south. Second is the necessity of providing some kind of a money product, and of giving the colony access over a good road to a growing market. Self-sufficiency is an illusion which many people dream about if they have not actually observed the operation of self-sufficient communities. But to purchase such things as salt, oil, tools, cloth, and the countless little gadgets which make modern living comfortable, a colony must be able to sell a surplus product in a not too distant market. Isolation can explain the failure of the American colony in the Amazon, the early difficulties of the Germans in Rio Grande do Sul, the collapse of the Polish colonies in western Paraná, or the lack of success encountered by the European colonies in eastern Peru. Access to a growing market is perhaps even more important than exceptionally good soil.

THE PROJECT

Here are four regions, then, where expanding frontiers of pioneer settlement are not accompanied by decreasing population in the centers. Conditions in these four regions are diverse, but a few elements common to all of them can be discerned. In all four the population is predominantly or purely European. Yet the significance of this fact may be given too much stress in view of the vigorously expanding black population of certain islands in the West Indies. In all four the system of land tenure in the frontier zones is that of small properties; only in the older nucleus of settlement in northern Middle Chile were there large estates with tenants. In all four the greatest expansion has been associated with at least a moderately prosperous commercial economy, developed through access to a growing market. Yet in both Costa Rica and Antioquia expansion began in the period of poverty which preceded the introduction of coffee; and while coffee provided the kind of prosperity needed to increase the

rate of expansion in the two northern regions, the protection of the colonists in Brazil from the possibility of speculation in coffee was an important factor in that region. No physical characteristics of the land seem to be common to all four regions. In coffee regions, position in the *Tierra Templada*, where coffee grows best, becomes significant. The energizing effect of climate which is produced by storminess and variations of weather in Chile and southern Brazil is quite lacking in the monotonous tropical climates of the two northern regions.

These remarks present an outline of what seems to be a most fascinating and significant series of related problems. A considerable amount of material exists regarding these four regions of settlement. But generally the writers about those regions have not been conscious that they had to explain anything unusual. Perhaps in the interval between this and the next American Scientific Congress historians and geographers, and also other scholars interested in these problems of population distribution, might undertake to investigate the causes of expanding settlement in these four regions. Perhaps the governments of the countries involved could be induced to carry out special statistical studies of these critical areas, with figures compiled by territorial divisions small enough so that effective comparison with actual land areas is possible. In each area detailed historical studies of the origin of the colonists and the course of settlement need to be carried out; and in each area geographers should provide detailed information regarding the arrangement of the settlements and their relation to the land. The results, brought together for comparison and discussion at later congresses, could not fail to throw new light on these fundamental problems of population.

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RUSSIA AND THE EMANCIPATION OF SPANISH AMERICA, 1816-1826

While the struggle for independence from the Motherland was raging in Spanish America, the armies of Napoleon had been defeated and at the Congress of Vienna the victorious Allies had reconstructed the map of Europe according to the doctrine of Legitimacy. As the spires and turrets of time-honored establishments emerged above the subsiding waves, certain European statesmen contemplated the formation by the great powers of an international system which would check a nation that, disregarding the rights of her neighbors, should overstep the prescribed boundaries. Czar Alexander I of Russia was much impressed with this proposal, which perhaps suggested to him the notion of an organization to preserve peace. Shortly afterward he framed the Act of the Holy Alliance. At Paris on September 26, 1815, the monarchs of Austria, Prussia, and Russia signed this so-called treaty which bound them to protect religion, peace, and justice and to maintain the existing political régime.¹ On November 19, 1815, the King of France subscribed an act of accession which avowed the sacred principles embodied in that curious treaty.² In May, 1816, King Ferdinand VII of Spain also acceded to it; in particular he declared that henceforth he would claim advice and support as an ally of the Czar.³

In 1817 England's willingness to mediate in the quarrel between Spain and her colonies caused the government of Russia to formulate its views about revolutionary movements in Spanish America. After a conference on that subject with

¹ F. Martens, *Recueil des traités et conventions conclus par la Russie avec les puissances étrangères* (15 vols., St. Petersburg, 1874-1909) Vol. IV, pt. 1, pp. 4-7. Documents from the Russian archives cited in this study were obtained by the writer through the aid of his colleague, Dr. F. S. Rodkey.

² A. J. H. de Clercq, *Recueil des traités de la France* (17 vols., Paris, 1864-1891), II, 630.

³ W. R. de Villa-Urrutia, "España en el congreso de Viena según la correspondencia oficial de D. Pedro Gómez Labrador, Marqués de Labrador," *Revista de archivos, bibliotecas y museos*, XVI (1907), 169.

Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Nesselrode, on May 7, Francisco Zea Bermúdez, the Spanish ambassador at St. Petersburg, wrote to his government with respect to instructions concerning the revolted Spanish colonies which the Russian cabinet had addressed to Dmitri Tatistcheff, the clever and intriguing ambassador at Madrid. These instructions, said Zea Bermúdez, "favor the adoption of means of conciliation and peace in preference to the use of force to re-establish tranquillity in those colonies." He declared that the Court of St. Petersburg "would see with pleasure an end so interesting to humanity and so useful to Spain as the pacification of her colonies" attained by the good offices of England. Nevertheless, it felt that some disinterested powers of Europe should take part in this intercession and that an agreement should be reached about the fundamental principles of the mediation.⁴

Soon afterward Tatistcheff explained Russian views to José García de León y Pizarro, the Spanish Secretary of State. Tatistcheff declared that the Czar wished to broach a matter which involved interests dear not only to Ferdinand VII but also to humanity. The ambassador commented as follows on the significance of the revolution in Spanish America:

The insurrection of a large part of the transatlantic dominions of His Catholic Majesty is not simply a Spanish question or an American question. From its outcome the world should gain a new experience in regard to the results of rebellion, of anarchy, and of an attempt against the rights of Legitimacy.

The ambassador advised the use of firmness rather than severity toward the revolted colonies. He reasoned that the victories of royalist forces in Spanish America had not disabused men's minds concerning those evils of colonial management attributed to the Motherland. He asserted that Russia would not be jealous of the amicable intercession of a foreign power in the struggle between Spain and her revolted colonies. Tatistcheff suggested, however, that it might be wise for her to grant certain concessions to her colonists. He declared that this was the wish of the magnanimous Czar

⁴ Zea Bermúdez to Pizarro, April 25/May 7, 1817, Archivo General de Indias (hereinafter cited as A. G. I.), Estado, 88.

who was "as devoted a friend of his Allies as a protector of the principles of eternal morality, the unique guarantee of the sacred bond which unites the people and the kings and assures the general welfare."⁵

Meanwhile the distracted Spanish Empire had attracted the attention of General Pozzo di Borgo, the influential ambassador of Russia at Paris, who on June 14, 1817, wrote to Nesselrode concerning the insurrection which was devastating Spanish America. This ambassador pointed out that there were important differences between the people of the United States during the American Revolution and the rebellious colonists in the Spanish Indies. He feared that if the Spanish-American revolutionists were successful they might only clear the way for "barbarous and ferocious tyrants." Furthermore, some European nations would lose the advantages which they had hitherto enjoyed from trade with the Spanish colonies. He held that for the Motherland to attempt to subjugate them by force of arms without recourse to any moral expedient, however, would be like trying to still the hurricanes of that region:

Instead of persisting in these fruitless attempts, Spain should present to Europe a plan for the pacification of her colonies. The basis of this should be an improved local administration, the grant of certain privileges to the provinces, and a large measure of freedom of commerce. Once this scheme was acknowledged to be equitable, the great powers should become mediators.⁶

In response to this communication, Nesselrode held that it would be difficult and even premature for his government to form just and positive ideas concerning the proper remedy for Spanish-American ills. He admitted, however, that the scheme suggested by Pozzo di Borgo held some promise of success.⁷ In a dispatch dated October 3, Pozzo explained that he did not favor either promising or granting armed assistance to Spain but merely wished to suggest that mediation should not be based strictly on a policy of non-intervention;

⁵ Tatistcheff to "Monsieur," June 6/18, 1817, *ibid.*

⁶ A. Polovstov, *Correspondance diplomatique des ambassadeurs et ministres de Russie en France et de France en Russie avec leurs gouvernements de 1814 à 1830* (3 vols., St. Petersburg, 1902-1907), II, 230. ⁷ *Ibid.*, 335.

for in the eyes of the insurgents such a policy would deprive the Russian attitude of that imposing uncertainty which revealed force in the background.⁸

In August, 1817, the English Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord Castlereagh, sent a memorandum to the great powers which suggested another solution for the Latin-American problem. His proposal was that England, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia should mediate in the strife between Spain and her revolted colonies. He stated that England was willing to undertake mediation on behalf of those powers on certain conditions.⁹ On October 4, 1817, Secretary Pizarro informed the English envoy at Madrid, however, that Ferdinand VII was not inclined to agree to this plan.¹⁰ The Anglo-Spanish *impasse* with regard to the Indies was brought to the attention of Czar Alexander by Francisco Zea Bermúdez who on November 13, 1817, transmitted to the Russian cabinet a memorandum which had been sent to him from Madrid concerning the English proposal for mediation. The Spanish Government held that no European nation should remain permanently neutral toward revolutionists who were bound to exert a dangerous influence on all peoples. The plan of mediation proposed by England was not acceptable to Spain, for it did not assure her any beneficial results if the revolutionary governments should refuse to accept the proposals which might be made. Instead of agreeing to this plan Ferdinand VII wished the Continental Allies headed by Russia to use their influence to induce the revolted colonies to acknowledge his suzerainty.¹¹

During the same year a peculiar transaction illustrated the deep interest of the Russian Government in checking the movement for the emancipation of Spanish America. An agreement for the transfer of eight warships from Russia to Spain appears to have been signed at Madrid in August, 1817, by Tatistcheff and Francisco Eguia, the Spanish Secretary of War. During the autumn of that year Spain actually secured

⁸ *Ibid.*, 393. This correspondence published by Polovstoff is also found in the *Sbornik Russkago Istoricheskago Obshchestva*, Vol. CXIX.

⁹ C. K. Webster, *Britain and the Independence of Latin America, 1812-1830* (2 vols., London, 1938), II, 352-358.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 359.

¹¹ (Copy). A. G. I., Estado, 90.

from the Russian Government some armed vessels which were presumably to be used in a military expedition against the insurgent colonies. But most of the warships thus obtained were in such poor condition when they reached Spain as to be almost useless.¹² So intimate, however, were the relations between the courts of Madrid and St. Petersburg that some continental diplomats suspected the existence of a Russo-Spanish alliance.

In a memorandum dated November 17, 1817, Alexander I formally called the attention of the great powers to the distracted condition of the Spanish colonies and also to the dispute between Spain and Portugal about the title to Uruguay. He reasoned that by a preliminary act the powers should settle this territorial issue. In vague phrases he maintained that the tranquillity of the Latin-American countries could then be assured by extending to them the advantages which flowed to Europe through the stipulations of the Congress of Vienna. Further, both Spain and Portugal should agree to an act arranging for the definitive pacification of their colonies. The mediatory powers were then to coöperate with those nations in carrying out this arrangement. In conclusion, the Czar stated that his diplomatic agents at the courts of the mediatory powers would be sent instructions to promote the negotiations which he proposed.¹³

The manner in which Russia wished to secure the pacification of the Spanish Indies was explained in an undated dispatch from her Chancellery to Tatistcheff. In this communication, it advised that if Spain could not pacify the revolted colonies, she should accept the offer of intervention made by the great powers in order to ensure a reconciliation with the colonies "and the preservation of her most sacred rights." Reasoning that the Motherland would herself have to formulate the basis for the pacification of Spanish America, the Russian ministers suggested that she might well agree

¹² García de León y Pizarro, *Memorias de la vida* (3 vols., Madrid, 1894-1897), II, 158-160; Villa-Urrutia, "España en el congreso de Viena," *loc. cit.*, XVI, 179-181; Count Capodistrias, "Aperçu de ma carrière publique, depuis 1798 jusqu'à 1822," *Sbornik*, III, 223.

¹³ Polevostoff, *Correspondance diplomatique*, II, 474-482.

to an armistice and to the concession of certain rights to her colonists in these words:

Far from becoming alarmed at the prospect of a constitutional charter, the Spanish Government should favor this solution in order to attach America to the Motherland by an infinite number of new bonds and at the same time to thwart all the calculations of either the mercantile or the revolutionary spirit which seem interested in multiplying in the New World the chances of discord. . . . Why could not the grant of civil and political rights and the formation of a local régime be varied according to the geographical situation, the population, the degree of civilization, the culture, the customs, and even the prejudices of each province? Why should not the splendid kingdoms of Mexico, Chile, Peru, Terra Firma, and Buenos Aires each have a distinct form of administration and a system particularly adapted to each of them in whatever pertains to police, education, civil and municipal rights, navigation, and commerce?¹⁴

On November 20, 1817, the policy of Russia toward Spanish America was further disclosed in supplementary instructions to Tatistcheff under four heads. 1. The Court of Madrid should be induced to grant large powers to the plenipotentiary who was to represent it in the proposed conferences of the Allied Powers at Paris. 2. It should be persuaded to undertake at once the preparation of an act of pacification framed so as to reconcile the Spanish-American revolutionists with the Motherland and thus to make clear to the mediating powers the limits within which their coöperation should be exercised. 3. Arguments should be submitted to His Catholic Majesty to demonstrate the need of joining the issue involved in the dispute concerning the ownership of Uruguay with the negotiations for the pacification of the Spanish colonies. 4. The Court of Madrid should consider that the disputed title to Uruguay was a minor matter which should precede the major negotiation concerning the colonies. Assuming, however, that this view might not be accepted by the Spanish

¹⁴ "Projet de dépêche réservée au conseiller privé de Tatistcheff," *Arkhiv Revoliutsii i Vneshnei Politiki* (hereinafter cited as A. R. V. P.), Madrid, 1817, 7750. Cf. the statement made by Francisco de Miranda concerning the liberal sentiments expressed by Catherine II about the independence of Spanish America when he visited Russia in 1787. See W. S. Robertson, *The Life of Miranda* (2 vols., Chapel Hill, 1929), I, 75.

King, the Russian ministers reasoned that the territorial controversy would not cause any prejudice to other discussions having as their object the pacification of the New World.¹⁵

At that time Russia was thus in favor of an armistice between Spain and her revolted colonies. Further, she urged the formal grant by the Motherland of a species of constitution to the Indies which would be adapted to varying conditions in the different administrative divisions. Russian ministers urged that Spain should frame an act for reconciliation with her colonies which would indicate the nature of the mediation to be performed by the great powers. Those ministers also felt that, as a preliminary to a reconciliation with her colonies, Spain should seek an adjustment with Portugal concerning the dispute over the title to the land on the left bank of the Uruguay River. In an autobiographical sketch composed in 1826, Count Capodistrias, a Greek who served for a time as a diplomatic adviser and personal secretary of state of Alexander I, said:

More than once in deigning to converse with me about the deplorable situation of the Iberian Peninsula, the Emperor acknowledged that the moral and the material cause of its ills could not be remedied as long as the fortunes of its colonies were subject, on the one hand, to the mediaeval methods of Cadiz and Madrid and, on the other hand, to the commercial activities of the merchants of London.¹⁶

In response to an official note embodying the omnibus proposals of Russia, the English minister at St. Petersburg, Earl Cathcart, observed to Nesselrode that he feared the Allies would not be able easily to reach a decision upon the reforms "which they would consider as essential to the new Constitution of the Colonies." Furthermore, Lord Castle-reagh held that the execution of the Russian project would lead to great delay in case the mediation between Spain and her insurgent colonies was postponed until all the differences existing between her and Portugal were adjusted and until the courts of both Madrid and Rio de Janeiro should agree

¹⁵ "Projet de dépêche au conseiller privé Tatistcheff," November 20, 1817, *ibid.*, Madrid, 1817, 7550.

¹⁶ "Aperçu de ma carrière publique, depuis 1798 jusqu'à 1822," *Sbornik*, III, 221-222.

to a plan for the pacification of South America.¹⁷ Castlereagh disapproved a Russian proposal that economic coercion should be used to enforce a plan of mediation approved by the Allies.¹⁸

On August 1, 1818, in accordance with an order from Madrid, Zea Bermúdez sent to Nesselrode the formal reply of his government to the latest proposals concerning mediation. It maintained that negotiations should be undertaken among the European powers to reconcile the rebellious colonists with the Motherland upon the following bases. 1. Capable Spanish Americans should be admitted to public office in the colonies on the same terms as Peninsular Spaniards. 2. Commercial relations between foreign countries and the provinces of Spanish America should be regulated by principles suited to its political situation and to that of Europe. 3. His Catholic Majesty was disposed to adopt during the negotiation any measures proposed by his Allies which seemed to him compatible with the conservation of his rights. The utmost concession which Ferdinand VII seemed willing to promise the colonists at this juncture was thus the admission of creoles to public office and a modification of the exclusive commercial system which in reality had already been disrupted.¹⁹

In February, 1818, Prince Polética, who had been made the Russian minister to the United States, asked for special instructions concerning his prospective discussions about Spanish America with Secretary of State John Quincy Adams.²⁰ On April 18, 1818, Secretary Capodistrias accordingly addressed an important dispatch to Polética, copies of which were also sent to the Russian embassies at London, Madrid, Paris, and Rio de Janeiro. Assuming that a divergence of views among the interested courts of Europe would leave the moot issue unsettled, the Secretary reasoned that Adams or

¹⁷ Webster, *Britain and the Independence of Latin America*, II, 293-295.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 295-296.

¹⁹ (Copy), enclosure in Zea Bermúdez to Pizarro, July 23-August 4, 1818, A. G. I., Estado 88. This note resembled a circular note transmitted by Spain to the Allies on June 12, 1818, which was printed in *The Annual Register*, 1818, pp. 84-85.

²⁰ Polética to Capodistrias, February 27, 1818, No. 13, A. R. V. P. On the career of Capodistrias see his "Aperçu de ma carrière publique, depuis 1798 jusqu'à 1822," *Sbornik*, III, 163 ff.

Luis de Onís, the Spanish minister at Washington, would presumably desire answers to three questions: 1. Was Russia so free of international engagements that she could remain "an inactive and impartial spectator of events?" 2. Was she disposed to take part even indirectly in the policy of the United States "and thus to favor the emancipation of the Spanish colonies by promising to recognize them as free and independent?" 3. "If a war should break out on this issue between Spain and the United States or even between that republic and England, what attitude would Russia take?"

Speaking on behalf of the Czar, in reply to the first question the Secretary declared that Russia had no special engagements with any power and that the treaties of Paris and Vienna of 1814 and 1815 and the Act of the Holy Alliance formed "the unique and unalterable basis of the policy of His Imperial Majesty." In reply to the second question Capodistrias declared in the following passage that the Czar did not wish to promote the subjugation of the Spanish colonies:

Desirous to secure for these immense and rich countries a civil and political existence suitable to their progress in civilization, His Imperial Majesty does not feel authorized to promote such a consummation by his direct or indirect intervention, either independent of the Spanish Government or by intentions foreign to the true and legitimate interests of that state. As a friend and ally of His Catholic Majesty, the Emperor will not insist that the Spanish colonies should obtain from their mother country an administration founded upon the principles of a national representation. . . .

In reply to the third question Capodistrias expressed grave doubt whether force of arms would bring about a settlement of the vexatious problem of the Spanish colonies. The Emperor would frown upon any move which tended to precipitate a war.²¹ Because of a report that at its next session the Congress of the United States would recognize the independence of the Spanish colonies, in November, 1818, Capodistrias sent supplementary instructions to Polética as follows:

²¹ "Correspondence of the Russian Ministers in Washington, 1818-1825," *American Historical Review*, XVIII, 310-315. The draft of this dispatch preserved in A. R. V. P. bears the statement that copies of it were also sent to the Russian legations at other important capitals.

Any act that prejudices the principles of justice which should regulate the political relations between states cannot obtain the approval of the Emperor. Furthermore, His Imperial Majesty is the ally of the King of Spain, as well as of all the sovereigns and all the governments that signed or acceded to the acts of Vienna and the acts of Paris of the year 1815. . . . Accordingly, if upon your arrival in the United States the American Government has not yet decided to recognize the independence of the insurgent Spanish colonies, you are expressly recommended to dissuade the cabinet at Washington from this act of hostility toward Spain by using the same circumspection which has already been recommended to you.²²

Capodistrias accordingly denied the existence of a secret treaty with Spain, disclaimed that by mediation his government wished to aid her to restore her authority over the Indies, and suggested that she should reform her colonial administration. He instructed Polética to use his influence to prevent an outbreak of hostilities because of boundary disputes, and urged that minister to dissuade the United States Government from acknowledging the independence of the revolted Spanish colonies.

Indeed at this time Russia seemed inclined to let those colonies entirely alone. In an audience accorded to General Hulot, the French envoy in St. Petersburg, in June, 1819, the Russian autocrat expressed the opinion that the best mode of handling the Spanish-American Revolution would be to abandon the insurgents to their fate, "to reject all overtures or propositions on their part, and to furnish them with no aid whatsoever." Alexander I thought that this general neglect would overcome them and would soon deliver them almost defenseless to the efforts of Spain. When speaking of the creation of monarchical governments in South America, he designated them as "republics disguised under the forms of monarchy."²³

Polética arrived in Washington on May 24, 1819. Five days later he left with Secretary John Quincy Adams copies of his instructions from the Russian cabinet. With regard to

²² Capodistrias to Polética, November 1/13, 1818, A. R. V. P., Washington, 1818.

²³ Hulot to Dessolle, May 26/June 7, 1819, Archives du ministère des affaires étrangères, correspondance politique (hereinafter cited as A. A. E.), Russie, 159.

its views concerning the Spanish colonies, Adams informed the Russian diplomat that in his opinion sooner or later they must be recognized as independent nations. In reply Polética, whom Adams described as "a very troublesome personage," admitted that La Plata might be able to cast off the Spanish yoke but asserted that its people were not competent to establish an independent government. On June 17 the Russian diplomat told Adams unofficially that the Czar much desired that the United States would join the Holy Alliance—an invitation to which the American Government could not accede.²⁴

Another occasion for the formulation of Russian views concerning Latin America had meantime been furnished by the conference of European powers at Aix-la-Chapelle. In September, 1818, the delegates of Russia, Nesselrode and Capodistrias, arrived in that city. The views of their government concerning the Spanish Indies in 1818 were evidently embodied in a joint Franco-Russian memorandum composed by Count Sérurier, who had served as minister of France to Washington and sanctioned by Duke Richelieu, the French minister of foreign affairs. This memorandum reasoned that the real object of the nations represented at Aix-la-Chapelle was to preserve all Europe from the dangers with which the Spanish-American Revolution threatened it and that a most urgent interest of the European powers was to prevent that revolution from acquiring too much momentum before a plan for the pacification of the colonies could be matured and carried out. An event which would tend to make the evil irremediable would be the recognition of one of the governments established by the insurgents. Fear was expressed that the Democratic party in the United States might exert pressure in the next Congress to secure an acknowledgment of the independence of La Plata. There was danger that there might be formed in the New World a great republican federation headed by the United States. Such a young, rich, republican world would in his opinion constitute a real danger to old, monarchical Europe:

²⁴ J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, IV, 370, 378-381, 394, 401, 404; J. B. Moore, *A Digest of International Law*, V, 378-379.

All that remains in Europe of the spirit of discontent, of faction, and of discord would naturally seek a *point d'appui* in America. The consequences of this might be incalculable.²⁵

As a result of the stubborn opposition of Castlereagh, the plenipotentiaries of Russia withdrew their support from the joint program which suggested the use of force by the Allies against the insurgent colonies of Spain.

In December, 1818, after Ferdinand VII had positively declined foreign mediation for the pacification of those colonies, Zea Bermúdez wrote to Madrid that Nesselrode had approved this decision; for the Russian diplomat felt that the moral means used in pacification should emanate from the Spanish Government. Furthermore, Nesselrode suggested that Spain should make known to the Spanish Americans her desire to promote their prosperity and happiness at the same time that she undertook to send armed forces to the western hemisphere. In conclusion that minister recommended that the military expedition which was being prepared for dispatch to La Plata should be equipped promptly "as the means most efficacious to terminate happily the negotiations pending with Portugal and to give at the same time the most salutary impulse to the important business of pacification."²⁶ It is plain that at this juncture, while attempting to dissuade the United States from recognizing the independence of La Plata, Russia was inciting Spain to subjugate the revolted colonists by force of arms.

A kaleidoscopic change in the Iberian Peninsula soon provoked the Russian Government to consider the revolt in Spanish America from another viewpoint. In January, 1820, orders issued by the Spanish Government for the equipment of an army to subjugate the revolted colonies precipitated an uprising led by Colonel Rafael Riego. After this movement spread to cities in northern Spain, Ferdinand VII reluctantly agreed

²⁵ Duke of Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda*, XII, 805-809. On the authorship of this memorandum, see W. S. Robertson, *France and Latin-American Independence* (Baltimore, 1939), 153 note. Cf. D. Perkins, "Russia and the Spanish Colonies, 1817-1818," *American Historical Review*, XXVIII (1923), 667.

²⁶ Zea Bermúdez to Marquis Casa Yrujo, December 28, 1818, A. G. I., Estado, 88.

to accept the liberal Constitution which had been framed in 1812 and to convoke a Cortes.

In an attempt to justify this subversion of the principle of Legitimacy, on April 19, 1820, Zea Bermúdez addressed a note to the Czar explaining that the revolution was not the result of a military conspiracy but the outcome of dissatisfaction at the rule of Ferdinand VII. Expressing regret at recent events in Spain, on May 2 Alexander I replied that his deep interest in that country was shown by his correspondence with various European courts as well as by his desire to have the authority of Ferdinand VII "consolidated in both hemispheres." He reasoned that the Spanish Government would have to decide whether its new liberal institutions were suited to produce the results which both hemispheres expected of His Catholic Majesty. In conclusion the Czar stated that the path which Spain now chose to pursue would determine the nature of the relations that Russia would maintain with her government.²⁷

In a memorial addressed by the Russian Chancellery to its ministers at foreign courts it made a general response to representations of the Spanish envoy at St. Petersburg and denounced the insurrection in Spain. It linked this revolution suggestively with the revolution in Spanish America. It declared that the ministers of the Allied Powers, who had been treating with a Spanish plenipotentiary, might well address him as follows:

The monarchs . . . have never ceased to entertain wishes for the prosperity of Spain. They will always entertain such wishes. They have desired that in Europe, as in America, institutions conformable to the progress of civilization and to the wants of the age might procure to all Spaniards long years of peace and happiness. They desire the same at this moment. They have wished that all these institutions should become a real blessing by the legal manner in which they should be introduced.²⁸

²⁷ *Historia de la vida y reinado de Fernando VII de España* (3 vols., Madrid, 1842), II, 398; *Annual Register*, 1820, part II, pp. 723-725. See further A. Stern, *Geschichte Europas seit den Verträgen von 1815 bis zum Frankfurter Frieden von 1871* (6 vols., Berlin, 1894-1911), II, 119.

²⁸ *The Annual Register*, 1820, part II, p. 727. A similar line of reasoning was presented in the circular dispatch sent from Verona in December, 1822, by Austria,

Clearly the Russian ministers, as well as Czar Alexander, took the view that the Revolution of 1820 in Spain was no less a violation of the doctrine of Legitimacy than the Spanish-American Revolution.

Two years later, while the Liberal Government still ruled Spain, an event occurred which furnished European powers a fresh occasion to enunciate their views concerning her insurgent colonies. This event was the acknowledgment by the United States of Spanish-American independence in principle. On March 8, 1822, President Monroe sent a message to Congress in which he declared that Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Chile, and La Plata had won their independence and had a claim to recognition by other nations. Congress agreed with this view and on May 8, 1822, Monroe signed a bill which appropriated \$100,000 to defray the expenses of "such Missions to the independent nations on the American continent" as the President might deem proper.²⁹

The recognition policy of the United States much displeased the government of Spain. Her ambassadors at leading European courts were instructed to protest vigorously against Monroe's proposal. The ambassador at St. Petersburg was to suggest that Russia would gain special commercial advantages by the conservation of Spanish sovereignty in the New World.³⁰ Francisco Martínez de la Rosa, Spain's Secretary of State, addressed to her ambassadors at the principal European courts a manifesto which was intended as a counterblast against President Monroe's message.³¹ On May 10, 1822, that Secretary addressed a dispatch to Pedro A. Argaiz, the Spanish chargé at St. Petersburg, declaring that it was urgent that Spain should get a satisfactory reply from Russia about the attitude of the American Congress toward Spanish America and instructing him that in case a response from the Russian

Prussia, and Russia. See Prince Metternich, *Mémoires, documents et écrits divers* (8 vols., Paris, 1880-1884), III, 675.

²⁹ W. S. Robertson, "The Recognition of the Hispanic American Nations by the United States," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, I (1918), 251-257.

³⁰ "Instrucciones reservadas á los representantes de S. M. en Londres, Paris, Viena, Petersburgo y Berlin," May 6, 1822, A. G. I., Estado, 90.

³¹ *Manifiesto del gobierno español á las potencias extrangeras sobre la independencia de las Américas* (Mexico, 1822).

Government was received, he was immediately to forward the news to Madrid and also to the Spanish legations in Paris and London.³²

It was June 25, 1822, before Nesselrode informed Argaiz that he had made known to the Czar the views of Spain with respect to the steps taken at Washington concerning Spanish-American independence. Nesselrode declared that Alexander I desired to see those colonies prosper under the rule of Ferdinand VII. The Russian diplomat added:

The King should be convinced by the slight results accomplished by the activities of agents of his American provinces and by the communications which his cabinet has received from several courts of Europe that the resolutions of the Allied Powers will not tend to decide before the proper time nor against the real interests of Spain the question to which she attaches an importance so legitimate. In this situation, as in all others, the Emperor will not depart in the least from the principles of loyalty, of justice, and of moderation which direct European policy and which he has had occasion to develop more than once in his friendly relations with your august sovereign.³³

Four days later a circular dispatch was sent from St. Petersburg to the Russian ambassadors at London, Paris, Berlin, and Vienna which mentioned Spain's manifesto animadverting upon the decision of the Congress of the United States to acknowledge the independence of Spanish America:

In this situation Spain certainly finds herself in a most alarming and difficult position. Plagued by the scourge of an anarchy which perhaps will cause her the loss of the finest dominions which any European empire ever possessed, even at this late date could she not invoke those conservative principles of the social order which in recent conjunctures she has herself so unhappily disregarded? In such a situation, even if the maxims of a loyal and pure policy do not prescribe to the Emperor that he should give to His Catholic Majesty a new proof of the respect due to sacred rights consecrated by a possession which has endured for centuries, merely the interest which this unfortunate monarch inspires would make it a duty for His Imperial Majesty to fulfill the pledge which has been made by allowing Spain the time to exorcise, if it is possible, the evil which menaces her.³⁴

³² A. G. I., Estado, 90.

³³ (Copy), *ibid.*

³⁴ Annex M in Nesselrode to Tuyl, July 13, 1822 (No. 5578), A. R. V. P., Washington, 1822; this annex is mentioned in "Correspondence of the Russian Ministers in Washington, 1818-1825," *loc. cit.*, XVIII, 342.

In the summer of 1822, though still lamenting the revolutions which had overthrown legitimist rule in Spain and in the Indies, the Russian ministers thus seemed inclined to allow the Spaniards to solve this thorny problem themselves.

Shortly afterward the attitude of England toward the revolted colonies of Spain again precipitated declarations of policy by the Continental Allies. Because of the depredations of pirates on English commerce, on November 24 the Duke of Wellington presented to their delegates assembled at the Congress of Verona a "memorandum on the necessity of some further recognition of the independence of the Spanish colonies." The reply of the Russian plenipotentiaries, headed by Nesselrode, declared that although their flag seldom appeared in Latin-American seas which were infested by corsairs, yet they hoped that the English navy would soon put an end to all piratical raids. These diplomats affirmed that Russia's views concerning the recognition of the *de facto* governments of Spanish America remained as they were in the spring of 1822. Rightly did they state that on more than one occasion since 1815, the Czar had made known to Ferdinand VII that a plan was needed for the pacification of the revolted colonies which would not only assure the well-being of the Spanish Americans but would also link them by fresh bonds to the mother country. They described the policy of Alexander I in these words:

Faithful to the conservative principles which his policy has always observed, persuaded that upon these principles there even depend the maintenance of legitimate governments and the rights which they possess, His Imperial Majesty would make no decision tending to prejudge the question of the independence of the southern part of America and he will continue to hope that Spain would have the good fortune to reëstablish her relations with the revolted colonies upon bases which were mutually advantageous.²⁵

The attitude which the United States had adopted toward those colonies naturally became a topic for consideration in the instructions which Nesselrode prepared in July, 1822, for the new minister to Washington, Baron Tuyl. As a guide to his conduct, Tuyl was given a copy of Nesselrode's letter to

²⁵ Webster, *Britain and the Independence of Latin America*, II, 82-83.

Argaiz of June 25, 1822, and also of the circular dispatch addressed soon afterward to Russian envoys at leading courts of Europe. Nesselrode feared that the American recognition policy would tend to invalidate the legitimate rights which Spain had enjoyed for centuries, but he reasoned as follows that fortunately the powers of Europe were free to act on different principles than those enunciated at Washington:

The United States should expect to see the political existence of the Spanish colonies considered in Europe from a point of view very different from that which her government and her Congress have contemplated it. But at least she has declared that they would be far from preventing Spain from becoming reconciled with her subjects in America and regaining the exercise of her rights, if she is able to do so. We are pleased to hope that the United States will persist in this system of neutrality and perhaps such a resolution faithfully carried out on her part will prevent any act of direct hostility between the Court of Madrid and North America.³⁶

Supplementary instructions to Tuyll dated December, 1822, stressed the need of preventing hostilities between Spain and the United States. Count Nesselrode stated that the Czar wished that the decision of the American Congress on recognition would not serve to aggravate in the least the misfortunes of Spain and that in case she tried to obtain political and commercial advantages from her dissident colonies, the United States would not take any step to prevent her from obtaining some compensation for "the loss of an entire world." Explaining that because of the deplorable situation of Spain at that time, the Czar felt like respecting the rights which she had enjoyed for three centuries, the count reasoned thus:

We do not pretend to check the march of the future. The emancipation of South America is probable; it is perhaps imminent. But, I repeat, in the eyes of the Emperor, this is an additional reason for wishing that his minister should induce the United States to adopt an inoffensive policy with regard to Spain. And as in similar circumstances, the intervention of Monsieur de Polética produced the happiest results, we are justified in basing upon your efforts hopes for the same outcome.³⁷

³⁶ Nesselrode to Tuyll, July 13, 1822 (No. 5578), with enclosures, A. R. V. P., Washington, 1822.

³⁷ *Idem to idem*, December 2/14, 1822 (No. 2643), *ibid.*

Months after the new minister arrived in Washington, he received a dispatch from Nesselrode expressing deep gratification at the impending triumph of Legitimacy in Spain because of French intervention. On October 16, 1823, Tuyll had an interview with Adams concerning the appointment of one D'Evereux, who had been a general in a revolutionary army in Colombia, as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of that republic to Denmark, Sweden, and Russia.³⁸ Tuyll informed Adams that his government had instructed him that it would not receive this envoy and that Alexander I had determined not to receive an agent from any of the insurgent colonies in the New World. Furthermore, Tuyll stated that the Czar had observed with satisfaction that the government of the United States had affirmed when it acknowledged Spanish-American independence that it did not intend to depart from the policy of neutrality which it had observed in the contest between Spain and her colonies.³⁹ On the same day the minister of Russia enforced his oral declarations concerning the recognition of *de facto* governments in Spanish America by a formal note which declared that the Czar would remain faithful to his political principles.⁴⁰ After the restoration of Ferdinand VII to absolute power, though realizing that the separation of the colonies from Spain seemed inevitable, the Court of St. Petersburg absolutely refused to receive agents from any of the rising Spanish nations in the New World.

At times Russian statesmen went even farther than Tuyll in expressing their dislike of the policy of acknowledging the independence of the Spanish colonies. On November 25, 1823, in commenting on certain questions concerning their recognition which Viscount Chateaubriand, the French Minister of

³⁸ D'Evereux to Dr. William Thornton, January 17, 1823, Thornton Papers, 1820-1849, Library of Congress. On D'Evereux see further *The Speech of Charles Phillipe, Esq. (the celebrated orator) to General D'Evereux and the Regiments under his Command previous to their Embarkation at Dublin to join the Spanish Patriots in South America* (London, 1819), 3, 4, 7.

³⁹ W. C. Ford, "Some Original Documents on the Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine," *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, second series, Vol. XV, 394-395; Adams, *op. cit.*, VI, 137, 190.

⁴⁰ Ford, "Some Original Documents on the Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine," *loc. cit.*, 400.

Foreign Affairs, had sent to St. Petersburg, Nesselrode reasoned that to acknowledge the independence of revolted provinces was to "affect the most delicate of the relations which existed among nations." Further, he declared to the French ambassador, Count La Ferronnays, that if it was proved that by recognizing the independence of the Spanish colonies, one would deprive the mother country of the sole means of reëstablishing her authority in those colonies and also of the means of drawing some advantages from the title to their possessions, the result would be that in the existing conditions, no foreign government could legally announce such recognition. The Russian diplomat added:

It is possible that the Spanish Government is not able to recover its colonies. We lack the data necessary to express a definitive opinion on that subject. . . . The Emperor would consider as unjust, as inconsistent with the principles which direct the policy of the Allied Courts to wrest from the Spanish Government by an act which would at least be premature the last resources which remain to her for this great enterprise.

With regard to Chateaubriand's question whether Russia, not having colonies, would leave the decision about Spanish-American independence to France and England, Nesselrode responded that his country actually owned colonies and islands on the northwest coast of America. He reasoned that the European powers which had contended with revolts in the Old World were concerned about the future of Spanish America. It was among these Allies and with the King of Spain that this matter should be settled. Though the allied courts regretted that England wished to adopt a different policy, in this important question they should follow the same principles which they had invariably pursued. With respect to the course to be followed if Spain refused to arrange a reconciliation with her colonies and if the efforts of the allied courts failed to reëstablish her control over them, the Czar still believed that, instead of pursuing their separate interests, the Allies should remain faithful to the avowed principles upon which the peace and security of the European Continent depended.⁴¹ Though

⁴¹ Nesselrode to Pozzo di Borgo, November 25, 1823, A. R. V. P., Madrid, 1822, 9124.

dubious about the ability of Spain to recover her lost colonies, Nesselrode was nevertheless reluctant to take any step which might affect unfavorably the policy of Ferdinand VII who clung tenaciously to the hope of restoring his suzerainty over Spanish America.

The Czar's views with respect to the status of the Spanish colonies is illustrated by a letter of La Ferronnays to Paris in November, 1823, describing an interview with Alexander I in which the latter stated that he was in complete agreement with France, which was reluctant to adopt a recognition policy. Alexander I added:

The first thing to be done, in my opinion, is not to swerve from the principle. One should no more sanction a revolution in America than in Europe. It is the King of Spain alone who should decide upon his rights; but however that may be, who is able either directly or indirectly to dispute this with him? For the issue is to decline to recognize the independence of southern America or to recognize this without his sanction. Furthermore, what would one aspire to do with this America where everything is in the most frightful chaos? To acknowledge the independence of what? Of whom? Where are the chieftains? Where are the governments? Which is the party that dominates? With whom should we treat? For the result of recognizing a country is the negotiation of treaties. Does one wish to compare the situation of southern America with the revolution in North America against England? There is no analogy between them. . . . Where are the Franklins, the Washingtons, and the Jeffersons of southern America?⁴²

Near the end of October, 1823, the Czar had decided to send General Pozzo di Borgo, who was now supervising Russian legations in western Europe, to Madrid on a special mission in the expectation that he would aid in the establishment there of strong, monarchical institutions and would promote an adjustment with the revolted colonies.⁴³ Pozzo was presented to King Ferdinand VII on November 15, 1823. In an address which praised the victory that had been won over the revolutionists in Spain, the Russian diplomat expressed the hope that the Spanish King would put an end to the last

⁴² La Ferronnays to Chateaubriand, November 28, 1823, A. A. E., Russie, 165.

⁴³ Ford, "Some Original Documents on the Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine," *loc. cit.*, 404.

of the rebellions by a firmness which would prevent their recurrence and by a clemency which would cause them to be forgotten. "Such," the Russian diplomat is quoted as having said, "are the sentiments of the Emperor, my august Master."⁴⁴

On December 8, this diplomat wrote from Madrid to Nesselrode to animadvert upon the policy which had been adopted by the liberal Cortes toward the Spanish colonies. He denounced certain treaties which had been signed by its agents with the authorities in certain insurgent countries as works of "treason and iniquity." He expressed regret that Prince Polignac had held conferences with Secretary Canning about the Spanish Indies at the very time when King Ferdinand VII was in captivity. Pozzo di Borgo expressed the opinion that the dispatch by Canning of agents to Spanish America was intended to destroy the good effects upon the Royalists there of the deliverance of their King from the Liberals. This diplomat advised that before the reports of these agents concerning conditions in the revolted colonies reached London, the Allies should take action to counteract the measures of the English Government.⁴⁵

Nevertheless, on January 9, 1824, Nesselrode wrote thus to Count Bulgary, the Russian ambassador at Madrid:

From the legal point of view, without an express request from Ferdinand VII, his Allies cannot deliberate legally concerning the policy to be followed toward the countries and the peoples over which the King of Spain is the legitimate sovereign. Otherwise they would be lacking in the respect which they profess for that same Legitimacy; they would consequently discard the principles which they have proclaimed in the face of the world. Such a request is therefore absolutely necessary. Finally, the King is not ignorant that the Continental Alliance is exposing itself to the most imminent peril in order to save in Spain a cause which it rightly considers as the cause of all the monarchies, for that cause will be gravely compromised if the revolution wins a complete triumph in America.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ *Historia de la vida y reinado de Fernando VII de España* (3 vols., Madrid, 1842), III, 184-185.

⁴⁵ Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode, December 8, 1823 (No. 4), A. R. V. P., 7576.

⁴⁶ Nesselrode to Count Bulgary, January 9, 1824, No. 9027, A. R. V. P., Madrid, 1824. For the views of Count Lieven, Russian envoy at London, see T. Schiemann,

Through English journals Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, became known in St. Petersburg in the middle of January, 1824. The American minister there felt that its "decided tone" had considerable influence inimical to thoughts of Russian intervention to restore the authority of Ferdinand VII over his revolted colonies.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, in a conference at St. Petersburg in the following May between La Ferronnays and Nesselrode, the Russian diplomat was pleased upon being told that in spite of the opposition of England, the French Government would look with favor on a Spanish project to send a fleet and an army against the revolted colonies. When La Ferronnays expressed regret that the deplorable condition of the Spanish monarchy was a great obstacle to the subjugation of the colonies by Ferdinand VII, Nesselrode smilingly responded:

But why cannot his Allies aid him? And besides what could England say, or rather what could she do, if an army composed of Spaniards, Frenchmen, Russians, Prussians, and Austrians should embark upon a fleet equipped and financed by all the Allies of the Spanish King and should proceed to America in order to regain his lost rights for that monarch?⁴⁸

Influenced doubtless, as Chateaubriand had been, by fear that the outcome of forcible intervention by Continental powers in the Spanish Indies would be to leave French soldiers upon the battlefield to bear the brunt of Anglo-Saxon displeasure alone, La Ferronnays did not favor this proposal for intervention by the continental powers headed by Russia. So far as the writer is aware, the insinuating suggestion made by Nesselrode shortly after the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed that the Holy Allies should take joint action against revolutionists in the New World was the only serious proposal ever made for an agreement by the Holy Allies to restore the

Kaiser Alexander I und die Ergebnisse seiner Lebensarbeit (2 vols., Berlin, 1904-1908), I, 603-604.

⁴⁷ Henry Middleton to Adams, February 17, 1824, Department of State, National Archives, Despatches from Ministers, Russia, 10.

⁴⁸ La Ferronnays to Chateaubriand, May 14, 1824, A. A. E., Russie, 166. See further *Archivo diplomático da independencia* (6 vols., Rio de Janeiro, 1922), IV, 132-133.

authority of Ferdinand VII over Spanish America by force of arms.

Another circumstance which disturbed the Allies was the decision of the English Government in December, 1824, to negotiate treaties with Mexico, Colombia, and La Plata which would have the effect of recognizing the *de facto* governments of those states.⁴⁹ Nesselrode wrote to Pozzo di Borgo that presumably Canning would be surprised at the mild language used by Russia's ambassador in London concerning England's acknowledgment of Spanish-American independence. Expressing himself frankly to Pozzo, however, the Russian Minister said: "Without considering that it is unjust and odious, the recognition of this independence appears to be a precipitate step taken unnecessarily by the English for the sole purpose of giving a great stimulus to their mercantile interests."⁵⁰

The English policy of recognition much provoked Ferdinand VII who in consequence again consulted the Russian Court concerning an appeal to the Allies. In response Alexander I expressed the opinion that the Spanish King should solicit their mediation by suggesting that preliminary negotiations regarding the colonies should take place at Paris. At one of a series of conferences held there in 1824-1825 by the resident diplomatic agents of Austria, Prussia, and Russia with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning Spanish America, the Russian ambassador read a dispatch from his court which summarized Russian policy by exhorting them to maintain the conservative principles of the Alliance and to persist in the decision not to recognize the independence of the revolutionary governments in Spanish America, but to give Spain their moral support in her attempt to restore her authority over the revolted countries. At the same conference Pozzo di Borgo made known another dispatch in which the

⁴⁹ H. Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning* (London, 1925), 150.

⁵⁰ C. A. Villanueva, "La diplomatie française et la reconnaissance de l'indépendance de Buenos Aires, de la Colombie et du Mexique par l'Angleterre (1825)," *Bulletin de la bibliothèque américaine*, October, 1912, pp. 12-13. Similar language was used by the Czar to La Ferronnays in an audience in February, 1825. La Ferronnays to Damas, April 4, 1825, A. A. E., Russie, 164. See further F. L. Paxson, *The Independence of the South-American Republics* (Philadelphia, 1903), 248-249.

Czar invited the Allies to induce the King of Holland to refrain from acknowledging Spanish-American independence directly or indirectly.⁵¹

In December, 1825, Nicholas I became Czar of Russia. On April 18, 1826, the Russian Chancellery prepared instructions for Pozzo di Borgo which pointed out some of the changes that had recently taken place in Spanish America. In Peru the revolutionists had triumphed on the battlefield of Ayacucho, while in Mexico the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa had fallen into their hands. In both Mexico and Colombia triumphant revolutionists had taken the offensive and were threatening to attack Spanish rule in Cuba and Puerto Rico. Mexico, Argentina, and Chile had been recognized as independent nations by England. The independence of the French colony of Saint-Domingue, which had been christened Haiti, had been acknowledged by Charles X. By a treaty with Brazil, Portugal had recently conceded the independent status of that imperial colony. Furthermore, the United States, as well as England and France, was urging Spain to alter her policy toward her revolted colonies.

On May 10, 1825, Secretary of State Henry Clay had instructed the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to influence the Russian Government to induce Spain to end the hostilities with her colonies.⁵² Soon afterward the Russian cabinet informed Pozzo di Borgo in the following passage that Spain should reconsider her American policy:

It is necessary for Spain to inquire whether she possesses the means of reconquering her American provinces in whole or in part, or the means of protecting from a hostile attack or any other danger the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico, or even the means of prolonging the war with any certainty of success. All that the Emperor desires, as a friend of the King of Spain, is that this issue should be discussed in his councils with the care and the impartiality that it deserves. . . . In the explanations to be undertaken on this subject with the Spanish Government, the Emperor intends to show that in no manner does he

⁵¹ "Protocols of Conferences of Representatives of the Allied Powers respecting Spanish America, 1824-1825," *American Historical Review*, XXII, 606-607.

⁵² W. R. Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations* (3 vols., Washington, 1925), I, 244-250.

desire to forestall the decisions of Spain in regard to her colonies or to acknowledge their independence, at least so long as she has not recognized them herself; but that, as the result of a sincere friendship, he agrees to consider with care in reaching a decision her resources, her actual situation, the probable attitude of those powers that would most influence the outcome in this crisis, and under all circumstances to make a positive response to the overtures which have been made to us by the cabinet of Washington.⁵³

Further, there is reason to believe that soon afterward the Russian Government instructed its envoy to direct the attention of the government of Spain to the fact that a significant change had taken place in Spanish America; for, as the contest there had become on the part of the Motherland a defensive war, "it behooved the Court of Madrid to make such engagements as were called for by the existing state of things."⁵⁴

To a considerable extent the policy followed by the Russian Government toward the Spanish Empire from 1816-1830 was accordingly based on the doctrine of Legitimacy. It seems that the attitude of Russia toward the Spanish-American Revolution was also influenced by certain principles enunciated in the Treaty of the Holy Alliance. Russia's policy was further affected by her close relations with France, which felt restrained from acknowledging Spanish-American independence largely because of the Bourbon Family Compact of 1761. Through expositions of policy made by Russian statesmen with respect to the revolted colonies of Spain, there occasionally runs a strain of political thought which reflects the idealistic spirit of Alexander I.

It is noteworthy, however, that Russian diplomats occasionally urged upon Spain the need of modifying her colonial policy by granting a charter of privileges which would concede certain social and political reforms to the Spanish Americans. In strange contrast with this attitude, at times certain Russian statesmen favored intervention by force of arms to restore the rule of Ferdinand VII over his revolted colonies.

⁵³ "Projet de dépêche au lieutenant general Pozzo di Borgo," A. R. V. P., Paris, 1826, 9153.

⁵⁴ Granville to Canning, June 2, 1826, Public Record Office, Foreign Office, 27/350.

Though the ministers of Nicholas I advised the Spanish Government to acknowledge the independence of its colonies on the American Continent, yet their government refrained from recognizing them until after the death of Ferdinand VII when Spain herself reluctantly adopted a policy of recognition. Thus to a considerable extent the policy of Russia toward Spanish America was opportunistic as well as legitimist.

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FREDERICK DOUGLASS AND THE MISSION TO HAITI, 1889-1891

When Frederick Douglass was appointed by the Harrison Administration in 1889 as Minister Resident and Consul General to Haiti, and Chargé d'Affaires for Santo Domingo, he was approximately seventy-two years of age and the undoubted leader of the colored race in the United States.¹ In his early years natural gifts had been suppressed by slave surroundings. Later life as a freed man had won him high distinction as an orator in the abolitionist movement. Liberals on both sides of the Atlantic gave him their friendship. He viewed the Civil War with perhaps a fuller comprehension than any other man of color. His race emancipated, he championed its fight for civil rights with all the ardor of his abolition days. Following 1865, he pursued successfully a real estate business in Washington, enjoyed considerable political prestige, and under the Grant Administration accompanied Andrew D. White in his mission of reconnaissance in Santo Domingo, where he won White's esteem as the most brilliant man of color he had ever met. The appointment of Douglass to the Haitian mission was official recognition of his race in the United States and at the same time a conciliatory gesture to that race in Haiti. From the Administration's viewpoint it was an intelligent and a liberal move.

The Haiti to which Douglass was accredited had just emerged from a revolution, in which the government of "President" Légitime had been overthrown with customary violence. Légitime was a pawn of France in West Indian diplomacy. His victorious opponent, Hyppolite, was a protégé of the United States, and was indebted for success to a timely concentration of American naval strength in Haitian waters.

For the America of Harrison's Administration was not the "satiated state" of Woodrow Wilson and his successors in

¹ Approximately, because the date of his birth in slavery is only conjectured to have been 1817.

the White House. Imperialism was still a reputable word, and imperialism was perhaps the keynote of the foreign policy of Harrison and Blaine. This imperialism found major expression in Chile and Hawaii, but the acquisition of naval bases in West Indian waters was regarded as important. Behind support for Hyppolite was an informal pledge that the successful revolutionary would facilitate United States naval expansion in the Caribbean by leasing the Môle St. Nicolas, strategic key to neighboring waters.

That Douglass sympathized with these imperialistic aspirations is possibly a bit surprising, but it is a tribute to his native powers of intellect. He was shrewd enough to discern what many never do discern, that new conditions vitiate conclusions based on former data. So long as slavery persisted in the United States, Douglass opposed, or would have opposed, expansion at Black Haiti's expense. With slavery overthrown, the cardinal objection to America's expansion disappeared, and Douglass could view with a mind unbiased by a dead issue the advantages to both countries of strong naval bases in the West Indies. "Liberal" that he was, he saw no reason to oppose the basic *raison d'être* of his mission.

Presumably, therefore, the man and the hour had met. But such was not the case, and not the least interesting chapter in American foreign relations is an explanation for the essential failure of the mission. The explanation is political in part; in part subjective.

The subjective element involves consideration of Douglass' great pride of race. He realized his own prestige as the foremost man of color in his country. He was intoxicated by the hearty welcome he received in Haiti as an exemplar of what the black man can accomplish. Correspondingly, he would feel a painful jealousy of any white man who should encroach upon his just preserves. Yet precisely this occurred when Rear Admiral Bancroft Gherardi, distinguished nephew of the historian Bancroft, was commissioned to act with Douglass as co-negotiator for the Môle St. Nicolas.

From the official viewpoint, the appointment of Gherardi was as logical as that of Douglass. The Admiral represented

the service that would profit by the acquisition. He was in command of the North Atlantic fleet. He had been a pioneer in advocating acquisition of the base. Nor was he personally deficient in diplomatic aptitude. It is not hard to see why the appointment was determined on. Yet difficulties might have been foreseen. A black man of great eminence might be jealous of his own and of his race's newly won prerogatives.

A further ingredient in the picture was the relations between the new minister and the Secretary of State. That Douglass was critical of Blaine would appear from a passage in his autobiography, wherein he attributed Blaine's defeat in 1884 to the party's defection from earlier principles of liberalism: "The life of the Republican party lay in its devotion to justice, liberty and humanity. When it abandoned or slighted these great moral ideas and devoted itself to materialistic measures, it no longer appealed to the heart of the nation, but to its pocket. It became a Samson shorn of its locks. The leader in this new and downward departure of the party was the first to feel its fatal consequences. It was he, more than any other man, who defeated the policy of Grant, Conkling, Gen. Butler, and other true men, in favor of extending national protection to colored citizens in their right to vote."²

Tastes differ in heroes as in other matters. Some might not agree with Douglass as to the immaculate qualities of Conkling and General Butler. But it appears that in Douglass' catalogue of heroes James G. Blaine had a very lowly place. He admits elsewhere, however, an affection for a son of Blaine, his "good friend at the State Department," who kept him *au courant* with inner news.³

Although a lease of the Môle St. Nicolas was the prime objective of American policy in Haiti, numerous minor issues called for settlement. In these the minister proved conspicuously successful. His very arrival was timed to coincide with the inauguration of President Hyppolite,⁴ and he was directed

² *Life and Times of Frederick Douglass Written by Himself* (edition of 1892), p. 671.

³ The *Washington Post*, Aug. 11, 1891.

⁴ Haiti. Instructions, Jan. 13, 1888, to June 13, 1898. No. 2, Sept. 20, 1889.

to press persistently upon Haiti the necessity for payment upon the \$60,000 recently awarded the heirs and creditors of Charles Adrian Van Bokkelen, a preliminary payment being due almost immediately.⁵ Claims against Santo Domingo also warranted attention.⁶

Pertaining to the character of finished business, but foreshadowing a prime dissatisfaction of Douglass with his mission, was an indemnity paid by Haiti to William P. Clyde for loss of the *Ozama* and deposited for safe keeping by Douglass' predecessor with Rear Admiral Gherardi.⁷ There is but one other allusion to Clyde in either the instructions or dispatches of the mission, and it is a commentary on the inability of official documents to reproduce a situation that Douglass developed a positive hatred for Clyde and referred to him with utmost bitterness in published writings. Of the Clyde line's representative in Haiti, he wrote: "From the first this agent assumed a dictatorial attitude. . . . Between this agent and the United States Government I found myself somewhat in the position of a servant between two masters; . . . and I thought as between this agent and the United States, I chose to serve the latter."⁸

The agent was a South Carolinian, who did not readily adapt himself to man-to-man approaches to a Negro. The bitterness that he aroused is unmistakable, and a subjective interpretation must recognize Douglass' keen sense of outraged personal, racial, and national dignity.

Racial dignity was fostered by restored tranquillity in Haiti. "It is admitted," Douglass wrote, "that order and tranquillity have never been so complete in Port au Prince at the close of any revolution, as under the Provisional Government of General Hyppolite."⁹ Peace and prosperity might now be reasonably anticipated.¹⁰ With administering of the oath of office to the new man on horseback the confidence of

⁵ *Ibid.* No. 4, Sept. 26, 1889.

⁶ *Ibid.* No. 1, Santo Domingo Series, Oct. 4, 1889.

⁷ Haiti. Instructions, Jan. 13, 1888, to June 13, 1898. No. 9, Oct. 25, 1889.

⁸ *Life and Times of Frederick Douglass* (ed. of 1892), pp. 746-747.

⁹ Haiti. F. Douglass, 1889-1890. Dispatch, No. 1, Port-au-Prince, Oct. 15, 1889.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

Douglass increased further. The country seemed pervaded by a new atmosphere of hope.¹¹

In due course Douglass was officially presented to General Louis Mondestin Florvil Hyppolite, the new President, who offered generous homage to the new minister's eminence as a Negro and as an American. Douglass replied in a vein of Nineteenth Century optimism which reads sadly against the background of our world today:

"Happily, too, the spirit of the age powerfully assists in establishing a sentiment of universal brotherhood. Art, science, discovery and invention have gone forward with such speed as almost to transcend our ability to keep pace with them. Steam, electricity and enterprise are linking together all the oceans, islands, capes and continents, disclosing more and more the common interests and interdependence of nations.

"The growing commerce and intercommunication of various nationalities, so important to the dissemination of knowledge, to the enlargement of human sympathies, and to the extinction of hurtful prejudices import no menace to the autonomy of nations, but develop opportunities for the exercise of a generous spirit of forbearance and concession, favorable to peace and fraternal relations between them.

"In this beneficent tendency of our times, I assure Your Excellency that the President of the United States desires for the Republic of Haiti the fullest participation."¹²

Here is Douglass at his best. Himself the beneficiary of Nineteenth Century liberalism, he foresaw its universal extension. Every circumstance of the address fired his imagination.

To these enthusiastic overtures of Douglass, the President in part replied: "As to you, Mr. Minister, your reputation is known in the two hemispheres. You are the incarnation of the idea which Haiti is following—the moral and intellectual development of men of the African race by personal effort and mental culture."¹³

Before two months were past, the underlying motive of the mission was apparent. On December 9, 1889, Douglass

¹¹ *Ibid.* Dispatch, No. 5, Oct. 26, 1889.

¹² Haiti. F. Douglass, 1889-1890, No. 13, Nov. 18, 1889.

¹³ *Ibid.*

reported that American naval officers had been reconnoitering the Môle. Their presence, coupled with numerous items in the American press, aroused Haitians to an extreme jealousy for their national integrity. Opponents of President Hyppolite were prompt to capitalize his supposed intention to alienate a portion of the national domain. But Douglass doubted their success.¹⁴ In this he was overoptimistic, deceived in part by protocol. The genuine esteem which he enjoyed in Port-au-Prince, the numerous expressions of regard for himself and for his country, blinded him to the realities of local politics, to the danger which the new regime was certain to incur if ever it attempted to lease the Môle.¹⁵ Nor were the Haitians especially Machiavellian. They possessed the French facility for compliment. To lavish praise on one so eminently deserving it was not hypocrisy. But on basic principles of policy they must preserve free judgment.

There is some hint, meanwhile, in the official documents, of a silent duel between France and the United States respecting Haiti. On December 20, 1889, Douglass inquired of Blaine whether Haiti should be encouraged to reject the forthcoming return of the French minister, the Comte de Sesmaisons, as likely to be an instigator of counter-revolution, whom Haiti nevertheless will not reject unless fortified by American assurances.¹⁶ To which the Secretary of State pointedly replied that Haiti must decide for herself, but "It is the undoubted right of an independent State to decide whether a foreign Minister is personally acceptable. This Government has never hesitated to act on that principle."¹⁷ Sesmaisons did not return. The United States obtained this minor victory.

Interestingly enough, the minister at first spoke highly of Admiral Gherardi. In his intercourse with Douglass and with the authorities in Haiti, Gherardi observed the amenities. Douglass was perhaps flattered by the attentions of so eminent a person. Not till later was he conscious of an essential rivalry

¹⁴ Haiti. F. Douglass, 1889-1890, No. 17, Dec. 9, 1889.

¹⁵ Haiti. F. Douglass, 1889-1890, No. 18, Dec. 14, 1889. This subject is covered in the excellent study of Mr. Ludwell Lee Montague, *Haiti and the United States* (Duke University Press, 1940), *passim*.

¹⁶ Haiti. F. Douglass, 1889-1890. Telegram, Dec. 20, 1889.

¹⁷ Haiti. Instructions, 1888-1898. Telegram, Washington, Dec. 23, 1889.

in their positions. Following an exchange of courtesies between Gherardi and President Hyppolite, Douglass reported "a most wholesome effect."¹⁸ Gherardi was polite to Douglass in arranging for the latter's trip by sea to present his credentials at Santo Domingo. And Blaine expressed his pleasure, possibly his relief, at the turn affairs were taking.¹⁹

New Year's in Haiti was celebrated on the last day of the departing year, on the present occasion with unusual ceremony. And Douglass wrote approvingly to Blaine of the contribution of Gherardi and his staff to the gorgeous ceremonial.²⁰ As dean of the diplomatic corps, Douglass contributed a brief address.

Douglass was devoting himself, meanwhile, to active prosecution of his mission. Patient application to its details, coupled with a sincere desire in Haiti to please the distinguished man of color, insured him marked success, and resulted for his own part in a genuine sympathy for Haiti and its problems. There is pathos in his trust that Haitian appointments in various European capitals may be reciprocated by ministers instead of consuls "and perhaps secure men of larger sympathies than the consuls usually commissioned to this country possess."²¹

Numerous allusions to the political and economic situation in Haiti reveal an eagerness that this experiment in Negro self-government succeed. Thus of an election consuming fifteen days and attended by disorder, Douglass comments wistfully, "In the main I think that the election has been fair and that the result reached is in favor of the stability of the government and of the peace of the country."²²

On his official visit to Santo Domingo, Douglass was received with the customary exchange of compliments, though quiet dignity was substituted for military fanfare, and his presentation of credentials was not to President Heuraux but

¹⁸ Haiti. F. Douglass, 1889-1890, No. 21, Dec. 20, 1889.

¹⁹ Haiti. Instructions, 1888-1898, No. 24, Jan. 6, 1890.

²⁰ Haiti. F. Douglass, 1889-1890, No. 24, Jan. 6, 1890.

²¹ Haiti. F. Douglass, 1889-1890, No. 30, Jan. 16, 1890.

²² Haiti. F. Douglass, 1889-1890, No. 31, Jan. 17, 1890.

to the Vice-President. In various respects Douglass found Santo Domingo more liberal to foreigners than Haiti. He was pleased to note that American capital and enterprise were making headway, and that the city of Santo Domingo had doubled in population during the nineteen years since his preceding visit. Of an address before a colored church in Samaná he comments happily: "On my former visit . . . I was the grateful medium in conveying to this people a sum of money contributed on board the U. S. S. 'Tennessee' towards the erection of a church and now I was asked to address them in this same church. I found them happy in all that I could say to them of the beneficial change wrought in the condition of the colored people of the United States since 1824."²³ Politically the atmosphere was clouded by growing dissatisfaction with Heuraux.²⁴ In a sort of bread and butter letter thanking the Department for civilities extended, Douglass remarked that fifty hours on the *Dolphin* saved a week of dangerous land travel, and complimented its "gentlemanly commander Charles O'Neil."²⁵

A few days later Douglass wrote his chief a warm-hearted letter of condolence over the loss of two of his children, Mr. Walker Blaine and Mrs. Coppinger. ". . . In view of my personal knowledge and appreciation of Mr. Walker Blaine and of my official relation with him through the Department of State, his death touches me as a personal bereavement."²⁶

A characteristic forerunner of political disturbance in Haiti was fire. In February, 1890, occurred probably the worst of these since the disastrous conflagration of July, 1888. Twenty-two houses were burned near the "Palace," but Douglass reported cheerfully to Blaine that the government, while not wholly out of danger, was well qualified to cope with all existing opposition.²⁷ He failed to see apparently the menace of the fire and what it symbolized to the ultimate objectives of his mission. The government of Hyppolite would never

²³ Dominican Republic. F. Douglass, Nos. 10, 14, Feb. 11, 1890.

²⁴ Dominican Republic. F. Douglass, No. 24, May 12, 1890.

²⁵ Haiti. F. Douglass, 1889-1890, No. 32, Feb. 6, 1890.

²⁶ Haiti. F. Douglass, 1889-1890, No. 35, Feb. 15, 1890.

²⁷ *Ibid.* No. 37, Feb. 20, 1890.

dare—persistence of martial law attested that²⁸—to engage in any foreign policy affording leverage to disaffected elements.

The presence of American warships in Haiti, in March, 1890, was construed as strengthening the government. Whether by coincidence or not, Hyppolite seized the occasion for a tour through the area least reconciled to him. He took along his political rivals, "it being safer to have them under his eye than to have them left at home."²⁹ At the same time the government requested foreign representatives, Douglass among them, for lists of the nationals of each, resident in Haiti. Douglass thought it improper as well as impossible to comply. In this refusal he was sustained by the Department,³⁰ which further approved his failure to ascertain who might be the "fugitives under your protection charged with offenses against the common law during the last civil strife in the country and not covered by the amnesty." That would presuppose a judicial function with which the minister was not invested.³¹ In April, he reported that the southern trip of President Hyppolite was a success, but that discontent in Haiti was chronic.³²

One of the claims intrusted Douglass was that of the *Haitien Republic*,³³ details concerning which are of less interest than the circumstance that they were vigorously presented by Mr. Louis D. Brandeis, already launched upon a great career in law. Brandeis and Douglass failed to hit it off together, and the latter found undoubted satisfaction in disclosing to his superiors that the Boston attorney was completely misinformed in his private advices that England, France and Germany were sending a fleet to enforce their claims. Moreover any claims against the government of *Légitime* had slight validity.³⁴

A one-day visit of the *Kearsarge* in May, 1890, aroused

²⁸ Haiti. F. Douglass, No. 46, March 13, 1890.

²⁹ *Ibid.* No. 47, March 13, 1890.

³⁰ Haiti. Instructions, 1888-1898, No. 34, March 11, 1890.

³¹ Haiti. Instructions, 1888-1898, No. 38, March 27, 1890.

³² Haiti. F. Douglass, 1889-1890, No. 59, April 25, 1890.

³³ Haiti. Instructions, 1888-1898, No. 37, March 14, 1890.

³⁴ Haiti. F. Douglass, 1889-1890, No. 63, May 14, 1890. Also Haiti. Instructions, 1888-1898, No. 44, April 19, 1890.

considerable excitement among the natives,³⁵ and confirmed the government in its reluctance to yield anything to naval pressure short of a forcible seizure of Haitian territory, an action for which American opinion was considered unprepared.³⁶ Trusting in the popularity of this policy of Haiti for Haitians, the government on the very day of its formal inauguration abandoned martial law in Port-au-Prince.³⁷ Further evidence of stability and prosperity was installation of a cable connecting Port-au-Prince with the Môle St. Nicolas.³⁸ Political opponents still made capital, however, of the danger lurking in friendship for the United States.³⁹

In these concessions by the government, failure was foreshadowed for America's objectives. That Douglass perceived this may be doubted, so intoxicating were the plaudits of his hosts. Hyppolite's first annual message boasted that "for the first time the flag of one of the first Powers of the civilized world lowered (*se baisser*) with all the prescribed ceremonial before a Haitien Chief of State," and paid personal tribute to Douglass as "the illustrious champion of all men sprung from the African race, himself one of the most remarkable products of that race which we represent with pride on the American continent."⁴⁰ These compliments, undoubtedly sincere, reflected no intention to meet Haitian obligations to the land which Douglass represented. The most they indicated was a willingness to placate Douglass in matters of routine. These amenities culminated in a formal opening of the new cable, Douglass transmitting the first message: "Progress Cable completed to PortauPrince, 30 December 1890."⁴¹ To which Blaine appropriately replied: "Congratulate President Hyppolite that the two Republics are nearer together to-day than they have ever been."⁴²

This high moment climaxed the first period of the mission. Six months more and Douglass would resign. The disturbing

³⁵ Haiti. F. Douglass, 1889-1890, No. 64, May 14, 1890.

³⁶ The New York Daily Tribune, Aug. 14, 1891, p. 6, cols. 3-4.

³⁷ *Ibid.* No. 71, May 30, 1890, enclosing clippings from *Le Moniteur* of May 28th.

³⁸ *Ibid.* No. 80, June 27, 1890.

³⁹ *Ibid.* No. 80.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* No. 85, July 9, 1890.

⁴¹ Cable Message, F. Douglass to J. G. Blaine, Dec. 30, 1890.

⁴² Haiti. Instructions, 1888-1898. Telegram, Dec. 31, 1890.

factor was Gherardi. How far was he to blame? It should be remembered that he was not an afterthought. His interest in the Môle St. Nicolas antedated that of Douglass. He was placed in full control prior to Douglass' arrival.⁴³

On January 1, 1891, instructions were transmitted to both Douglass and Gherardi. Douglass was desired to "co-operate to the best of your ability in bringing about the end to which the Admiral will give all his energies," and to remember that President Harrison considered our acquisition of the Môle to be in full conformity with Haiti's interests as well as those of the United States.⁴⁴ This would seem to give Gherardi outright priority. Nevertheless the Admiral's instructions read that so far as the duties of his command permitted, he should "cooperate as special commissioner with our Minister at Port au Prince in an important diplomatic negotiation with the Government of the Republic of Hayti."⁴⁵ Constitutional limitations precluding outright purchase, a lease alone should be sufficient, "a lease which in its operation shall prove of great value to the safety and prosperity of the Haytian Republic, while it shall yield to the United States all the conveniences which its Navy may require in that portion of the West India Islands."⁴⁶

Before these instructions reached him, Douglass, on January 5, 1891, in a confidential dispatch reaffirmed his enthusiasm for the cession of the Môle and summarized a New Year's conversation with the Haitian Foreign Secretary. "Mr. Firmin had complained that the 'New York Sun' had published a statement that President Hyppolite had definitely promised the United States a coaling station at the Mole St. Nicholas [*sic*]. Mr. Firmin denied the existence of any such promise and did so with some feeling, and was at a loss to know how any such an idea should have been published. I assured him of my utter inability to explain. I knew of no ground of assurance upon which the statement was made."⁴⁷

⁴³ *Ibid.* Telegram, Blaine to Gherardi, Sept. 4, 1889.

⁴⁴ Haiti. Instructions, Blaine to Douglass, Washington, Jan. 1, 1891.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* Instructions of Blaine to Gherardi, Jan. 1, 1891.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Haiti. F. Douglass, Jan. 6-Oct. 23, 1891. Port-au-Prince, Jan. 5, 1891.

Firmin was taking the aggressive. His initial reaction proved to be the final. But Douglass made the best of opportunity. He recognized that the objections raised by Firmin were a reflection of popular opinion superstitiously united against territorial concessions.⁴⁸ Upon this reluctance of the Haitians Douglass moralized at length and disapprovingly, but the objections remained. On January 28, he and Gherardi met jointly with Hyppolite and Firmin and persuaded the executive to approve the lease, subject to approval by the legislative chambers,⁴⁹ something the executive doubtless knew to be impossible.

Reports reached Blaine from both participants in this decisive interview. Gherardi was generous in his estimate of Douglass: "Mr. Douglass is very active in his support of the measure and is sanguine in his views of the result. He takes great interest in it and has succeeded in a measure, I think, in impressing on General Hyppolite and his Minister of Foreign Affairs the importance the United States attach to these negotiations and the earnestness and persistence with which they will be carried on."⁵⁰

A week later Gherardi reported two items of further interest from this interview, one a pledge of strong support by the United States if needed to maintain the Hyppolite régime in power; two, an opinion by Douglass that "It might possibly be best to seize the Mole. This would relieve the present government of any responsibility in the matter. The Mole is now a bone of contention and a cause of revolution in this country. The question of ceding it to one country or another furnishes capital for revolutionary agitation."⁵¹ In this idea Gherardi heartily concurred and he begged permission "in case of final refusal," to take just that step. "The negotiations could then be taken up and carried through successfully based on the cession of the Mole as a 'fait accompli.'"⁵²

Gherardi's quotation of his colleague was no doubt sub-

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* Douglass to Blaine.

⁴⁹ Haiti. F. Douglass, Jan. 6-Oct. 23, 1891, No. 123, Jan. 29, 1891.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* No. 124. From Admiral Gherardi's report of Jan. 31, 1891.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* Feb. 7, 1891. Letter from Gherardi to Secretary of State.

⁵² *Ibid.*

stantially accurate, but when that colleague eventually learned that he had thus been cited his denial was angry and emphatic.

In his correspondence with Firmin, Gherardi adopted the full phraseology of American imperialism when he declared that it was incontrovertibly the "manifest destiny" of the Môle to become a naval depot for warships of the United States.⁵³

Early in February, the U. S. S. *Petrel*, *Philadelphia*, and *Kearsarge* combined in a naval demonstration, possibly ill-timed, which painfully harrowed Haitian sensibilities. Douglass sought to explain away the matter as mere practice cruising in a nautical routine of no significance.⁵⁴

Again on February 9, 1891, Gherardi and Douglass jointly interviewed Firmin. They sought removal of restrictions upon sailing vessels until their cargo consignees had paid Haitian import duties.⁵⁵ The goods alone were adequate security. To detain their vessels was outrageous. Nevertheless, it was an old Haitian custom. By its abandonment the Douglass mission won a distinct concession.

Formal written application for leasing the Môle St. Nicolas was filed on February 2, 1891. Gherardi signed alone, but with Douglass' full concurrence. Firmin betrayed embarrassment.⁵⁶ His rather puerile rejoinder demanded from Admiral Gherardi credentials more complete than those he previously presented.⁵⁷ With the Admiral's request for these Blaine instantly complied.⁵⁸ In yielding thus to the insistence of the Haitian minister, Gherardi followed the advice of Douglass who felt that compliance with punctilio would strengthen the United States' position.⁵⁹

Whatever may have been intended by Hyppolite and Firmin, domestic issues intervened. Hyppolite quit his capital on February 22 for a "triumphal" tour through Southern Haiti, accompanied by two thousand men, and his political opponents

⁵³ *Ibid.* Gherardi to Firmin, Feb. 2, 1891.

⁵⁴ Haiti. F. Douglass, Jan. 6-Oct. 23, 1891, No. 126, Feb. 9, 1891.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* No. 128, Feb. 9, 1891.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* Telegram, Gherardi to Blaine, Feb. 16, 1891.

⁵⁸ Haiti. Instructions, 1888-1898. Cipher Telegram, Feb. 18, 1891.

⁵⁹ Haiti. F. Douglass, No. 132, Feb. 18, 1891.

as hostages.⁶⁰ In his absence fire broke out, presumably political, with several hundred houses burned.⁶¹ The times were not propitious for concessions deemed humiliating.⁶²

While negotiations for the Môle were languishing, relations between Douglass and Gherardi grew steadily less cordial. Douglass fairly seethed with indignation when he learned that Gherardi had quoted him to Blaine as willing that the Môle be seized, to present a *fait accompli*. He wrote the Secretary excitedly, "... I have the honor to declare to you in terms as explicit as the usages of diplomatic correspondence will permit that what is ascribed to me by the Rear Admiral is amazingly inaccurate and in its full force and significance is calculated to do me marked and startling injustice."

More ingenuously, he added that "the erroneous statement herein complained of may have been based upon, and probably did grow out of, a merely casual remark that I made outside of official reserve and which was to the effect that if the United States should take the Môle for a coaling station, the Government of Haiti would thus be relieved from assuming a responsibility which, in view of the well known sentiments of the Haitien people on the subject, that Government might deem it unwise to assume. My remark was to this effect and no other."⁶³

There is no essential difference between the Gherardi and the Douglass versions of a statement which, proclaimed in Haiti, would destroy the case for Douglass as a superman. He was understandably annoyed at this menace to his popularity, but Gherardi's reputation for veracity is not thereby impugned.

There meanwhile was assembling at Port-au-Prince as formidable a fleet as the United States could well dispatch.⁶⁴ The *Chicago*, *Boston*, *Atlanta* and *Yorktown* had joined the *Philadelphia*, while the *Kearsarge* and the *Enterprise* were expected daily. Such a concentration could in the circumstances have only one objective, and the Haitian Government

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* No. 137, Feb. 28, 1891.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* No. 140, March 11, 1890.

⁶³ *Ibid.* No. 152, April 20, 1891.

⁶² *Ibid.* No. 148, April 4, 1891.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* No. 154, April 21, 1891.

reacted vigorously. On April 23rd, Douglass telegraphed in cipher, "Haiti has declined lease of the Môle."⁶⁵

Whatever disappointment Douglass felt at the failure of a project which had his full support, was compensated by the discomfiture of Admiral Gherardi. Some attempts in early May at renewal of negotiations were repulsed by Firmin⁶⁶ and the episode was closed. On May 9, Douglass applied for leave of absence.⁶⁷ In his own mind the mission had already terminated, though leave was sought as of July 1. That gave him opportunity while still in Haiti to witness a violent upheaval and a ruthless suppression, and to confront the problem of refugee protection in the foreign embassies.⁶⁸

Extracting wisdom from these horrors, Douglass concluded that for the barbaric conditions in the island, "The real remedy will be found when this people shall have worked their way out of the habit of irregular and violent changes of government, and shall have come to a full respect for the independence and the impartiality of their courts of justice."⁶⁹

The departing minister found satisfaction, one may suspect, in enclosing for Blaine's perusal a copy of Hyppolite's annual message, affirming that "The presence of Admiral Gherardi during more than three months in the harbor of Port au Prince, necessarily occasioned great emotion in the whole country." Fortunate it was, the President contended, that Haiti's refusal to lease the Môle was taken in good part and the episode terminated peaceably.⁷⁰

Returned to the United States, Douglass resigned his mission as of July 30, 1891.⁷¹ He straightway set about his exculpation. He was liberal with interviews for the press and as a *pièce justificatif* wrote two articles for the *North American Review* in distinctly doubtful taste. The impropriety of his

⁶⁵ Haiti. F. Douglass, Jan. 6-Oct. 23, 1891, April 23, 1891, Douglass to Blaine. Also *Ibid.* No. 156, April 23, 1891.

⁶⁶ Haiti. F. Douglass, No. 162, May 7, 1891.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* No. 165, May 9, 1891.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* No. 170, May 30, 1891, No. 172, June 17, 1891; No. 173, June 19, 1891; No. 174, June 19, 1891.

⁶⁹ Haiti. F. Douglass, Jan. 6-Oct. 23, 1891, No. 172, June 17, 1891.

⁷⁰ Haiti. F. Douglass, Jan. 6-Oct. 23, 1891, No. 179, June 27, 1891.

⁷¹ *Ibid.* Cedar Hill, Anacostia, D. C., July 30, 1891.

conduct may be deduced from the contemporary reaction of the New York *Tribune*. The *Tribune* was historically friendly to abolition and to Douglass. It gave considerable space on August 11 to his resignation as a news item.⁷² Editorial comment followed shortly, with generous estimate of his attainments and distinction, coupled with admission that his racial instincts might have militated against successful prosecution of American interests. With it all, however, "No success that he might have won there was needed as a crown to his unique career, and no failure, if failure there has been, will in any way affect the admiration to which his past entitles him."⁷³

For whatever was amiss Hyppolite was blamed. Only through American assistance was his revolt successful. To refuse the anticipated payment was dishonorable. "Well knowing that the mighty Republic would let him defy if he chose, he has taken the course best calculated to serve his present ends. We doubt if another result would have been possible no matter who represented us in the negotiations."⁷⁴

Nevertheless, the one paper in America most completely bound to Douglass by its own traditions could not stomach his decision to haul forth diplomatic secrets before the public gaze. Thereby he did himself a grave injustice. His chief grievance was that he had been a victim of race prejudice. In this he was unduly sensitive. His pique against Gherardi was unfair. The Admiral had a prior interest in the negotiation and it was entirely proper that he aid in its conclusion, and "so long as he was instructed to co-operate with the Minister no indignity was offered to Mr. Douglass."⁷⁵

When the first article appeared, the *Tribune* lost all patience with its hero and reproached him bitterly: "Nothing which was charged against Mr. Douglass approached in seriousness the just criticism to which he has exposed himself by his precipitate and unseemly haste in writing these undiplomatic papers." The conclusion was inescapable that Douglass was unfitted for the diplomatic service.⁷⁶

Certainly Douglass came dangerously near to delusions of

⁷² The New York Daily *Tribune*, Aug. 11, 1891.

⁷³ *Ibid.* Aug. 14, 1891.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* Aug. 23, 1891.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* Sept. 25, 1891.

grandeur when he informed the *Washington Post* that "President Hippolyte [*sic*] referred to me in a flattering way in two of his messages and that fact, I think, excited some jealousy here." Such a statement is curiously revealing. What follows is more rational if not less egotistical. "I accomplished more in my brief ministry there than had been achieved before in twenty years."⁷⁷

We may take leave of Douglass on his own terms. He had been socially a success in Haiti. This he had capitalized for the routine objectives of his mission. In the major issue of the *Môle* his sympathies were somewhat divided, though primarily with the United States. Forces more potent than he or Gherardi or Blaine could control withheld success. Here failure was divided, the chief brunt falling on Gherardi, who bore it far more manfully than Douglass. The inferiority complex, the superiority complex, and finally the martyr complex drove him first to resignation and then to an unwise attempt at exculpation. With the *Tribune* we may regret his faults of temperament and admire the sum of his achievement.

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⁷⁷ The *Washington Post*, Aug. 11, 1891.

TIRADENTES IN THE CONSPIRACY OF MINAS¹

By Decree No. 22,647, the Provisional Government of Brazil ordered the commemoration on April 21 of the execution of Tiradentes.² Perhaps the celebration of no other event in the history of Brazil would have met with equal approval from the Brazilian people, for today Tiradentes stands high in their affections as a precursor of their independence. Tiradentes was an army ensign who in 1788 joined with two soldiers, two priests, and a lawyer in a conspiracy to overthrow Portuguese rule. The time of the conspiracy, 1788, was just after the American Revolution and just before the French Revolution. The place was Minas Gerais, then the decayed captaincy that shortly before had been pouring its gold and diamonds into the Portuguese treasury. Minas was also the residence of some of the leading philosophers and men of letters in Brazil at the end of the eighteenth century. Because of its time and place, and because of the death of Tiradentes at the hands of the Portuguese government, the conspiracy has become a center for popular legends that cluster around it as tradition clusters in the United States around the founding fathers of the Revolution. The Tiradentes legend, if the popular tradition may be so called, passes currently among Brazilians and

¹ Almost the only source for the Conspiracy of Minas is the record of the trial of the conspirators. This has been published in full under the direction of Rodolfo Garcia by the Bibliotheca Nacional of Rio de Janeiro as *Autos da Devassa da Inconfidência Mineira* (7 vols., Rio de Janeiro, 1936-38). About half of the whole record was published in the *Arquivo do Distrito Federal* (Rio de Janeiro, 1894-98). The best account of the Conspiracy is that by Lucio José dos Santos, *A Inconfidência mineira: o papel de Tiradentes na Inconfidência mineira* (São Paulo, 1927). Of historical interest are the accounts by J. J. Norberto de Sousa e Silva, *A Conjuração mineira* (Rio de Janeiro, 1860), written from the monarchist point of view; and Eduardo Machado de Castro, "A Inconfidência mineira: narrativa popular," *Revista do Arquivo Publico Mineiro*, VI (1901), 1063-1151, written from the republican point of view.

The text used in this paper is the *Autos da Devassa da Inconfidência mineira*, referred to hereafter as *ADIM*.

² *Diario Official* (Rio de Janeiro), April 17, 1933. This decree reestablished the holiday provided by Decree No. 155-B of January 14, 1890.

sometimes is accepted as fact by writers on historical themes. Calogeras, for instance, to take at random one instance among several, saw a connection between the conspiracy and the general political notions of the period that had led to the American Revolution and were to lead to the French Revolution. He also described the conspiracy as having its origins among the intellectual élite of Minas.³

This paper will attempt only to determine what Tiradentes did in the conspiracy. For want of space, it will not attempt a judgment of his character, nor will it consider many actions that have been attributed to him by popular tradition. And yet two legendary aspects of the conspiracy must be dealt with at once before commencing a study of Tiradentes himself. First comes the question of the connection of the conspiracy with republican ideas outside Brazil. This question is important because of the extent to which Tiradentes talked of foreign support for the revolution in Brazil. Next comes the question of whether the conspiracy was the creation of literary men and philosophers. This is important, because Tiradentes was neither a philosopher nor a poet. Both these questions will be summarily treated here before moving on to consider the work of Tiradentes.

The central part of the conspiracy to which these two questions relate was, briefly, this. In Rio de Janeiro in 1788 Tiradentes met José Alvares Maciel, a young Brazilian student just back from Coimbra. Later, during Christmas week in Villa Rica, in Minas, he met with Maciel, Padre Carlos Corrêa de Toledo e Mello, and Colonel Francisco de Paula Freire de Andrade and, with them, decided to revolt. A week later, these four men were joined by Alvarenga Peixoto and Padre José da Silva e Oliveira Rollim, and the group, now six in number, discussed more plans. After the second meeting the conspirators did not meet again as a group, but spoke individually to their friends of the projected revolt.

The incident usually mentioned to show the influence of republican ideas antedates the central part of the conspiracy as just sketched. In brief, it is the story of a young Brazilian

³ João Pandiá Calogeras, *A Formação historica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1930), pp. 82-85.

student who attempted to interest Thomas Jefferson in a Brazilian revolt. Between the autumn of 1786 and the spring of 1787, José Joaquim da Maia, a student from Rio de Janeiro who was studying at Montpellier, first wrote to and later met Jefferson, then United States Minister to France, and discussed with him a Brazilian revolution. The link between Jefferson and the conspiracy is very weak. In France, da Maia had known a student from Minas, Domingos Vidal de Barbosa, who, finishing his course at Montpellier, returned to Minas. In the meantime, José Alvares Maciel, who had not known da Maia, finished his work at Coimbra and also returned to Minas. Maciel met Tiradentes in Rio en route to Minas, and, in Minas, met with the principal conspirators. Following the two meetings, the leading conspirators told a number of persons of the plot. One among them was Francisco Antonio de Oliveira Lopes, a relative of Domingos Vidal de Barbosa. Oliveira, talking one day with some men and with Barbosa, spoke of the conspiracy and Barbosa countered with what he knew of da Maia and Jefferson. When all the conspirators were arrested, Oliveira implicated Barbosa, who, in his turn, told the judges of da Maia. Thus, it is clear that Maciel was the student who was concerned with the two meetings of the conspirators; that Maciel, who had been at Coimbra, was not the student who had known da Maia, who had been at Montpellier; and that Barbosa, who had known da Maia at Montpellier, knew of the conspiracy at second hand and only after the two meetings had taken place.⁴

To clear up the question of the literary men and the conspiracy, two points must be recognized. First is the fact that for some time before 1788 the four principal poets and philosophers of Minas, Claudio Manoel da Costa, Luiz Vieira da Silva, Thomaz Antonio Gonzaga, and Ignacio José de Alva-

⁴ Santos (*op. cit.*, pp. 93-109, 228-233, 302-304) has demonstrated the absence of any causal connection between Jefferson and da Maia and the conspiracy. The account given above, like his, rests on the evidence of Barbosa and Oliveira and on the letters between da Maia and Jefferson and between Jefferson and John Jay in which he describes meeting da Maia. The Barbosa-Oliveira evidence is published in *ADIM*, I, 168-9, III, 364-9; the Jefferson correspondence (with da Maia's letters catalogued under "Vendek," his pseudonym) are in the Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress.

renga Peixoto, had been criticizing the government in Minas in essays and satires. When Alvarenga, the only one among them to attend the second meeting, brought them the news of the conspiracy, he simply furnished them one more subject of conversation. The second point is that the planning of the revolt preceded any discussion of it by the poets. They discussed the plan and speculated as to the nature of the state to be set up in Minas, but they did not originate the idea of the revolt nor make the plan for it.⁵

Thus it is clear that neither Tiradentes nor the other principal conspirators were influenced by knowledge of da Maia and Jefferson. Likewise, though allowance must be made for the fact that the conspirators knew the literary men and were generally aware of their philosophical conversations, they concluded their two meetings without the general participation of the poets and philosophers. Consequently, the whole conspiracy was not connected with the American Revolution through Jefferson, nor was the central part of it—the two meetings of the principal conspirators—the work of literary men.

But showing what the conspiracy was not still leaves Tiradentes' exact rôle to be settled. Much that has been written on his work has been colored by the opinion of the writers as to what sort of man he was, and he has been defamed and defended in almost equal measure. Lucio José dos Santos, whose book is the latest and best on the subject, attempts an estimate of his character. He does not consider Tiradentes to have been mad in the medical sense of the term. Impulsive, impetuous, impatient, given to reading his own good intentions into the actions of others: these were his faults. Belief in an ideal of a free Minas, and, perhaps, of a free Brazil; generosity in his dealings with his friends; magnanimity in his refusal to implicate others when he himself was on trial for his life: these and other qualities made him, as Santos read the evidence, no ordinary man and one worthy to be the prime

⁵ Santos, *op. cit.*, pp. 367-404. Santos was particularly concerned with destroying the thesis of Norberto de Sousa e Silva that Gonzaga was the chief of the conspiracy. Cf. Francisco Antonio de Varnhagen, *História Geral do Brasil* (3rd integral ed., 5 vols., São Paulo, N. D.), IV, 397-419, who also rejects the idea of Gonzaga's primacy.

mover in the conspiracy. Nevertheless, though Santos presents a picture of what sort of man Tiradentes may have been and considers his influence to have been paramount in the conspiracy because of his character, he does not clearly state exactly what Tiradentes did in the conspiracy.⁶

Some detail of the life of Tiradentes is needed to explain his actions and to cast a little light on his motives. He was born on November 12, 1746, in the town of São João d'El-Rei in Minas Gerais and christened Joaquim José da Silva Xavier.⁷ Though his father, a first-generation Brazilian of Portuguese ancestry, did not belong to any of the great mining or land-owning families of Minas, he had some means and, in his community, some position and prestige.⁸ The details of the first thirty-five years of Joaquim José's life are little known. He probably grew up on his father's *fazenda*. Judging from his later life, he seems to have acquired a fairly good education, probably given him by an elder brother who was a priest.⁹ He did not settle down early to any determinate profession or occupation. For a while, he was a *mascate*, or peddler,¹⁰ and, at the same time, a practitioner of dentistry. "Indeed, he drew teeth with the most subtle lightness and ornamented the mouth with new ones, made by himself, which appeared natural."¹¹ From this occupation, and perhaps because of such spectacular skill in it, he received the nickname of Tiradentes, the puller of teeth, which became so closely associated with him as to be used instead of his own name

⁶ Santos, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-170, 560-72.

⁷ Santos (*ibid.*, pp. 116-125) has a good discussion of the controversial points concerning the birth and birthplace of Tiradentes. Tiradentes was the fourth of seven children.

⁸ Santos (*op. cit.*, p. 123) infers this from his having held the post of *vereador* in the *Camara* of São José.

⁹ Machado de Castro (*loc. cit.*, *passim*), confessedly an admirer of Tiradentes, interprets all relevant incidents in his life in the light of his possessing a superior education. Santos (pp. 123-5), more moderate, infers from Tiradentes' occasional presence in literary circles in Villa Rica that he may have had enough literary education to make him acceptable there.

¹⁰ " . . . mercador ambulante. . . ." Machado de Castro, *loc. cit.*, p. 1077.

¹¹ Frei Raymundo de Pennafort, "Últimos Momentos dos Inconfidentes de 1789," *Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro*, XLIV, i (1881), 167, note 14.

even in legal documents. In these first thirty-five years, too, he produced two natural children, a son and a daughter.¹²

At the age of thirty-five, without possessing powerful family connections, and without having achieved a regular family, an occupation, or an income, he entered the army. He enlisted in 1781 in the paid regiment of dragoons of the Captaincy of Minas, of which the Governor-General of Minas was *ex-officio* commandant and colonel, and which was stationed at the capital, Villa Rica.¹³ In this work he began to make use of whatever education he had received. He went with his regiment to Rio de Janeiro and the south¹⁴ and was several times chosen for special missions.¹⁵ Not only did he win a reputation for reliability, but he was also given assignments because of a special knowledge of mineralogy.¹⁶ Nevertheless, whatever his worth as a soldier, he never rose above the rank of ensign, or *Alferes*, and mainly, it would appear, because of his lack of family influence. Having been passed over four times when promotions had been made, he became disgruntled, and, without leaving his regiment, looked elsewhere for advancement.¹⁷ Making use of his knowledge of mining, he bought the necessary licenses and some land and set up with four slaves. But the cost of getting started and the small returns from his workings prevented him from profiting from the venture.¹⁸ Failing in Minas, he decided to

¹² During his trial, he was described thus in the "Estado das familias dos reus sequestrados": "Solteiro e tem uma filha natural por nome Joaquina de menor idade que vive pobremente em companhia de sua mãe nesta villa." (*ADIM*, III, 142.) The account of the descent of the son is not clear and depends on the family traditions of his descendants. Cf. Antonio Borges Sampaio, "Genealogia do Alferes . . . Tiradentes . . .," *Rev. Arch. Pub. Min.*, IX (1904), 335-7.

¹³ Martinho de Mello e Castro, the Portuguese Minister of State at the time, described the army and militia of Minas in his instructions to Barbacena, the new Governor-General. "Instrução para o Visconde de Barbacena," *Rev. Inst. Hist. Bras.*, VI (1844), 20-4, paragraphs 45-51.

¹⁴ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 33; of Antonio Ribeiro de Avelar, *ibid.*, p. 100; of Jeronimo de Castro e Souza, *ibid.*, III, 258.

¹⁵ For his commission and other documents relating to these missions, see *Rev. Arch. Pub. Min.*, II, ii (1897), pp. 347-50.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 45-6.

¹⁸ Santos, *op. cit.*, p. 132. At one time he thought that he had discovered a bed of emeralds, which would have made his fortune; this, however, was a mistake. See a document concerning a "green stone" found by him, *Rev. Arch. Pub. Min.*, V, i-ii (1900), 162-3.

try his luck in Rio, where he knew many people because of his dentistry. He was not, however, going to carry on his dental practice.¹⁹ Rather, he had two schemes in mind, one to build warehouses of which the city was in need, and the other to conduct water into the city to operate mills.²⁰ By these schemes he hoped to make much money, but he soon saw the impossibility of succeeding with only his limited capital.

In 1788, Tiradentes, by then forty-three years old, had tried a number of plans to acquire wealth and independence. Each had failed and left him a neglected ensign in a Minas regiment. More than ever disgruntled, he now began to rail against the governor of Minas, Cunha e Menezes, basing his formless complaints on what he thought to be the governor's animosity to him. He thought the governor had prevented his success; this opinion he did not keep to himself, but spoke openly of it to several persons.²¹

In July or August of 1788, when he was in Rio, he heard that José Alvares Maciel²² was in town, just off the ship from Europe. He had been studying in Coimbra and, on finishing his course, had gone on through France and England to notice the industrial and political condition of those countries. He was the brother-in-law of Francisco de Paula Freire de Andrade, the lieutenant-colonel of Tiradentes' regiment, and Tiradentes went to pay him a courtesy call. Maciel spoke of what he had seen in Europe, and Tiradentes, his grievances in mind, listened. He for one, he said, complained against bad government. Maciel, the returned traveller, said that in the foreign countries where he had been, people wondered at the Brazilians' not having followed the example of the British colonies in North America.²³

On the way from Rio back to Minas to rejoin his regiment,

¹⁹ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 33.

²⁰ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 37; cf. "Registo de uma Petição do Alf.ºs Joaquim José da Silva X.ºr," [June 19, 1788], *Arch. Dist. Fed.*, III, 511-2.

²¹ Testimony of Mathias Sanches Brandão, *ADIM*, I, 271-2; of Antonio de Affonseca Pestana, I, 122-3; III, 456.

²² For his life, see Santos, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-8; and *Rev. Arch. Pub. Min.*, XIV (1909), 469-74.

²³ "... entrou o respondente a lembrar-se da independencia, que este paiz podia ter, entrou a desejar-a e ultimamente a cuidar no modo por que poderia isso effectuar-se. . . ." Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 47; of Maciel, IV, 396.

Tiradentes stopped one night at a *fazenda*. He complained bitterly to his host of the governor of Minas. Cunha e Menezes had now been succeeded by the Visconde de Barbacena, but this made no difference to Tiradentes. Passing from his attack on the governor, he went on to say that foreign powers marvelled that Brazil had not withdrawn from Portuguese subjection. His host, comfortably settled, a large landowner and a colonel of militia, shook his head. "When I am in this valley," he quoted, "the next seems greener."²⁴ A day or so later, stopping en route at the house of a young priest, Tiradentes again complained of the government and said that he considered a revolution feasible if foreign aid could be found. But his second listener was no lover of rebellion and civil uproar. Tiradentes, he thought, did not know the whole danger in a scheme of revolt and suggested that he stop talking of it, as it might be bad for him.²⁵

Not at all discouraged, Tiradentes continued after he reached Villa Rica to think of Brazil as independent. When Maciel arrived from Rio, he talked further with him and suggested that Maciel speak to his brother-in-law, Freire de Andrade. By the time that Tiradentes went himself to speak with Freire, a change had occurred in his thinking. Heretofore he had spoken simply of foreign support for a revolt in Brazil. Now, speaking to his colonel, young, fortunate, and with a most promising future, he altered the line of his thought. In Rio, he said, was a revolutionary party that, to proclaim a revolt against Portugal, needed only to know which side Freire would take. Freire, hearing Tiradentes speak, assumed an air of surprise, but said nothing one way or the other.²⁶

Then one evening in Christmas week of 1788, Tiradentes passed by Freire's house. He found Freire closeted with Maciel and with the vicar of Villa de São José, Padre Carlos Corrêa, and, taking advantage of the occasion, they all began to talk about a revolution. As they saw the state of Brazil,

²⁴ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 47; of José Ayres Gomes, I, 206-9.

²⁵ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 47-8; of Padre Manoel Rodrigues da Costa, I, 154-6.

²⁶ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 48. Neither Maciel nor Freire refers to this episode.

a revolution would be entirely justified by the tyrannous rule of Portugal.²⁷ The immediate excuse for a rising lay ready at hand in the knowledge, widely spread among the people of Minas, that Barbacena, the new governor, was coming with orders to collect the *derrama*, or back-taxes on gold. No excuse could have been better. Minas, once the greatest gold-producing region of the colony, had been paying enormous sums in taxes to the royal treasury. Though the output of the mines had lessened, the government made no effort to accommodate the taxation of gold to the decrease in production. Shortly the arrears began to pile up, so that by 1788 Minas owed five hundred and twenty-eight *arrobas* of gold in back-taxes.²⁸ Relying on the dismay caused by the threat of the *derrama*, the four men agreed to revolt.²⁹

Within the next few days after this first meeting, Tiradentes spoke to a number of persons in Villa Rica, some of whom were interested and others of whom sent him about his business. He sought out two officers of the militia^{29a} and approached, though without success, the bookkeeper of a government contractor.³⁰ He also spoke to a surgeon whom he thought to have friends in Rio, in order to get from him letters of introduction to persons of consequence in the capital.³¹ While Tiradentes was going about, Freire was also active in interesting some of his friends, and spoke, among others, to the poet, Ignacio José de Alvarenga Peixoto. Alvarenga did

²⁷ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 48; of Padre Corrêa, IV, 169.

²⁸ The *arroba* is a weight of a little more than thirty pounds. The history of gold mining and taxation in Minas may be studied in two documents written about the time of the Conspiracy. One is by José João Teixeira Coelho, a Portuguese official, who wrote in 1780 an "Instrução para o Governo da Capitania de Minas Geraes" (*Rev. Arch. Pub. Min.*, VIII, 1903). The other is the instruction of Mello e Castro to Barbacena, cited above in footnote 13. Both of these, and Teixeira Coelho especially, give much material on the general state of Minas in the second half of the eighteenth century. In addition, use may be made of the classic work on Brazilian gold, W. L. von Eschwege, *Pluto Brasiliensis* (Berlin, 1833). A good outline of the subject may be found in Santos, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-45.

²⁹ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 48; of Padre Corrêa, IV, 169.

^{29a} Testimony of Antonio de Affonseca Pestana, *ADIM*, I, 122-3; of José de Vasconcellos Parada de Souza, I, 126-7; of José Antonio de Mello, I, 135.

³⁰ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 53; of Vicente Vieira da Motta, I, 108-10.

³¹ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 53; of Salvador Carvalho do Amaral Gurgel, II, 190-1.

not think well of the scheme or of Tiradentes. "A madman, yes, but he speaks with much warmth in the matter . . .," said Freire at one time,³² and offered to send Tiradentes to Alvarenga "if only to see how inflamed he was in the matter."³³ Finally Alvarenga assented, but when he met Tiradentes he found him only homely and frightened, and talked but a short time with him.³⁴ But Alvarenga carried the impression that he had gained from Freire and Tiradentes to three of his friends, Claudio Manoel da Costa, Thomaz Antonio Gonzaga, and Canon Luiz Vieira da Silva.³⁵ These men, with Alvarenga the intellectual leaders of Minas, soon were discussing the scheme with interest. When Tiradentes went to speak to Claudio, Claudio listened, but later told Alvarenga that at the time he thought Tiradentes a blockhead.³⁶

On a cold and rainy night in January, Tiradentes again met the original group at Freire's: Freire himself, Padre Corrêa, and Maciel. Shortly a second priest came by, Padre Rollim, a particular friend of Tiradentes and invited by him into the conspiracy;³⁷ and, when the rain had ceased, Alvarenga, who had been expressly summoned.³⁸ These men were not irresponsible youths. Two were priests, one aged forty-one and the other fifty-nine. Alvarenga at forty-five had been a judge and was now a colonel of militia and a man of means. Freire at thirty-two had large land-holdings and had before him a promising career in the army. Maciel, the youngest, at twenty-eight was a graduate of Coimbra.³⁹ Of all of them,

³² Testimony of Alvarenga, *ADIM*, IV, 142.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

³⁵ The testimony of these men appears in *ADIM*, IV. Santos has a good treatment of them, pp. 234-78 (Costa); 279-96 (Gonzaga); 297-301 (Vieira).

³⁶ Testimony of Alvarenga, *ADIM*, IV, 140. The *ADIM* text reads "tlapido." The text in the *Arch. Dist. Fed.* reads this as "Tapado," as does Santos (*op. cit.*, 209).

³⁷ Freire was the first to speak to Rollim of the plot; a few days later Tiradentes himself broached the subject. Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 49; of Rollim, IV, 411.

³⁸ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 49; of Rollim, IV, 415; of Corrêa, IV, 169-70; of Alvarenga, IV, 144; of Freire, IV, 207. Corrêa wrote the note summoning Alvarenga; it was found among Alvarenga's papers. *ADIM*, I, 81. Freire when on trial glossed over the two meetings held at his house and belittled the whole affair as "mais tresvario, que reflexoins serias." (*ADIM*, I, 54.)

³⁹ The whole conspiracy was a remarkably middle-aged affair. The average age

Tiradentes, at forty-one, was the poorest and had only his army pay to live on.

To the meeting Tiradentes brought one great argument. He said categorically that there was a feeling of unrest among the inhabitants of Rio and that a revolt was imminent there. If an uprising took place in Minas it would be sure to gain support from the disaffected persons in Rio.⁴⁰ Perhaps encouraged by this talk, the conspirators proceeded to discuss the revolt. Hostilities were to begin in Villa Rica, the capital, on the announcement of the levying of the *derrama* by the Visconde de Barbacena. Certain of the conspirators were to make ready a supply of gunpowder.⁴¹ At a given watchword, Tiradentes, who demanded for himself "the main rôle and the greatest risk,"⁴² was to appear in the streets of Villa Rica with a few followers and arouse the inhabitants with cries of "Viva a liberdade!"⁴³ Freire de Andrade was to call out the troops under his command, ostensibly to suppress the uprising, but really to join forces with the supposedly aroused populace.⁴⁴ The capital safely launched in sedition, Tiradentes would set out and capture the Visconde de Barbacena at his country place near by. Exactly what was to be done with him was a difficult matter to decide. At first it was thought wise to kill him, but it was decided to put him and his family outside the Captaincy to find their way to Portugal, there to say "that here [in Minas] Governors were not liked."⁴⁵

The republic that would be set up in Minas following the of 18 witnesses who had been informed of the plot was about 48, with extremes of 24 and 65.

⁴⁰ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 49-50; of Alvarenga, IV, 144; of Corrêa, IV, 172-3. Tiradentes made so much of this that Freire suggested starting the revolt in Rio; testimony of Corrêa, IV, 72-3. Alvarenga spoke as if he assumed that the revolt would start in Rio and so set an example for Minas; testimony of Alvarenga, IV, 144.

⁴¹ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 51; of Corrêa, IV, 170; of Rollim, IV, 415; of Alvarenga, IV, 145.

⁴² Testimony of Corrêa, *ADIM*, IV, 170; of Maciel, IV, 398.

⁴³ Testimony of Alvarenga, *ADIM*, IV, 144.

⁴⁴ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 49; of Corrêa, IV, 170; of Rollim, IV, 415; of Alvarenga, IV, 144; Freire, IV, 217, who claimed that he would speak to the populace, but do nothing more.

⁴⁵ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 50-1; of Corrêa, IV, 172-3; of Rollim, IV, 415-6; of Alvarenga, IV, 144-5; of Freire, IV, 212, 217.

revolt was conceived mainly as an instrument of expediency. Maciel was to set up a powder factory to supplement the stores of gunpowder accumulated for the revolt and, later, factories for other articles.⁴⁶ The republic was to have a flag. Tiradentes wanted a design of three triangles to symbolize the Trinity, but Alvarenga, more "enlightened," suggested a representation encircled with a motto from Virgil, of an Indian breaking his chains.⁴⁷ The discussion of the revolt and the republic turned to the question of the nature of the population in Minas. The very large number of slaves Alvarenga suggested setting free, as a move in accordance with the spirit of the revolt and one calculated to win the support of the slaves for the republic. Maciel very sensibly objected to this, whatever may have been the philosophical symmetry of universal emancipation, on the grounds that such a liberation would deprive the mines and the projected factories of labor and cripple the new state in its infancy.⁴⁸ Whether the Portuguese inhabitants of Minas would support or attack the republic no one knew. Padre Corrêa suggested killing off all loyalists in Minas to prevent their impeding the success of the republic, but this plan Alvarenga cried down as impious.⁴⁹

Following this second meeting, the group broke up and did not meet again as a group. Further discussion of the plans for the republic was carried on by Alvarenga, Padre Corrêa, and Padre Rollim. Alvarenga and the literary men conversed as before in an academic manner and seldom touched on practical matters. The two priests, each in his own circle of friends, thought less about the classics than did the literary men and gave more attention to the form and action of the projected government. In addition, both priests went about trying to draw people to the support of the revolution.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 51; of Alvarenga, IV, 145.

⁴⁷ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 52; of Alvarenga, IV, 147; of Corrêa, IV, 170; of Freire, IV, 218; of Maciel (IV, 398-9), who said "... aindaque elle Respondente não está muito certo nos projectos do dito Alferes, porque provocaram mais o riso do que a contemplação seria;"

⁴⁸ Testimony of Maciel, *ADIM*, IV, 397-8. It is interesting to note that Padre Corrêa thought that Maciel had sat by and listened but had said nothing; testimony of Corrêa, IV, 170.

⁴⁹ Testimony of Maciel, *ADIM*, IV, 398.

⁵⁰ Cf. testimony of Alvarenga, *ADIM*, IV, 146-54; of Rollim, IV, 417-31; of Corrêa, IV, 171-201; of Domingos Abreu Vieira, I, 91-6; of Gonzaga, IV, 247-85.

Tiradentes took no part in the discussion of abstract political science. With his interest in the revolt itself, he went into groups of people in Villa Rica to stir up feeling for the revolt. In one such group, he broke out into a complaint against the government and was cautioned by his hearers, who anticipated some ill consequence. He cried out: "If all were of my spirit; but that is in the hand of God. . . ." ⁵¹ Another time, in a shop under the house of a former government contractor, he exhibited a list that he had made of the population of Minas and reiterated his complaint against the governor.

Look here [he said], you have all these people under the lash of one man, and we stand around and cry like the blacks, Ay! Ay! Every three years a governor comes and carries off a million and his servants carry off that much again. How are the poor sons of America to get along? If they were another nation they would have revolted already.

When someone present expressed wonder that he should speak so freely of revolt, Tiradentes answered, full of passion, that he did not mean to revolt, but to restore, and repeated his words several times. ⁵²

So it went in Villa Rica. Claudio Manoel da Costa even changed his opinion of Tiradentes, and said: "In Minas there was no one worth anything . . . only Tiradentes, who was going about like the wind; but they would cut off his head yet." ⁵³

By March of 1788, however, Tiradentes seemed disgusted with the people of Minas for their want of response, and, when word came concerning his waterworks scheme in Rio, he decided to go down to Rio at once. ⁵⁴ First he went to Cachoeira do Campo to obtain leave of absence from Barbacena, commander-in-chief of his regiment. ⁵⁵ There he chanced to meet Alvarenga and told him that he was off ". . . to see in

Testimony of others may be found, *passim*, in *ADIM*, or in summary in Santos, *passim*, under names of witnesses.

⁵¹ Testimony (*denuncia*) of Bazilio Brito Malheiro do Lago, *ADIM*, I, 23.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 29-30.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁵⁴ Testimony of José Antonio de Mello, *ADIM*, I, 135. There was no secret about Tiradentes' projects in Rio, for references to them are frequent in the testimony of witnesses.

⁵⁵ Tiradentes was so little provided with money that he had to borrow one hundred milreis from his friend, Domingos de Abreu Vieira, for the journey. Testimony of Abreu Vieira, *ADIM*, I, 94.

what state were those succors from France with which it was hoped to make the republic in Rio de Janeiro first."⁵⁶ At Cachoeira he also met a former government contractor, Silverio dos Reis, known to be heavily in debt to the crown, and spoke to him of the revolt.⁵⁷ Unknown to Tiradentes, Silverio had already been invited into the conspiracy by another of the plotters, and he was even then deciding to bargain with the governor-general and to exchange his knowledge of the revolt for a pardon from his debts.⁵⁸ Silverio listened but said little and Tiradentes rode off to Rio unaware that shortly Barbacena was to know all about the plot.⁵⁹

As he went down the road to Rio, Tiradentes talked to more persons about the conspiracy. Now he spoke as if the revolt were assured. Meeting a drover, he said that salt and gunpowder would be good loads to carry to Minas.⁶⁰ Falling in with a surveyor, he told him about the revolt, and, when eating at an inn, drank with him to the health of the new government.⁶¹ Going even further than this, he assured a captain of militia cavalry that on the levying of the *derrama* revolts would break out in Rio, Baía, Pernambuco, Pará, Matto Grosso, and elsewhere. Success was assured, because he claimed that the conspirators already had France and England in their favor.⁶² Certainly he made no secret of the conspiracy nor sought to bind his hearers to secrecy. The drover spoke of the man who had told him to carry gunpowder to Minas;⁶³ the soldier discussed with others what he had

⁵⁶ Testimony of Alvarenga, *ADIM*, IV, 147-8. Tiradentes does not mention this incident.

⁵⁷ Testimony of José Lourenço Pereira, *ADIM*, III, 396-7; of Patricio Pereira, III, 482-3.

⁵⁸ Cf. a document concerning Silverio's intentions, *Rev. Inst. Hist. Bras.*, LV, i (1892), 403.

⁵⁹ Denunciation by Silverio dos Reis, *ADIM*, I, 6-10. Silverio first spoke to Barbacena about the conspiracy and then put his statement into writing on April 11. He handed it to Barbacena on April 19.

⁶⁰ Testimony of Domingos Pires, *ADIM*, I, 230-1.

⁶¹ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 54, 59; of Antonio de Oliveira Lopes, II, 233-40; III, 359-60; of João da Costa Rodrigues, I, 186-7.

⁶² Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 54; of João Dias da Motta, I, 130.

⁶³ Testimony of José de Vasconcellos Parada e Souza, *ADIM*, I, 126-7; of Joaquim de Lima e Mello, I, 133-4; José Vicente de Moraes Sarmiento, I, 137; of Domingos José de Souza, III, 419; of Manoel Luis Pereira, III, 261, who quotes

heard;⁶⁴ and the innkeeper passed on the news of the toast to the new republic.⁶⁵

In Rio, having left this wake of surprise and speculation behind him, Tiradentes continued to speak publicly of the intended revolt. He spoke to several soldiers, but aroused little interest among them, and even made them hostile and suspicious.⁶⁶ He carried with him at times two books on the constitutional laws of North America, one in French and one in English, and asked acquaintances to translate passages for him.⁶⁷ Not discouraged by his cool reception, he continued his talk while trying to find out about his scheme for waterworks. Once, when he went to the Opera House, he was hissed. People asked why the disturbance, and were told that this was a man "who was to make America happy, and this city as well, at which everybody laughed."⁶⁸ Many people thus put him down for crazy, and many joked with him on his passion, while one or two baited him on his ideas for amusement.⁶⁹

Tiradentes had reached Rio on March 25. On April 19, Silverio dos Reis formally denounced the conspiracy to the Visconde de Barbacena. Then he was sent to Rio by Barbacena to inform the Viceroy, Vasconcellos e Souza, of the plot.⁷⁰ Vasconcellos, alarmed, prepared many cells in the various prisons of Rio and, having appointed a *Devassa*, or

Domingos Pires, who says of other drovers that "iam rindo, e mofando . . ." and "estavam fazendo zombaria de um doido, que era o Alferes de patrulha. . ."

⁶⁴ Cf. testimony of Theotônio Maurício de Miranda, *ADIM*, I, 174; of João Francisco Telles, I, 293.

⁶⁵ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 54; of João Dias da Motta, I, 130.

⁶⁶ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 54-5; of Francisco Xavier Machado, I, 142-3; of João José Nunes Carneiro, III, 240-2, 255-7; of Pedro de Oliveira e Silva, I, 266-70.

⁶⁷ No precise titles were ever quoted from these volumes. Testimony of Francisco Xavier Machado, *ADIM*, I, 142-3, 261-6.

⁶⁸ Testimony of José Joaquim da Rocha, *ADIM*, III, 329. This witness thought that the remark applied to Tiradentes' waterworks scheme in Rio, but could not be sure.

⁶⁹ Cf. testimony of Francisco Xavier Machado, *ADIM*, I, 142-3; and of João José Nunes Carneiro, III, 240-2, 255-7.

⁷⁰ "Offício do Visconde de Barbacena dando conta para o corte de haverem abortado os planos de Tiradentes," *Rev. Inst. Hist. Bras.*, XL, i (1877), 168; "Registro da carta do Exmo. Snr. General sobre a suspensão da derrama," *Rev. Arch. Pub. Min.*, VII (1902), 979-80.

court of inquiry, cast about in his city for Tiradentes.⁷¹ Tiradentes, hearing that he was wanted and finding the city too well guarded for him to escape, changed his lodgings secretly in the night. The Viceroy, through Silverio who acted as his spy, shortly discovered the hiding place.⁷² Tiradentes, hearing the tramp of the Viceroy's soldiers in the quiet of the Sunday night of May 16, snatched up a blunderbuss to defend himself, but, on second thought, he laid it down, and when summoned by the officer of the squad, surrendered without the least resistance.⁷³ With his arrest in Rio and that of the other conspirators in Minas, the conspiracy proper comes to an end.

In his first three interrogations before the *Devassa* in Rio, Tiradentes simply denied knowing anything of the conspiracy except what was generally known.⁷⁴ By January 18, 1790, the judges had interrogated all the principal conspirators except Padre Rollim and had the main lines of the conspiracy fairly clear.⁷⁵ Tiradentes, seeing that further denial was useless, confessed his part. Being disgruntled by his neglect in his regiment, he had met Maciel in Rio with a mind disposed to complaint. He had thought of a revolt and had sounded out people on the way back to Minas. In Villa Rica he had talked to more people and had joined with the other conspirators. Both on the road to Rio and in Rio itself he had continued to talk of revolt.⁷⁶ His confession on January 18, though full, left some points not clear to the judges and he was interrogated seven more times.⁷⁷ Out of his recapitulation of his

⁷¹ "Correspondencia oficial do V. R. Luiz de Vasconcellos a cerca da conjuração que teve lugar na capitania de Minas Geraes no anno de 1789," *Rev. Inst. Hist. Bras.*, XXXII, i (1869), 263-84. Vasconcellos and Barbacena were both criticized by the Portuguese government for their handling of the Conspiracy and their letters and reports, consequently, generally show them to be on the defensive concerning the steps that they took.

⁷² "Informação de Joaquim Silverio sobre o Padre que sabia onde estava o Tiradentes e que deu lugar a que este fosse preso," *Arch. Dist. Fed.*, I, 382-3.

⁷³ Cf. "Auto de exame feito em um bacamarte, que se achou ao Alferes Joaquim José da Silva Xavier," *ADIM*, IV, 441-2.

⁷⁴ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 29-44.

⁷⁵ Maciel confessed his part on November 20, 1789; Padre Corrêa on November 14-17, 1789; and Alvarenga on November 11, 1790.

⁷⁶ Testimony of Tiradentes, *ADIM*, IV, 44-57.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 58-99.

actions, two points emerged quite clearly. One was that he considered himself the sole mover and the most ardent partisan of the revolt, and that he wished the judges to treat him as such. The second was that he had fabricated the reports of foreign aid to make the revolt appear more likely to succeed and in order to attract people to the revolt. There was, indeed, no basis for his remarks about aid coming from overseas to support a general Brazilian revolt or coming from Rio to help a revolt in Minas.

When the *Alçada*, or sentencing court, came to sum up its case against the conspirators, the counsel for the defense did what he could to excuse the prisoners.⁷⁸ As far as Tiradentes himself was concerned, it was admitted that he had spoken with great freedom of the revolt. At the same time, and despite his claims to have been the prime mover in the revolt, the counsel represented him as a person with a reputation for madness and small judgment, and possessed of a loose and reckless tongue. All this, combined with his poverty, had prevented anyone from taking seriously his ideas, good or bad, thought out or flighty. Being thus generally considered unimportant and irresponsible, banishment would be a sufficient punishment.⁷⁹ The *Alçada* thought otherwise, and condemned to death Tiradentes and nine of those whom it considered the principal conspirators.⁸⁰

When the heavy death sentence was read, Tiradentes was one of the most self-possessed of the prisoners, and reiterated his claim to be the most important among them:

I am the cause of the death of these men [he said]. I wish I had ten more lives and could give them for all of them. If God will hear me, I alone shall die and not they.⁸¹

Later, when the court issued its final commuted sentence⁸²

⁷⁸ The defense appears in *ADIM*, VII, 203-12.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

⁸⁰ The sentence of the *Alçada* appears in *ADIM*, VII, 145-97.

⁸¹ "Memoria do Exito da Conjuração que teve em 1789," *Rev. Inst. Hist. Bras.*, XLIV, i (1881), 146. This anonymous account and the Pennaforte "Ultimos Momentos . . ." are the sources for the details of the last days and execution of Tiradentes.

⁸² The Portuguese government made use of the long trial to impress the people of Rio with the power of the government, with the danger to the state from the

and did indeed name him as the chief of the conspirators,⁸³ he seemed perfectly happy. While the other prisoners rejoiced in the banishment to Africa that for them replaced death in Brazil, he remained bound hand and foot.

He witnessed the so unexpected metamorphosis but, as courageous as contrite, he said to the Father Superior who sought to comfort him: "I shall now die full of joy, because I shall not take with me so many unhappy men whom I have led astray."⁸⁴

And die alone he did, on a bright Sunday morning, April 21 of 1792, in a simple white shift contrasting with the splendid holiday uniforms that were scattered through the enormous crowd moving restlessly about the scaffold.⁸⁵

In summing up the rôle of Tiradentes in the conspiracy, these points emerge. He began to complain against the governor Cunha e Menezes at the time of the failure of his military career, his gold-mining scheme, and his waterworks scheme. When Barbacena was appointed governor of Minas, Tiradentes transferred his resentment to him. Thus, his dislike of the government preceded the conspiracy proper. When he heard of the affairs of Europe from Maciel, he built up the idea of the desirability of foreign support for a Brazilian revolution and later spoke of this foreign support as a certain thing. Later, when he spoke to Freire and to the principal

conspiracy, and with the clemency of the queen, D. Maria I. The trial may be said to begin with the appointment of the *Devassa* in Rio in May of 1789 and to last until the execution of Tiradentes in April of 1792. During this time almost one hundred persons were interrogated by the *Devassa*, many of them several times. On October 15, 1790, the queen sent an order to the judges for them to execute only the leader or leaders of the conspiracy. Even so, it was not until April 18, 1792, that the *Alçada* signed its sentence. In the first sentence, they condemned to death ten men, including Tiradentes, and, then, to make plain the queen's clemency, commuted all the sentences except that of Tiradentes to banishment. All the documents for the conclusion of the case are in *ADIM*, VII, *passim*.

⁸³ *ADIM*, VII, 225-7; "Correspondencia da Corte de Portugal com o Brasil, 1780-1784," *Rev. Inst. Hist. Bras.*, XXXVII, i (1874), 18-20.

⁸⁴ "Últimos Momentos . . .," p. 179.

⁸⁵ The Viceroy intended to give Rio as much of a show as possible to exhibit the clemency and piety of the queen in reducing the death list. Cf. "Ceremonias religiosas em regosio de se ter descoberta a conjuração," *ADIM*, VI, 407-8; "Festas mandadas fazer . . .," *Rev. Arch. Pub. Min.*, VI, ii (1901), 638-40; "Últimos Momentos . . .," pp. 180-5; "Memoria do Exito . . .," pp. 154-8; "Correspondencia official do V. R. Luiz de Vasconcellos . . .," pp. 263-84.

conspirators, he converted the idea of foreign support into one of a revolutionary party in Rio de Janeiro, thus changing the general notion of foreign support for a Brazilian revolution into support near at hand for a revolt in Minas. As he later admitted, this talk of foreign support, whether from overseas or from Rio, was fabricated to attract followers to the revolt. In the second meeting of the conspirators, he again asserted the presence of the revolutionary party in Rio. In the two meetings that make up the heart of the conspiracy, his interest lay in the revolt that was to overthrow the Portuguese government in Brazil, and not, so far as the evidence shows, in the sort of government that was to be set up after the revolt. After the two meetings, he continued to speak of the revolt rather than of the subsequent government. His carrying around volumes on the laws of North America is no proof of a further interest in the government, for one was in French and one in English, neither of which languages he could read. In prison and on the scaffold, his behavior was both magnanimous and generous, and contributes much to make his name a legend in Brazilian history.

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DOCUMENTS

SIMÓN BOLÍVAR AND NEUTRAL RIGHTS

The following letters were sent by Bolívar to Baptis Irvine, Special Agent of the United States, during the course of their negotiations at Angostura in 1818 and 1819. This correspondence is now to be found in the archives of the State Department, imbedded in a volume in the Special Agents Series entitled *Cursory Notes on Venezuela*—Irvine's final report to the Secretary of State. The value of this historical nugget, comprising some four hundred and sixty closely written folio pages, has been recognized,¹ but its contents have not been exploited.*

Baptis Irvine was a Baltimore journalist with a vast enthusiasm for Liberty and a turbulent political past. By pulling the proper wires, he managed to have himself appointed as Special Agent to Venezuela.² John Quincy Adams, who later described him as "a fanatic of liberty for the whole human race—honest but with a brain always in a snarl,"³ instructed him on January 31, 1818, to report on the progress of the revolution in Venezuela, and on certain American merchant ships condemned by a Venezuelan Admiralty Court because of an alleged breach of blockade.⁴

After some fairly friendly preliminary diplomatic skirmishing, Irvine realized that Bolívar did not intend to restore the ships. The Liberator, likewise, came to see that Irvine's mission did not mean that the United States government had decided to modify its neutral position. There followed a rising bitterness and mutual recrimination which resulted in a breakdown of the negotiations.

But these letters are not merely the unlovely remains of a nasty squabble. They constitute a significant record of Bolívar's arguments and theories on the question of neutral rights and duties. Much has been written and surmised concerning the Liberator's *international ideals*. These letters set forth his practice and principles of *international law* when he was confronted with a specific case.

LEWIS HANKE.

The Hispanic Foundation,
The Library of Congress.

¹ W. S. Robertson in *Am. Hist. Ass., Report*, 1907, I, 444, 452, 458.

² *Memoirs of J. Q. Adams*, V, 57.

³ *Ibid.*, IV, 444.

⁴ U. S. State Dept. Archives, *Despatches to Consuls*, Vol. II, 94-100.

* This is the second publication of the Bolívar-Irvine letters. They were first published on the 150th anniversary of Bolívar's birth. Academia Nacional de la Historia, Caracas. *Boletín*, XVI, No. 62 (April-July, 1933), 190-215. Ed.

Señor Agente

Angostura 29 de Julio de 1818, 8°

Tengo el honor de acusar la recepcion de las dos notas del 25, y 27 del corriente, que antes de ayer se sirvió V. S^a. poner en mis manos.

La primera no puede ser contestada de un modo formal y razonado sin consultar antes el proceso seguido para la condena de las Goletas mercantes Tigre y Libertad pertenecientes á los Ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos del Norte, Peabody, Tucker y Coulter. Solo me atreveré por ahora á adelantar á la consideracion de V. S^a. las siguientes observaciones relativas á la segunda nota.

Los Ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos, dueños de las Goletas Tigre y Libertad, recibirán las indemnizaciones, que por el órgano de V. S^a. piden por el daño que recibieron en sus intereses, siempre que V. S^a. no quede plenamente convencido de la justicia, con que hemos apresado los buques en cuestión. Tengo demasiada buena opinion del carácter elevado de V. S^a., para no referirme en todo al juicio que debe formar V. S^a. en su consciencia de nuestro procedimiento con los Ciudadanos Americanos, que olvidando lo que se debe á la fraternidad, á la amistad y á los principios liberales que seguimos, han intentado y executado burlar el bloqueo y el sitio de las plazas de Guayana y Angostura, para dar armas á unos verdugos y para alimentar unos tigres, que por tres siglos han derramado la mayor parte de la sangre Americana, ¡la sangre de sus propios hermanos! Yo siento con V. S^a. un sumo placer esperando que este sea el primero y el último punto de discusion que haya entre ambas Repúblicas Americanas; pero siento un profundo dolor de que el principio de nuestras transacciones en lugar de ser de congratulaciones, sea, por el contrario, de quejas.

Permitame V. S^a. observarle que, quando el Gobierno de Venezuela decretó el bloqueo del rio de Orinoco, no solamente se propuso sino que efectuó sitiar las plazas de Guayana y Angostura. Y yo pienso que el sitio de una plaza ó plazas es algo mas estrecho que un bloqueo maritimo, y pienso que los sitiadores gozan, por lo menos, de los mismos derechos que los bloqueadores. El ejército de Venezuela puso sitio á estas dos plazas en los primeros dias de Enero, y en esos mismos dias publicó el bloqueo y lo hizo efectivo de varios modos, como despues se manifestará.

En quanto *al daño de los neutrales*, que V. S^a. menciona en su nota, yo no concibo que puedan alegarse en favor de los dueños del Tigre y la Libertad los derechos, que el derecho de gentes concede á los verdaderos neutrales. No son neutrales los que prestan armas y municiones de boca y guerra a unas plazas sitiadas y legalmente bloqueadas. Si yo me equivoco en esta asercion tendré gran satisfaccion en reconocer mi error.

Concluyendo, por donde he empesado, repito que yo me refiero al juicio de V. S^a. forme de la justicia con que hemos procedido en la condena de las goletas Tigre y Libertad pertenecientes á Ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos, en vista de la respuesta que me propongo pasar á V. S^a.

Tengo el honor de ser con la mayor consideracion

de V. S^a.

el mas atento adicto serv^d.

BOLÍVAR.

Angostura Agosto 6 de 1818, 8º

Sñr Agente

Tengo el honor de responder á la nota de V. S^a. de 25 de Julio proximo pasado relativa á las indemnizaciones, pedidas por las condenas hechas de las Goletas Américas Tigre y Libertad, apresadas por las fuerzas maritimas de Venezuela.

Para proceder con mas órden y claridad se expondrán 1º. los hechos distintamente, segun constan de los procesos seguidos, y de los diarios de los buques; y despues se aplicarán los principios del derecho. Empezaré por la Goleta Tigre, en que parecen aquellos mas dudosos y complicados.

La Tigre salió del Orinoco á cumplir una contrata celebrada entre el Gobernador [*sic*] Español de esta Provincia Coronel Fitz Gerald y Mr. Lamson, en que se obligaba este á retornar en armas y municiones el cargamento de Tabaco que le dió aquel. En efecto el 17 de Marzo de 1817, (y no el 12 como alega el defensor) salió de Salem con el cargamento que habia ofrecido, y entró en este puerto por el mes de Abril. Saliendo, despues, del Orinoco por el mes de Julio fué apresada el dia 4 con un cargamento, que era en parte el producto de negociaciones anteriores y en parte del último cargamento q^e. introduxo.

Tanto el capitan Tucker como el defensor Lamson alegan que ignoraban el bloqueo y sitio; pero el primero se contradice, quando asegura en su declaracion que, estando en este Puerto, vió salir un convoy Español contra las fuerzas que tenian los patriotas en el rio cerca de Sⁿ Miguel, y el segundo, quando en su representacion confiesa que se hallaba en esta plaza, donde no podia ignorar que habia un ejército frente de ella y de las fortalezas de la Baja Guayana. Ademas el diario del buque contiene noticias de haber sido apresados por los patriotas algunos buques dentro del Rio, como en efecto se tomaron por nuestras fuerzas sutiles un Bergantin, una Goleta, y un Guayro mercantes, y despues todo el apotadero enemigo situado en la Isla de Faxardo. Pero aun quando no les constase esto, es sabido que el decreto de bloqueo

expedido en 6 de Enero de 1817 fué publicado en la gazeta de Norfolk de 6 de Marzo de aquel año, y consiguientemente es de presumir que lo publicasen otros papeles de los Estados Unidos. Habiendo sido esta publicacion en aquella fecha, y no habiendo salido la Tigre sino el 17 del mismo mes es en sumo grado probable que no ignoraba el bloqueo.

Los hechos con respecto á la Libertad no permiten ningun genero de discusion. Ella salió de Martinica en el mes de Junio con municiones de boca para esta plaza, y estando ya dentro del Rio encontró con los buques nuestros que lo bloqueaban. Por el comandante de estos supo que no debia seguir: se le mandó regresar, y se le auxilió con un práctico. Despues de una conducta tan liberal por nuestra parte, la Libertad fué encontrada de nuevo remontando el Rio en contravencion del bloqueo ya notificado. Pruebas que constan de la declaracion de su Capitan Guillermo Hill y de las deposiciones del Señor Almirante y Comandante Diaz.

De los hechos expuestos nacen dos argumentos contra la Tigre. El uno es haber violado el bloqueo y sitio de Guayana, entrando y saliendo de puerto bloqueado y sitiado efectivamente, y el otro haber violado la neutralidad introduciendo armas y municiones á nuestros enemigos. Nadie puede disputar al Gobierno de Venezuela el derecho de declarar en estado de bloqueo un puerto o puertos, poseidos por el enemigo. Sus fuerzas maritimas son capaces de hacer efectiva semejante declaratoria, y lo han manifestado de un modo positivo en el bloqueo del Orinoco. La publicacion del decreto de bloqueo en los Estados Unidos doce dias antes de que saliese la Tigre responden á todas las excepciones alegadas. Si el capitan de la Tigre no lo supo, como debió, ningun Gobierno está obligado á intimarlo á los individuos sino á las naciones y nadie puede dudar que uno de los medios de publicarlo es por las gazetas.

Precindiendo de estas consideraciones el segundo argumento es por sí solo bastante para condenar á la Tigre como buena presa. Desde el momento en que este buque introduxo elementos militares á nuestros enemigos, para hacernos la guerra, violó la neutralidad y pasó de este estado al beligerante: tomó parte en nuestra contienda á favor de nuestros enemigos, y del mismo modo que, si algunos ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos tomasen servicio con los Españoles, estarian sujetos a las leyes que practicamos contra estos, los buques que protegen, auxilian, ó sirven su causa deben estarlo y lo están.

Es verdad que si la Tigre hubiese logrado evadirse y hubiese adoptado posteriormente la conducta neutra, de que no debió apartarse, no podria ser condenada; pero ella no lo logró, y fue apresada en circunstancias en que actualmente llenaba las funciones de enemigo:

estaba en las aguas de nuestro territorio con este carácter, y conducía á su bordo parte del producto del contrabando que habia introducido. Todas estas circunstancias agravan su causa y doblan nuestro derecho para confiscarla.

No es ni aun probable que el viaje redondo que hizo la Tigre, en virtud de la contracta, fuese por cuenta del consignatario Lamson y no por la de la casa de Peabody y Tucker sus dueños. Ningun documento se ha presentado para calificar esta excepcion, y el Gobierno tiene en contra los informes que dió el Gobernador Ceruti, quando fue tomado prisionero, de haber celebrado su predecesor una contrata de armas con una casa de los Estados Unidos. Puede, sin embargo, suponerse que sea cierta la exposicion de Mr. Lamson; pero no por esto se destruye el derecho, que nos dá contra el buque la infraccion del bloqueo y, lo que es mas, de la neutralidad. La Tigre es condenable y debe sufrir la pena: sus dueños no debieron fletarla para una negociacion que quebrantaba la neutralidad, y si lo hicieron, se sugetaron á todos los riesgos. Si alguna cosa tienen que reclamar será contra el consignatario Lamson, y no contra el Gobierno de Venezuela, que solo ha aplicado las leyes y las prácticas de las naciones que la condenaban.

Fue la prestacion de auxilios militares á una potencia beligerante es una declaratoria implícita contra su enemiga, es un principio incontrovertible y que está confirmado por la conducta de los mismos Estados Unidos, donde no se permite que se hagan armamentos de ninguna especie por los independientes contra los payses Españoles, donde han sido detenidos y aprisionados algunos oficiales Ingleses que venian para Venezuela, y donde se ha impedido la extraccion de las armas y municiones que podrian venir para el Gobierno de Venezuela. La diferencia única que hay es, que quando es el Gobierno quien los presta, la nacion se declara enemiga, y quando son los particulares sin conocimiento de él, ellos solos se comprometen, y no se hace responsable la Nacion. La Tigre, pues, trayendo armas contra Venezuela, fué nuestra enemiga, y no puede de ninguna manera acogerse á las Leyes de la neutralidad, que habia despreciado y violado.

Solo falta responder a la excepcion de que el juicio se siguió de un modo ilegal, sin permitir el uso de un Intérprete y sin oír la defensa. Confesando el Capitan Tucker los hechos, que se han expuesto, y no habiendolos contradicho el defensor Lamson en su defensa, sino confirmandolos, no eran necesarios otros procedimientos, que solo servirian para hacer mas costoso el juicio á las partes. Esta misma consideracion se tuvo presente para no practicar por escrito todos los demas actos é informaciones que se tomaron, y los dueños de la Tigre deberian

agradecer, que no se les hubiese agravado con mas gastos, originados de su mas larga detencion y de las cartas del proceso.

No puede concebirse como el Capitan Tucker alega que no se le permitió hacer su defensa, ni usar de Intérprete. Lo primero es evidentemente falso, pues ademas de la que verbalmente se le oyó, consta en el sumario la que presentó por escrito Mr. Lamson. En vano intenta probar su falsa asercion diciendo que la sentencia siguió inmediatamente á su declaracion. Basta abrir el sumario seguido, para ver que esta se le tomó el 24 y aquella no se pronunció sino el 27 de setiembre. Lo segundo lo es igualmente, por que preguntandole si necesitaba de intérprete respondió que nó, y el haber firmado con su nombre su declaracion manifiesta que supo lo que firmó, á menos que quiera decirse que se le forzó á hacerlo. Creo que nadie podra acusar al Gobierno de Venezuela semejante conducta, ni el Capitan Tucker alega esta excepcion.

El derecho para la condena de la Goleta Libertad no admite ningun genero de duda. Los hechos están uniformemente testificados: son incontestables. Alegar ignorancia del bloqueo y sitio un buque, que salió de Martinica en el mes de Junio de 1817 cinco meses despues de publicado aquel y establecido este quando las relaciones mas frecuentes de esta plaza en el Gobierno Español eran con aquella Isla, es manifestar un alto desprecio por la verdad y por la buena fé. Sin embargo, el comandante de nuestras cañoneras fué tan liberal, que pasó por un simple dicho, y la mandó salir sin detenerla y auxiliandola. Si despues se le ha encontrado remontando otra vez el rio en abuso de nuestra liberalidad y confianza, su infraccion ha sido doblemente grave.

Otra excepcion opuesta por el Capitan Hill es que *no sabia por donde baxar*. Pero un buque que ha podido encontrar las bocas del Orinoco y entrar por ellas hasta cerca de la Antigua Guayana ¿no podra hacer el mismo viaje para salir aun quando no se le hubiese dado práctico? Si el Capitan Hill dixera que despues de haberse separado de nuestros buques, la Esquadrilla Española lo obligó á subir, podria pasar por probable su excepcion, y á lo menos le daria derecho para reclamar contra esta Nacion los males, que se le siguieron de haberlo forzado á quebrantar el bloqueo contra las leyes de la neutralidad.

Si el Almirante Brion hizo uso de los buques en cuestión, antes de ser juzgados, pudieron sus Capitanes haber añadido, quando fué, y las circunstancias que precedieron á este hecho. Los buques fueron siempre respetados, y no se habrian empleado nunca en el servicio de la República, si los mismos Capitanes no se hubiesen prestado voluntariamente á las proposiciones que se les hicieron, y si, en prueba de

la cordialidad de sus consentimientos, no hubiesen ofrecido hasta sus personas. El Gobierno no puede dar una prueba mas irrefragable de esta verdad, que el haber sido empleados en los buques, despues de armados, parte de las mismas tripulaciones, que antes tenian, y algunos de los oficales.

Resumiendo la cuestión podriamos presentarla baxo estos dos aspectos: si se ha seguido el proceso con regularidad, y si ha habido derecho para dar las condenas. Examinada atentamente la causa seguida contra las Goletas Tigre y Libertad, sin duda se encontrarán informalidades, que se podrán calificar de esenciales por el efecto inevitable de las circunstancias. Pero si estas faltas perjudican á alguno es mas bien al Tribunal que las cometió, que á las partes que V. S. representa. Seguido el juicio por los trámites mas rigurosos, los Ciudadanos Americanos no habrian ganado mas que multiplicar, sin necesidad, las pruebas que existan contra ellos, y aumentan sus perjuicios y los gastos del proceso que habrian crecido en la misma proporcion. Ademas si nuestras prácticas judiciales han sufrido algunas alteraciones en la següela de este juicio, el mayor agravio ha sido hecho á nuestros Leyes, y el único derecho que podria reclamar el extranjero, que se cree ofendido, es que se vuelva á seguir el juicio conforme á los trámites ordinarios.

La cuestión se debe reducir á examinar escrupulosamente si el Almirantazgo de Venezuela ha tenido derecho para condenar las Goletas Tigre y Libertad. La cuestión no se cambia por el modo con que se ha examinado el hecho, y el derecho no cambia por que está fundado sobre el hecho.

Desde los primeros dias de Enero de 1817, las plazas de Guayana y Angostura fueron sitiadas hasta el mes de Agosto del mismo año. En este tiempo las Goletas Tigre y Libertad han venido á traer armas y pertrechos á los sitiados, y por esto cesan de ser neutrales, se convierten en beligerantes, y nosotros hemos adquirido el derecho de apresarlas por qualquier medio que pudiesemos ejecutarlo. En los primeros dias de Enero hemos publicado el bloqueo del rio Orinoco, y desde aquella época empezamos á poner en execucion dicho bloqueo con todas las fuerzas, que el Gobierno tenia á su disposicion. Nuestros buques mayores cruzaban en las bocas aunque por intervalos, y nuestras fuerzas sutiles, que se hallaban estacionadas entre la vieja y la nueva Guayana, apresaron en los meses de Marzo, Abril y Mayo un Bergatin, una Goleta, un Guayro mercantes y el apostadero militar de la Isla de Faxardo. Si á principios de Junio tuvimos un combate con los enemigos en las aguas de Casacoyma donde perdimos la mayor parte de nuestras cañoneras, estas fueron inmediatamente reemplazadas por las del Comandante Diaz y la Esquadrilla del Almirante Brion. De

este resumen se deduce, que el río estaba bloqueado por nuestras fuerzas, y que ningun neutro podia auxiliar con armas y municiones las plazas sitiadas y bloqueadas sin executar actos hostiles que le harian perder los derechos de neutralidad, si fuese apresado por los sitiadores y bloqueadores en su entrada ó salida, pues que contra ambas operaciones, se oponen las fuerzas enemigas. Tanto se contraviene en entrar como en salir de un puerto bloqueado donde se ha entrado despues de establecido el bloqueo, y por consiguiente ni el Tigre ni la Libertad tienen legitimos reclamos que hacer contra el Almirantazgo de Venezuela.

Si las naciones neutrales hubiesen obligado á nuestros enemigos a respetar estrictamente el derecho público y de gentes, nuestras ventajas habrian sido infinitas, y menos tendriamos que quejarnos de los neutros. Pero ha sucedido lo contrario en todo el curso de la presente guerra. La España ha extendido el derecho de bloqueo mucho mas allá que la Nacion Británica: ha hecho confiscar quantos buques neutrales han podido apresar sus corsarios por qualquier causa ó pretexto. En la plaza de Cartagena el General Morillo ha prolongado el bloqueo, despues de tomada por las armas del Rey, y ha tratado como prisioneros de guerra á quantos neutrales cayeron en sus manos, haciendo de este modo una innovacion tan escandalosa en las leyes públicas de las naciones. No se ha visto, sin embargo, que ninguna potencia maritima haya reprimido este abuso tiránico y otros, quando todas las naciones maritimas son mas fuertes que la España. Pretender, pues, que las Leyes sean aplicables á nosotros, y que pertenezcan á nuestros enemigos las practicas abusivas, no es ciertamente justo, ni es la pretencion de un verdadero neutral, es, sí, condenarnos a las mas destructivas desventajas.

¿No seria muy sensible que las leyes las practicase el debil y los abusos los practicase el fuerte? Tal seria nuestro destino si nosotros solos respetasemos los principios y nuestros enemigos nos destruyesen violandolos.

Seria, sin duda, muy glorioso para Venezuela que, pareciendo la última en la escala de las Naciones, fuese la mas religiosa en respetar el derecho escrito de las gentes, y nada seria tan conforme con sus instituciones y objeto, como el ver restablecer la Justicia entre los pueblos y los pactos generales q^e. ligan á todas los hombres de todas las naciones. Pero siendo infinitamente lamentable que en esta última época de turbulencia, de agrecion y tirania, nada haya sido tan hollado como el derecho publico ¿con qué fuerzas podrá oponerse Venezuela al imperio de las practicas opresivas de casi todas las potencias maritimas?

No obstante todas las antecedentes consideraciones, yo vuelvo á

someter al juicio de V. S. la decision de esta cuestión, refiriendome confiadamente á la rectitud del discernimiento que tan eminentemente distingue a V. S.; bien convencido de que el Gobierno de Venezuela está pronto por generosidad, á la devolucion de los intereses confiscados á los dueños de las Goletas Tigre y Libertad, siempre que V. S. no se persuada intimamente de la justicia con que ha obrado el Almirantazgo de esta República.

Tengo el honor de ser con la mas alta consideracion
de V. S.
el mas at.^o y obed.^{te} servidor

BOLÍVAR.

Angostura 20 de Agosto de 1818

Señor Agente

Sin embargo de que la nota de V. S^a., fecha de 17 del presente, que tuve el honor de recibir ayer, no puede considerarse sino como preliminar ó preparatoria á la que ofrece dirigirme en contestacion á mi respuesta del 6, creo muy conveniente anticipar algunas reflexiones que nacen de los mismos principios admitidos en ella por V. S^a.

V. S^a. considera como justa mi indignacion con respecto á los protectores ó auxiliares de nuestros feroces enemigos; pero añade V. S^a. que es infundada si se atiende á que *comerciantes neutros no deben abandonar su profesion por hacerse partidarios políticos*. Sin sostener lo contrario, puedo observar que no encuentro la necesidad de que un neutro abraza este ó aquel partido si no quiere abandonar su profesion, ni concibo que pueda hacerse aplicacion de este principio á los Puertos bloqueados sin destruir los dros [derechos] de las Naciones beligerantes. Si la utilidad de los pueblos neutros es el origen y fundamento para no excluirlos del comercio de las Potencias en guerra, estas interesan contra el que se hace en puertos bloqueados no solamente la misma rason, sino tambien el mal que resulta de la prolongacion de una campaña ó guerra que podria terminarse rindiendo ó tomando la plaza reducida á acedio. *La imparcialidad que es la gran base de la neutralidad* desaparece en el acto en que se socorre á una parte contra la voluntad bien expresada de la otra, que se opone justamente y que ademas no exige ser ella socorrida.

La conducta de la Francia y la Inglaterra en los ultimos años de su celebre lucha viene muy á proposito en apoyo de esta opinion. Pero yo no intento justificarla, por que ni creo que nuestro caso en cuestión sea de aquella naturaleza, ni necesito otros argumentos que los mismos propuestos por V. S^a. La doctrina citada de Vattel que es sin duda, la mas liberal para los neutros no solamente sostiene poderosamente el derecho con que Venezuela ha procedido en la condena de las goletas

Tigre y Libertad sino que da lugar á que recuerde hechos que desearia ignorar para no verme forzado á lamentarlos. Hablo de la conducta de los Estados Unidos del Norte con respecto á los independientes del Sur, y de las rigurosas leyes promulgadas con el objeto de impedir toda especie de auxilios que pudieramos procurarnos allí. Contra la lenidad de las leyes Americanas se ha visto imponer una pena de diez años de prision y diez mil pesos de multa, que equivale á la de muerte, contra los virtuosos Ciudadanos que quisiesen proteger nuestra causa, la causa de la justicia y de la Libertad, la causa de la América.

Si es libre el comercio de los neutros para suministrar á ambas partes los medios de hacer la guerra, ¿por que se prohíbe en el Norte? ¿por que á la prohibicion se añade la severidad de la pena, sin exemplo en los anales de la República del Norte? ¿No es declararse contra los independientes negarles lo que el derecho de neutralidad les permite exigir? La prohibicion no debe entenderse sino directamente contra nosotros, que eramos los únicos que necesitabamos proteccion. Los Españoles tenian quanto necesitaban ó podian proveerse en otras partes. Nosotros solos estabamos obligados á ocurrir al Norte así por ser nuestros vecinos y hermanos, como por que nos faltaban los medios y relaciones para dirigirnos á otras potencias. Mr. Cobbett ha demostrado plenamente en su seminario la parcialidad de los Estados Unidos á favor de la España en nuestra contienda. Negar á una parte los elementos que no tiene y sin los quales no puede sostener su pretension quando la contraria abunda en ellos es lo mismo que condenarla á que se someta, y en nuestra guerra con España es destinarnos al suplicio, mandarnos exterminar. El resultado de la prohibicion de extraer armas y municiones califica mas claramente esta parcialidad. Los Españoles que no las necesitaban las han adquirido facilmente, al paso que las que venian para Venezuela se han detenido.

La extrema repugnancia y el dolor con que recuerdo estos actos, me impiden continuar exponiendolos. Solo la necesidad de justificar al Gobierno de Venezuela podria haberme forzado á manifestar unas quejas que he procurado sofocar hasta ahora y que habria resultado en el silencio y en el olvido si no fueren necesarias ya para desvanecer los argumentos con que ha querido V. S. probar la ilegitimidad de las condenas dadas contra las goletas Tigre y Libertad.

Quiero, sin embargo, suponer gratuitamente por un momento que la imparcialidad ha sido guardada. ¿Que deduciríamos de aquí? Ó es preciso negarnos el derecho de bloqueadores y sitiadores, ó es preciso decir que pueden los buques neutros entrar y salir de los puertos que han sido excluidos temporalmente del comercio por un decreto de bloqueo llevado á efecto. Para lo primero seria necesario declararnos fuera del Derecho de las gentes, y consiguientemente sin obligacion de

respetarlo; y no seria menos monstruoso sostener lo segundo que choca contra todas las prácticas y leyes de las naciones.

Podria extender infinitamente las observaciones que he hecho, pero como no es mi objeto responder definitivamente sino quando haya visto y meditado la contestacion de V. S^a., que acabo de recibir, reservo para entonces explanar estas mismas razones y añadir las mas que ahora omito por no causar su atencion.

Con la mas alta consideracion, tengo el honor de repetir á V. S^a. los sentimientos de distinguida estimacion con que soy

de V. S.

atento y obed^{te} serv.

BOLÍVAR.

Angostura 24 de Agosto de 1818, 8º

Señor Agente

Yo esperaba haber satisfecho á V. S^a. en mi nota de 6 del presente sobre los hechos que sirven de fundamento al derecho con que el Almirantazgo de Venezuela procedió á dar las condenas contra las goletas Tigre y Libertad, y en consecuencia me preparaba á entrar en conferencias, que, lexos de tener el carácter de quejas, fuesen satisfactorias para ambos Gobiernos, y he visto con sentimiento la contestacion de V. S^a., que me ha hecho el honor de dirigirme con fecha de 19 del corriente.

Insiste V. S^a. en su reclamo intentando probar la ilegitimidad de aquel acto: niega los hechos alegados por mí, que constan de los procesos seguidos, y pretende que prevalezcan sobre estos documentos judiciales las representaciones y protestas que los interezados han dirigido al Secretario de Estado de los Estados Unidos. Si los dueños y fletadores de las goletas Tigre y Libertad han graduado de injusto ultrage el apresamiento de sus buques, que estaban sujetos, por lo menos, á una rigurosa discusion, no hallo un epiteto con que distinguir la revocacion á duda de la fé de nuestros actos y procedimientos jurídicos. Yo no me habria atrevido á hacer uso de deposiciones que no constasen, y quando me referí á los procesos fué en la resolucion de manifestarlos á V. S^a., siempre que los exigiese para convencerse mas. Ellos reposan originales en la Secretaria de Estado, y serán presentados á V. S^a. quando V. S^a. desee verlos.

Antes he confesado sin dificultad: que, *examinadas atentamente las causas seguidas contra las goletas Tigre y Libertad, se encontrarian informalidades, que podrian calificarse de esenciales por el efecto inevitable de las circunstancias.* Podria haber alegado, en apoyo de estas informalidades, el derecho que tiene cada pueblo para decidir sobre el

modo, con que deben averiguarse los hechos, en que debe fundarse la aplicacion de la ley. Apareciendo aquellos, poco importa que sea por esta ó aquella via: el derecho es siempre el mismo y en nada se altera. Podria tambien haber citado el artículo 12º de nuestras ordenanzas de Corzo, en que se previene: que los juicios de presas se sigan *sumariamente en el término de veintiquatro horas, ó ántes si es posible*; pero he preferido no hacer uso de este derecho por dar una prueba relevante de amor á la causa de la justicia. Pretender que un pueblo, que trata ahora de constituirse y que para lograrlo sufre todo género de males de parte de sus enemigos, tenga las mismas instituciones que el Pueblo mas libre y tranquilo del mundo, es exigir imposibles. Basta contemplar por un momento, con imparcialidad, la situacion de Venezuela para justificar su conducta, y admirar su zelo por el órden, y su amor y respeto por la justicia y la propiedad.

Previendo con V. Sa. que mientras no nos penetremos de las circunstancias, y mientras no convengamos en el principio á que debamos referirnos con respecto á los hechos hay pocas esperanzas de una composicion satisfactoria, convine en mi oficio del 6 en que podrian las partes exigir que se rehiciese el proceso. Es el único derecho, que la mas ilimitada generosidad puede conceder, y siento que V. Sa. no haya detenido en esto su atencion como el medio mas propio para una transaccion. En mi presente respuesta me propongo, pues, presindir de los hechos, que supongo conformes á las declaraciones tomadas en nuestro Almirantazgo, y solo me contraeré á los principios del derecho. El método exige que empiece por los que V. Sa. atribuye á las naciones neutras, y que exponga al fin los que corresponden á las beligerantes, limitandolos ambos á nuestro caso en cuestión.

Constituido á la cabeza de un pueblo que, proclamando los principios mas perfectos de libertad, no ha ahorrado los sacrificios de todo género por sostenerlos, desearia no admitir sino las maximas mas liberales en esta discusion: pero contrariadas estas por la doctrina y práctica general de las naciones, y muy particularmente por las de nuestra enemiga, me veo obligado á ceder á su poderoso imperio.

El principal argumento, que ha trahido V. Sa. como convincente, es el derecho de comercio que no puede negarse á los neutros, y que puede consistir en qualquiera especie de mercaderia y aun en elementos de guerra. No me atreveré á impugnar directamente esta opinion: me limitaré á señalarle los términos y justas excepciones á que la creo sujeta, para conciliar á la vez ambos derechos.

Es indudable que observando una estricta imparcialidad no pueden los neutros ser excluidos del comercio de las naciones en guerra. Los publicistas, sin embargo, se han esforzado en probar que está ex-

puesto á ser condenado, como contrabando, todo cargamento de armas y municiones que se encuentre en camino para qualquier puerto enemigo, y han sostenido sus opiniones con leyes escritas del derecho de gentes, como verá V. S^a. despues. A la verdad es bien sencible que haya prevalecido esta limitacion sobre la generalidad de aquella máxima que es á mi parecer muy conforme al interes de las naciones, por que es el único medio de proveerse de los elementos militares las que carecen de ellos. Pero aun admitida con toda esta extencion, no debe nunca aplicarse á los puertos bloqueados y á los sitiados, por que dexarian de estarlo siempre que pudiesen recibir socorros de fuera, y en vano se bloquearia ó sitiaria un puerto ó plaza, si estuviesen los neutros autorizados para prestarle impunemente los auxilios que necesitase. Semejante principio destruiria los derechos de la guerra.

La perfecta y estricta imparcialidad es otra consideracion que debe tenerse muy presente. Sin ella no hay neutralidad, y desvanecida esta cesa todo derecho que se deriva de ella. En mi nota del 20 he hecho algunas observaciones, aunque con suma repugnancia, sobre la conducta del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos con respecto á nosotros, menos con el objeto de probar su parcialidad, que con el de demostrar la falsedad del principio de absoluta libertad de comercio entre neutros y beligerantes. Los hechos estados en mi oficio del 6, las palabras de la acta del Congreso de 3 de Marzo del año proximo pasado, y los resultados ó efectos de aquella prohibicion, que han sido todos contra los Independientes, manifiestan, ó que el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos ha guardado con los Españoles consideraciones que no han obrado en nuestro favor, ó que no nos ha creido con derecho para comerciar, como neutros, armas y municiones, quando ha prohibido su extraccion. No hago mérito de esto sino como en adiccion á las otras muchas razones que justifican las condenas de las goletas Tigre y Libertad. Y estoy intimamente convencido de que, por mas estricta que hubiese sido su neutralidad, los buques en cuestión la habian violado y eran condenables.

Otro principio de V. S^a. es, que los buques neutros tienen derecho para venir á examinar por sí la realidad del bloqueo, puesto que deben ser avisados por la Esquadra bloqueadora. Permitame V. S^a. que yo niegue este principio, y que añada, ademas, que los buques en cuestión están fuera de este caso, aun quando se admitiese. Para negarlo tengo la autoridad de las desiciones de los Almirantazgos de Inglaterra, que han condenado los buques tomados en camino para puerto bloqueado aunque su aprehension sea en alta mar, y la práctica de nuestros enemigos los Espanoles que han aprehendido y condenado quantos han podido apresar, aun despues de rendida la plaza bloqueada, por la sola

sospecha de que venian á auxiliarla. La Goleta Tigre entró en esta plaza despues de establecidos el sitio y el bloqueo, despues que habiamos aprehendido varios buques, y si tuvo la fortuna de burlarse de nuestros apostaderos, tal vez al favor de la Esquadrilla enemiga, no prueba esto que el bloqueo y sitio se hubiesen levantado. En todo el mes de Abril se aprehendieron buques que conducian víveres y emigracion de esta plaza para las Colonias y para el Baxo-Orinoco, y á principios de Mayo un bergatin que venia de Europa fué tambien apresado. Nadie puede dudar que es tomado *in delicto* un buque, que sale de un puerto bloqueado, á donde se ha entrado contra sitio y bloqueo. La Tigre no habia concluido su viaje y estaba todavia en el acto del delito. Mi nota del 6 lo demuestra evidentemente. La goleta Libertad ha sido tratada con el respeto que V. S^a. quiere exigir: ella fué avisada, y sin embargo prosiguió su viaje en desprecio de nuestro aviso.

Si los interesados alegan ignorancia del bloqueo, yo conservo y presentaré á V. S^a. la gazeta de Norfolk de 6 de Marzo. Ademas puedo presentar el testimonio de los Almirantes y Gobernadores de las Antillas. Si los Estados Unidos no tienen una comunicacion directa con nosotros, si no nos reconocen, ni nos tratan, ¿de que modo les harémos entender nuestros decretos? Los medios indirectos, que son los que nos quedan, se han empleado, y como prueba puedo citar la gazeta indicada.

Antes he dicho, y ahora repito, que no es creible la excepcion de que las propiedades apresadas pertenecian á otro, que al dueño de las que se introduxeron en contravencion del bloqueo. El Capitan Tucker ha confesado que eran en parte el producto de la negociacion de armas, y en parte el de negociacion anterior; pero sin calificar esto, como podia haberlo hecho presentando las facturas, registros, y libros de comercio, (como en tales casos se acostumbra) en vano se intenta el argumento propuesto por V. S^a., aun quando fuese del caso.

Creo haber resumido los derechos que V. S^a. atribuye á los neutros. Pasemos ya á exponer los de los beligerantes. Suponiendo que no niega á Venezuela el derecho de declarar en estado de bloqueo este ó aquel puerto ó puertos, poseidos por sus enemigos, y que consiguientemente concede la legitimidad del decreto expedido en Enero de 1817 declarando en este estado los del Orinoco, expondré lo que los publicistas Españoles han juzgado como de derecho público, y lo que han executado. La retaliacion es el derecho mas seguro y legitimo de que puede servirse un pueblo en guerra. Las órdenes en consejo de Inglaterra á conseqüencia de los decretos de Milan y de Berlin son un exemplo bien terminante y decisivo.

Olmedo en el capítulo 15^o tomo 2^o del derecho público de la guerra,

(recapitulando los tratados y prácticas de la Europa) dice: "que aunque las naciones neutrales tienen derecho para exigir el comercio libre en cosas que no son de contrabando,¹ hay ciertos casos en que de ningun modo les es permitida esta facultad; por exemplo, en el sitio de alguna plaza especialmente quando está cercada por hambre, en cuyo caso ninguna nacion puede socorrer con víveres á los sitiados baxo la pena de perderlos, y aun de ser castigados gravemente los infractores; pues de otro modo seria inútil la guerra, habiendo quien pudiese estorvar los progresos de ella." Esta doctrina universal y antiquisima está confirmada por el artículo 33 de las ordenanzas de Corzo Españolas, concebidas en estos términos: "seran siempre buena presa todos los generos prohibidos y de contrabando que se transportasen para el servicio de enemigos² en qualesquiera embarcaciones, que se encuentren"; y luego continua, "tambien se considerarán como generos prohibidos y de contrabando todos los comestibles de qualquier especie que sean en caso *de ir destinados* para plaza enemiga bloqueada por mar ó tierra; pero no estandolo se dexarán conducir libremente á su destino, *siempre que* los enemigos de mi corona observen por su parte la misma conducta."

Esta es la regla que se observa en los juicios de presas por los Tribunales Españoles: es la que han seguido en todos tiempos, y sí ha sufrido algunas alteraciones es mas bien extendiendo su derecho contra los neutros. Tal ha sido su conducta en el bloqueo de Cartagena de que he hablado y á V. S^a. en otra ocasion.

Venezuela, que hasta ahora no ha podido ocuparse sino de combatir, se ha visto forzada á continuar las leyes y prácticas que la habian regido durante el duro yugo de la España, en quanto no han sido contrarias á su sistema de Libertad é Independencia. Si esta ley es injusta, si es contra los derechos de la neutralidad, la nacion Española, que la ha promulgado y cumplido desde el siglo pasado, debe ser la responsable y no Venezuela, que sin deshacerse de los monstruos que la despedazan y devoran, no puede aplicarse a mejorar las instituciones que deben ser la consecuencia y no las premisas de su reconocimiento é inscripcion en el registro de las naciones libres e independientes.

Los términos expresos de la ley, que se ha aplicado contra las goletas Tigre y Libertad, me eximen de entrar en nuevos detalles sobre si fué ó no efectivo el bloqueo marítimo hasta el mes de Junio, como V. S^a. ha dicho, si una vez establecido se levantó ó relaxó, y si nuestras

¹ Se entienden por de contrabando toda especie de armas, municiones y equipamontes militares para hacer la guerra en mar ó tierra (footnote in original letter).

² Se entienden y expresan los mismos objetos (footnote in original letter).

fuerzas eran ó no suficientes para llevarlo á efecto. La ley condena á todo buque que trata de introducir socorro de armas ó municiones de boca ó guerra á una plaza bloqueada por mar ó por tierra.

Me parece fuera de proposito probar que nuestros apostaderos estaban situados de modo que exponian á inminente peligro qualquier buque, que intentase entrar ó salir de este puerto. Antes de entrar la Tigre, es decir, en el mes de Marzo, fueron apresados en frente de San Miguel varios buques y sostuvimos tambien allí algunos choques contra los apostaderos militares del enemigo, hasta que al fin apresamos el de Faxardo. Si unas fuerzas que interceptan el comercio, y que baten y apresan los buques de guerra enemigos, no son suficientes para bloquear un puerto de rio, y si las naciones en guerra no son las que deben decidir de la especie y número de las fuerzas que emplean en sus operaciones militares, el derecho de bloqueadores será tan vario e indefinido como lo son los intereses de cada Pueblo.

Si el Almirante Brion no entró en el rio hasta el mes de Junio, fué, por que sus fuerzas no se creyeron necesarias dentro de él, sino quando quisimos estrechar mas las plazas, y yo no creo que para bloquear un puerto de rio sea necesario remontarlo. El rio estaba bastantemente bloqueado con nuestras fuerzas sutiles y con nuestro exercito de tierra, que las sostenia, mientras que nuestros buques mayores hacian sus cruceros en el mar.

Seria prolongar demaciado mi respuesta añadiendo mas razones y contestando á cada artículo de la nota de V. S^a. Me persuado que he satisfecho los principales. No puedo, sin embargo, terminar esta carta sin suplicar á V. S^a. me permita observarle, quan estraña debe parecer la conducta de los Capitanes y Sobrecargos de las goletas Tigre y Libertad por lo injuriosa que es al Almirantazgo de Venezuela. La sentencia contra sus buques fué pronunciada por el Tribunal de Almirantazgo, que es un Tribunal inferior. Si ellos se creyeron ofendidos, por que se les hubiese faltado á la justicia en la forma, ó de otro modo, ¿por que no protestaron la sentencia? ¿por que no apelaron á la autoridad Suprema? Pero lo que colma el agravio es la declaracion, en que el Capitan Hill afirma haberse substituido en su juicio otras respuestas á las que él dió. Sin duda que el Capitan Hill se ha imaginado que el simple dicho, ó el dicho jurado de un interesado, puede destruir el testimonio de un juez, que autorisó su deposicion con dos testigos, que no tienen siquiera la nota de extrangeros para él, puesto que eran sus paysanos. Si se le substituyeron las respuestas, ¿para qué firmó la declaracion? El Capitan Hill habla y entiende el Español, y si desconfiaba de su juez debió leer él mismo lo que firmaba, para no comprometerse.

Creyendo sin ninguna relacion con el derecho, que discutimos, el hecho de que V. S^a. se queixa contra el Almirante, por haber expuesto á venta la goleta Libertad antes de ser condenada, omito las consideraciones que puedo presentar para acusarlo, ya que no sea para justificarlo. Son hechos particulares que no dañan al asunto principal, sino en el modo.

Me lisongeo con la esperanza de que satisfecho V. S^a. plenamente, quedará transado de un modo satisfactorio el reclamo intentado, que contra todos mis deseos, he visto prolongar hasta llegar á hacerse molesto para una y otra parte, distrayendonos del objeto principal con discusiones prolixas sobre el derecho, y con episodios, que sin tener una estrecha conexion con los hechos, no pueden servir de base á la revolucion. La cuestión debe quedar reducida á este pequeño círculo: si los puertos del Orinoco estaban bloqueados ó sitiados en el mes de Abril quando entró á esta plaza la Tigre: si continuaban sin interrupcion el bloqueo y sitio en el mes de Julio quando fueron apresadas esta saliendo y la Libertad entrando. Demostrado el sitio y bloqueo, ó uno de los dos, en aquellas fechas, será preciso confesar la infraccion de los dos buques encontrados en el teatro de nuestra lucha, y la ley que los condena se aplicará facilmente.

Acepte V. S^a. las renovaciones del aprecio y alta consideracion con que soy

de V. S^a.

el mas atento adicto servidor

BOLÍVAR.

Señor Agente.

Angostura 6 de Setiembre de 1818. 8º

A su tiempo he tenido el honor de recibir las dos notas de V. S^a. fechas de 25 y 29 del mes proximo pasado. Como V. S^a. se queixa en la primera de ver introducida en la discusion una nueva materia, he querido aguardar su segunda carta para contraer á ella sola mi respuesta, y no extender mas una digresion que, mezclada accidentalmente en nuestras comunicaciones, no debe distrahernos del asunto principal. Mi presente contestacion será breve.

No me detendré sino en satisfacer á la única razon que ha reforzado V. S^a. ahora, dandole un valor que yo no le encontré quando en mi oficio del 6 de Agosto la toqué de paso. Tan insignificante me pareció entónces que no creí necesario rebatir en mi último lo que V. S^a. repuso en el suyo del 19, por que me parecia que en nada perjudicaba al derecho para la confiscacion el acto de servirse de los buques antes de la condena, quando el Gobierno era responsable de ellos, y quando los interesados prestaron sus consentimientos. Yo suplico á V. S^a. que relea con detencion lo que dixe en aquel oficio.

La simple conversion de los buques en nacionales podria llamarse *apropiacion*, si hubiese sido contra la voluntad de los que hacian veces de dueños, y si no hubiesen precedido proposiciones aceptadas en que el Gobierno se comprometia á la satisfaccion de los perjuicios, que recibiesen, caso de ser apresados ó deteriorados en aquel servicio, y que resultaren absueltos. Los buques debian sufrir mucho estando detenidos sin ejercicio mientras no fuesen juzgados, y yo no veo qué mal se les podia seguir de que fuesen empleados, quedando el Gobierno responsable á qualquier accidente de apresamiento V. S^a. Ademass se tuvieron presentes otras razones que no eran despreciables. Esperabamos por momentos que el enemigo evacuar el rio y las plazas que ocupaba y para esto debia forzar nuestra linea de bloqueo. Si los buques, que estaban detenidos, no sè armaban serian probablemente apresados, y servirian al enemigo no solamente para transportes, sino para proveerse de los víveres que contenian. Debiamos impedir al enemigo toda especie de socorro, y no teniamos otro medio para conseguirlo que armarlos. Un cúmulo de circunstancias concurrieron á hacer mas urgentes estas razones: nuestros puertos en la Isla de Margarita y costa de Cumaná estaban unos ocupados por Morillo y otros bloqueados; no teniamos, pues, a donde enviarlos mientras terminaba la campaña del Orinoco. Medite V. S^a. por un instante nuestra delicada situacion y se convencerá de que elegimos el partido mas prudente y aun el mas moderado. Podiamos á exemplo de los Españoles forzar los buques á que nos sirviesen.

En el año de 1814 hemos apresado buques neutrales que estaban empleados en transportar tropas enemigas contra nosotros con la bandera Inglesa. En la causa, que se les siguió, no alegaron los capitanes otro pretexto que el de haber sido compelidos á ello por los Españoles, que fueron, sin embargo, bien servidos y no se ha visto que ninguna nacion haya reclamado contra esta infraccion. Si ellos abusan impunemente de los buques neutros en nuestro daño, ¿por qué derecho estaremos nosotros obligados á respetarlos mas? ¿y no parece al contrario que nuestro estado de insurreccion hace mas acusables nuestras faltas?

La observacion de V. S^a. con respecto al bloqueo, que no cree efectivo por que no pueden unos pocos botes situados arriba de San Miguel bloquear los sesenta ó setenta caños del Orinoco, ni los puertos que están abaxo de aquel punto, no tiene ninguna fuerza, si considera V. S^a. que el único puerto habilitado del Orinoco ha sido siempre, la Angostura: este era el que nosotros bloqueabamos mas particularmente: á él entró y de él salió la Tigre. Aun quando admitiesemos, pues, que antes de la llegada del Almirante Brion no habia un bloqueo efectivo para todo

el Orinoco, es preciso confesar que lo habia para Angostura. Mas: el artículo 33 de las ordenanzas de Corzo, que antes he citado, establece terminantemente que incurren en la pena de confiscacion los buques neutros que vayan destinados con víveres ó efectos de contrabando para plaza *bloqueada* por mar ó por tierra. Si V. S^a. no se convence de que el bloqueo marítimo de los puertos del Orinoco era efectivo, basta que lo haya sido el de tierra. Esta ley Española, única que puede regir nuestra conducta, así por que no conocemos otra, como por que la represalia nos obliga á aplicarla, fué promulgada en 1796 y desde entónces ha estado en uso en presencia de toda la Europa y de los mismos Estados Unidos del Norte. Ninguna potencia la ha reclamado, y todas han sufrido y visto con indiferencia las escandalosas transgresiones del derecho público en nuestra lucha actual. Las intenciones de los neutros han sido adivinadas, y las adivinaciones han sido bastante causa para pronunciar confiscacion contra los buques y efectos, y prision contra las tripulaciones de los buques apresados en el bloqueo de Cartagena. La conducta de Venezuela ha sido incomparablemente mas regular: no se le puede atribuir un acto semejante.

V. S^a. se desentiende en su nota del 29 de este argumento que es uno de los mas poderosos que propuse en mi anterior. Yo sé que la España no puede dictar leyes á las naciones; pero tambien sé que las que establezca y practique en odio de Venezuela, deben ser practicada por esta en odio de ella. Mientras V. S^a. no me persuadea que el derecho de retaliacion es injusto, creeré que este solo argumento, (prescindiendo del bloqueo marítimo) es suficiente para calificar la justicia con que procedimos en las condenas de las goletas Tigre y Libertad. Los errores ó faltas que se observan en el modo y en los procedimientos, son, como he dicho antes, efectos inevitables de las extraordinarias circunstancias en que nos hallabamos, y no perjudican en nada á lo principal que en el derecho fundado en los hechos constantes por que han sido confesados judicialmente.

Insensiblemente he prolongado esta carta mas de lo que deseaba. Para una materia de tan poca importancia hemos extendido demasiado nuestra discusion, que no quiero hacer mas molesta añadiendo nuevas razones. Si las que he expuesto en mis cinco comunicaciones no prueban la justicia y rectitud con que se dictaron las condenas, las mas, en que pudiera detenerme, solo servirian para hacer difusa la conferencia, contra los deseos de V. S^a. y contra los mios propios.

Renuevo á V. S^a. los testimonios de apreciacion y alta consideracion con que soy

de V. S.

el mas atento adicto servidor

BOLÍVAR.

Angostura 25 de Setiembre de 1818, 8º

Señor Agente

La nota que tengo el honor de incluir á V. S. responde á algunas de las razones que V. S^a. me expuso en las suyas de 6 y 10 del corriente. No estando ni V. S^a., ni yo convencidos con los argumentos hasta ahora presentados, seria prolongar interminablemente la conferencia continuarla del mismo modo que se ha conducido hasta aquí. Como una prueba de la sinceridad de mis deseos por verla terminada y por que la imparcialidad y rectitud sean las que dicten la decision, propongo en conclusion el juicio de árbitros que se elegirán y procederán á formar sin acuerdos inmediatamente que V. S^a. me participe su aceptacion.

Mientras que la cuestión no sea decidida ninguna disposicion puede librarse con respecto al pago. Si en la sentencia que se pronunciase se declaran injustos los apresamientos, yo ofresco á V. S^a. que se harán todos las esfuerzos posibles por complacer á V. S^a. socorriendo á los Senores Leamy y Ledli, ó se harán los arreglos que se crean convenientes conforme á la situacion de los interesados y del Gobierno de Venezuela.

Soy con la mayor consideracion

de V. S^a.

el mas atento adicto serv^d

BOLÍVAR.

Angostura 25 de Setiembre de 1818, 8º

Señor Agente

Por mas atencion que he prestado á las notas de V. S^a. de 6 y 10 del corriente, y por mas que interese la descripcion que V. S^a. hace en ellas de las calidades y circunstancias de los Señores Leamy, Ledli y Lanson, yo no he podido convencerme de la ilegalidad que pretende V. S^a. probar en las condenas de las goletas Tigre y Libertad. Añadiendo constantemente razones, sin responder á las que por mi parte le presento, haremos interminable la discusion, que estaria ya concluida, si desde el principio hubiesemos limitado y dirigido nuestros argumentos á los dos puntos principales de la cuestión. Demostrar si las plazas de Angostura y Guayana estaban, ó no, bloqueadas por mar ó tierra desde el mes de Enero del año proximo pasado, y si durante el bloqueo entró y salió la Tigre de este puerto, é intentó hacerlo la Libertad, debió haber sido nuestro único objeto.

Lexos de ser injusto el apresamiento de estos dos buques ha sido hecho conforme á la doctrina misma que sirve de regla á la conducta de los Capitanes de los buques Americanos. (Vease la obra *The American Ship master daily assistant, or compendium of marine laws and*

mercantile regulations and customs, pag. 30, edicion de Portland.) El bloqueo siguiendo esta doctrina es *de hecho ó por notificacion*. Para el primero se exige actual investidura de la plaza bloqueada: para el segundo basta la notificacion acompañada de una fuerza competente ó *incompetente*; y sin embargo los derechos que dá este último son mas extensos que los del otro.

Yo he probado a V. S^a. que el decreto de bloqueo se expidió oportunamente y se publicó directa ó indirectamente conforme á nuestras relaciones con los payses extranjeros. El Gobierno de Venezuela no estaba obligado á hacer mas. He probado tambien que conservamos sin intermission fuerzas en el rio y cruceros en el mar, consiguientemente ninguna duda puede quedar sobre la realidad del bloqueo marítimo. Quiero, no obstante, prescindir de este argumento y señirme solo al derecho que nos daba el bloqueo por tierra. Si nuestras fuerzas marítimas han parecido á V. S^a. insignificantes y *sombra de una sombra*, creo que no tendrá la misma idea del ejército de tierra que era por lo menos quádruplo respecto de las tropas enemigas que bloqueabamos.

El medio mas breve que yo encuentro para una pronta transaccion es que sometamos la cuestión al juicio de árbitros que decidan: si estando bloqueadas por tierra las dos plazas de Angostura y Guayana por fuerza competente, incurrieron en la pena de confiscacion, segun las ordenanzas y prácticas Españolas, los buques neutros que entraron ó intentaron en ellas. Los deseos de ver terminada la parte especial de la mision de V. S^a. me han dictado este medio que espero sea aceptado por V. S^a. como el mas breve y que puede tener un resultado mas satisfactorio.

Las observaciones de V. S^a. relativamente á la goleta Libertad están fundados sobre informes falsos ó equivocados. No solamente no venia en auxilio de nuestra Esquadra el cargamento de víveres que ella trahia, sino que se ha denunciado como propiedad de Españoles que habian mandado aquellos fondos á Martinica para comprar víveres. Esta denunciacion fué despreciada, por que no se creyó necesario saber á quien pertenecia el cargamento quando no admitia duda la violacion del bloqueo.

El derecho de retaliacion de que he hablado á V. S^a. nos autoriza para executar contra nuestra enemiga la España las leyes y prácticas que ella exerce contra Venezuela, sean, ó nó, en perjuicio de los neutros; sin que en este caso nuestra conducta pueda caracterisarse de innovacion ó transgresion de la ley pública. La nacion, que quebrante primero la ley, es la única que puede llamarse infractora: y es la sola responsable de este atentado. El enemigo que se sirve de las

minimas armas con que se le ofende, no hace sino defenderse. Esta es la ley mas antigua y la mas universalmente conocida y practicada.

Yo no sé qué fuerza puede darse al papel dirigido por el Almirante Brion al Sobrecargo Lamson ofreciendole que seria bien tratado. El Almirante suponía que la Tigre no hubiese violado el bloqueo, por que habiendolo hecho ni el Almirante ni nadie podia absolverla de la pena á que la ley la condenaba.

El nombramiento de árbitros que pronuncien sobre la legalidad del bloqueo, segun he propuesto arriba, me exime de extender mas esta contestacion. Yo recomiendo, pues, á V. S^a. que tome en consideracion este medio, y me participe en resolucion ácerca de él. Creo que es este el testimonio mas claro que puedo dar de la rectitud é imparcialidad de mis intenciones.

Tengo el honor de reiterar los homenajes sinceros de respeto y alta consideracion con que soy

de V. S.

el mas atento adicto servidor

BOLÍVAR.

Angostura 29 de Setiembre de 1818, 8^o

Señor Agente

Al proponer á V. S^a. en mi comunicacion del 25 el juicio de árbitros para terminar nuestra presente conferencia, fué mi objeto principal abreviarla, y apartar de la decision hasta la mas ligera sombra de parcialidad. No aceptando V. S. aquel medio, y extendiendo sus razones sobre los mismos principios, antes alegados, me veo forzado por su última nota del 26 á resolver de una vez la cuestión.

En 24 del proximo pasado Agosto dixe á V. S., que los procedimientos judiciales de nuestro Tribunal de Almirantazgo serian la regla á que me referiria en la discusion del derecho. Los hechos, que V. S. ha presentado, no destruyen la verdad de los que constan en los procesos seguidos en nuestro Almirantazgo, ni es posible despreciar estos en contraposicion de informes particulares, sin faltar gravemente al respeto debido á las leyes.

Aunque V. S^a. en sus últimas notas se ha esforzado por probar, que la Libertad venia á buscar un mercado ente [*sic*] Angostura y Paria, yo no encuentro fundado en ninguna probabilidad este argumento, y mucho menos el que se inclinase á buscar nuestra Esquadra con preferencia. En el *conocimiento* del buque constaba que su destino era para Demararí, y el Capitan Hil en su declaracion añade que haciendo camino hacía allí, supo el estado en que se hallaba Angostura, y se dirigió aquí. La segunda parte del argumento es, no solamente falsa,

sino inverosímil. La Libertad fue encontrada por nuestras fuerzas sutiles, avisada del bloqueo y mandada salir previniendole hablase antes con el Almirante Brion, que estaba ya en el rio. Ella manifestó querer salir mientras estuvieron presentes nuestras cañoneras; pero inmediatamente que se separaron estas siguió su viaje para esta plaza, y fué alcanzada remontando el rio. Si su destino hubiera sido proveer á nuestra Esquadra, ella habria ido á buscarla, ó por lo menos, la habria aguardado. Lexos de ser esta su conducta, ella no huye y procura burlar nuestro bloqueo. Yo no veo en todo esto un solo hecho que acredite los deseos de servir á nuestros buques.

La consuncion de los víveres por nuestras tropas ó tripulaciones no liberta á los dueños de la Libertad de la pena que merecian por su violacion. No puede concebirse, como es que la justicia ó injusticia de un hecho depende de las circunstancias ó situacion en que nos encontramos. Segun el argumento de V. S^a. podria decirse que la miseria ó abundancia, en que nos hallasemos, debia influir en el dro [derecho] de confiscar la Libertad; pero con la notable diferencia de que V. S^a. quiere que por lo mismo que necesitabamos el cargamento, debimos pagarlo y dexar absuelto el buque.

Si V. S^a. no se ha convencido de que el derecho de retaliacion es aplicable á los neutros, es por que V. S^a. quiere confundir la ley pública con la civil de cada Pueblo. Un individuo, es verdad, no tiene derecho para faltar á otro, por que este le haya faltado: la conducta de cada uno debe ser conforme á la ley y no conforme á la de sus conciudadanos. Las naciones se gobiernan por otras reglas. Entre estas no se conoce ley que pueda obligar á una parte, quando la contraria se cree fuera de ella. Por repetidas ocasiones he demostrado á V. S^a. que Venezuela está en este caso en su actual lucha con la España, y ademas he añadido que aun quando por derecho de retaliacion no fuesen confiscables los buques en cuestión, lo son por las ordenanzas de Corzo, que rigen en nuestras Tribunales de Almirantazgos, hasta que pacificada la República podamos mejorar nuestro código é instituciones.

Despues de las muchas razones que he presentado á V. S^a. para demostrar la realidad del bloqueo por mar y tierra, quando me bastaba el segundo, no hallo á qué atribuir la pertinacia de V. S^a., en sostener la nulidad de ambos, sino á los informes siniestros ó equivocados que habrá recibido. La última nota de V. S^a. me acaba de persuadir que es esta la verdadera cama. De otro modo no se atreveria V. S^a. á estarme hechos, que habiendo pasado por mi vista, los desconozco quando V. S^a. los describe. Tal es el del *bergatin favorecido por el viento y las corrientes apresado por un destacamento de nadadores.*

Sin duda, el que dió á V. S^a. este informe, habia oido hablar de los pasages del Caura y del Apure, en que algunos nadadores abordaron las cañoneras enemigas, y confundió estos sucesos con el apresamiento del bergatin, tomado por nuestras flecheras en frente de Panapana. Pero es bien lamentable que la fuente de que V. S^a. extrahe todas las noticias, á que se refiere con respecto al bloqueo de esta plaza, esté tan viciada ó mal instruida de ellas. El aportadero de flecheras situado arriba de la boca del Infierno, se llama en su relacion cuerpo de Caballeria, y el acto de remontar el rio la Libertad, segun las declaraciones del Capital [*sic*] IIill y del Almirante, V. S^a. dice que es baxarlo á encontrar la Esquadra. Estoy seguro que si V. S^a. hubiese tenido exactos informes de todas las circunstancias, y si no hubiese creido parciales los que yo le he dirigido, habriamos convenido desde el principio en la legitimidad de las condenas.

Sin embargo de todo lo que V. S^a. ha expuesto para probar la nulidad del bloqueo por la insuficiencia de nuestras fuerzas, yo creo que él ha sido efectivo. Aun prescindiendo de que cada Pueblo en guerra es árbitro absoluto para decidir sobre la especie y número de Tropas que debe emplear en sus operaciones militares, sin que ningun neutro pueda mezclarse en definir las que se necesitan para la empresa, por que esto seria dictar leyes fuera de su jurisdiccion, tengo en apoyo de mi opinion el resultado de nuestro bloqueo, y el conocimiento de las fuerzas bloqueadas que es la regla mas cierta.

Fundado, pues en todas estas razones y las mas de que he instruido á V. S^a. en mis anteriores comunicaciones, á que me refiero, creo haber satisfecho y persuadido á V. S^a. la justicia con que fueron dictadas las condenas. Las leyes se han cumplido en ellas, y no me juzgo autorizado para alterarlas ó infringirlas á favor de los dueños de las goletas Tigre y Libertad. Esta es la única respuesta que puedo dar á V. S^a. en conclusion de nuestra presente conferencia.

Con sentimientos de la mas alta consideracion y sincera amistad tengo el honor de repetirme

de V. S^a.

atento, adicto servidor

BOLÍVAR.

Angostura 7 de Octubre de 1818. 8º

Señor Agente

Tengo el honor de acusar á V. S^a. la recepcion de su nota de 1º del corriente, en que se despide V. S^a. de la conferencia sobre las capturas que V. S^a. insiste en llamar ilegales. Despues de haber recibido V. S^a. una respuesta conclusiva y final y *quando ya no existen*

las ilusorias esperanzas de compensacion ni de persuacion parecia acusado el poco provechoso y superfluo empeño de refutar mis asunciones y errores. Si en efecto juzgaba V. S^a. de este modo quando escribia su nota, habria sido mejor que se hubiese ahorrado la pena de responder mis argumentos reincidiendo en las mismas faltas, que procuró corregir, de su comunicaciones de 6, 10, y 15 del pasado.

Si los testimonios, que V. S^a. tiene en su poder, siete meses há, son los que ha extractado en el párrafo 2º de su nota, no sé de donde deduzca V. S^a. que el 3^{er} párrafo de mi anterior los confirma. Jamas pude decir que la Libertad fué escoltada por nuestras flecheras ni que la casualidad de haberse baxado fuese la causa de haberse separado de ellas. Seguramente V. S^a. habrá leído muy precipitadamente el párrafo en cuestión, ó no lo ha entendido. Pero aun quando fuese efectiva la escolta, ó guardia que V. S^a. quiere suponer, esto no significaria sino que nuestras flecheras temian que la Libertad procediese de tan mala fé como su conducta posterior demostró. Ademas de esta observacion me permitiria V. S^a. que añada que nuestra Esquadra tenia un verdadero interes en no abandonar la Libertad mientras no estuviese segura de que no emprenderia entrar á las plazas bloqueadas. La órden que se le dió, para que hablase con el Almirante, fué con el objeto de que él la examinase, y no para despojarla del cargamento, como tan gratuitamente se ha querido suponer.

Es bien estraño que remita V. S^a. la fuerza de mis argumentos sobre retaliacion á la opinion de qualquier autor que yo pueda citar. La razon y la justicia no necesitan de otros apoyos que de sí mismas para presentarse: los autores no les dan ninguna fuerza. En toda mi correspondencia he evitado las citas, por que solo sirven para hacerla pasada y enfadosa, y por que he notado que las pocas que he hecho, instado por el ejemplo de V. S^a., han merecido su desprecio.

Desearia saber el nombre del *Comandante de la partida de caballeria llanera nadadora* que instruyó á V. S^a. del *apresamiento del bergatin favorecido por el viento y las corrientes.* V. S^a. *reitera este singular pero ilustrativo incidente* con tal firmeza y seguridad que me inclino á creer sea este algun suceso (que no haya llegado hasta ahora á mi noticia) diferente del que expuse á V. S^a. en mi anterior. Es muy difícil que así sea; pero tampoco puedo persuadirme que haya habido quien se divierta engañando á V. S^a. con cuentos. V. S^a. me obligaria muy particularmente citandome el autor de este.

Hasta aquí he podido contestar la nota de V. S^a. en cuestión; pero al llegar al párrafo *Pleasant enough in all conscience!* debo suspender la pluma como he suspendido mi juicio, para que no degeneren en farza nuestra correspondencia. No me atrevo á creer que sea el objeto

de V. S^a. convertir en ridículo una conferencia seria por sí misma, y por las personas que tratan, ni puedo persuadirme que ignore V. S^a. el paso estrecho y peligroso del Orinoco por entre dos peñas, que forman la boca llamado *del Infierno*, única causa de equivocacion de encuentro en el párrafo de mi nota transcrito por V. S^a. en la suya. El proverbio jocoso de la *Caballeria nadadora*, si es que lo ha sido, debe aludir á las brillantes y gloriosas jornadas en que pequeños cuerpos patriotas de esta arma han atravesado á nado los caudalosos rios Caura, Caroní y Apure, desalojando y batiendo las tropas Españolas que se les oponian y abordando buques de guerra. El amor á la Patria y á la gloria solos han dirigido estas empresas, que, lexos de ser risibles, merecen la admiracion y aplausos de los que tienen una Patria y aman su libertad. Repito a V. S^a. lo que he dicho arriba suplicandole que relea con mas atencion mi oficio del 29. Es preciso querer trastornar su sentido é investir sus frases para atribuirse V. S^a. lo que yo decia de las noticias que ha recibido, privadamente, de fuentes que, á la verdad no están mal instruidas, sino viciadas.

Quisiera terminar esta nota desentendiendome del penúltimo párrafo de la de V. S^a. por que siendo en extremo chocante é injurioso al Gobierno de Venezuela seria preciso para contestarlo usar del mismo lenguaje de V. S^a., tan contrario á la modestia y decoro con que por mi parte he conducido la cuestión. El pertinaz empeño y acaloramiento de V. S^a. en sostener lo que no es defensible sino atacando nuestros derechos, me hace extender la vista mas allá del objeto á que la ceñia nuestra conferencia. Parece que el intento de V. S^a. es forzarme á que recíproque los insultos: no lo haré; pero si protesto á V. S^a. que no permitiré que se ultrage ni desprecie al Gobierno y los derechos de Venezuela. Defendiendolos contra la España ha desaparecido una gran parte de nuestra poblacion y el resto que queda ansia por merecer igual suerte. Lo mismo es para Venezuela combatir contra España que contra el mundo entero, si todo el mundo la ofende.

Concluyo celebrando con V. S^a. la despedida del asunto, que doy por terminado, y renovandole los testimonios del aprecio y consideracion con que tengo el honor de ser

de V. S^a.

el mas atento adicto serv^d.

BOLÍVAR.

Angostura 12 de Octubre de 1818, 8^o

Señor Agente

Con mucha razon dice V. S^a. en su nota de 8 del corriente (que tuve el honor de recibir oportunamente) que mi comunicacion del 7

fué leída con sorpresa de parte de V. Sa., porque no esperaba una nueva carta sin que hubiese precidido una nueva proposicion. Si la nota de V. Sa. de 1º del corriente se hubiese limitado a despedirse del asunto, y no hubiese V. Sa. añadido otras observaciones, su sorpresa habria sido justa, como lo ha sido la mia al ver renovar una cuestión que, despues de la mas prolixa discusion, ha sido terminada formalmente por mi parte.

Aun quando los argumentos de que V. Sa. se sirve, fueron nuevos, y no una repeticion de los que he respondido ya, no me empeñaria en contestarlos, para que no crea V. Sa. que acepto y entro otra vez en la conferencia. Reclamo, sin embargo, el permiso de V. Sa. para repetirle, que si hay algunas apariencias o pretextos, para negar el bloqueo marítimo de esta plaza, es preciso estar ciego á la luz y á la razon para afirmar, que el de tierra *era una fantasma*, ó por lo menos, es necesario confundir el sitio con el bloqueo, y exigir para este lo que no corresponde sino á aquel. La ley de las naciones y la Española que he citado á V. Sa. no hablan sino de bloqueo para el qual basta que se prive á la plaza la introduccion de provisiones, tomando las avenidas ó caminos sin necesidad de establecer atrincheramientos ni formar lineas de circunvalacion, ni contravalacion. Jamas fué nuestro objeto sitiár á Angostura: nuestras operaciones y posiciones siempre fueron de bloqueadores.

El hecho de haber incendiado el bergatin, no arguye contra la existencia de nuestras fuerzas sutiles, ni prueba que fué abordado nadando. Nosotros no teniamos gente de mar para tripularlo ni puerto cómodo y seguro para conservarlo. Esta es la causa para haberlo quemado, lo mismo que hicimos con los demas buques mayores que se apresaron, aun quando eran tomados á gran distancia de las cañoneras enemigas. Las mismas flecheras que se apoderaron del bergatin, reforzadas poco despues con las del apostadero de San Miguel, batieron y tomaron los buques de guerra Españoles situados en Faxardo y pasaron al frente de esta plaza, por medio de toda la Esquadra Española, para ir á batir la expedicion que salió de aqui contra el apostadero que teniamos establecido arriba de la boca del Infierno. Logrado este suceso completamente, regresaron á sus antiguas posiciones volviendose á burlar de la plaza y de los buques de guerra. El Coronel Eugenio Roxas, á quien no conozco, y el Teniente Coronel Rodriguez podian haber dado á V. Sa. noticia de todas estas operaciones efectivas, en lugar de los cuentos que se han divertido en inventar.

Nada, de quanto V. Sa. diga, puede destruir la superioridad de nuestro ejército de tierra sobre el enemigo, y lo que V. Sa. alega para probar la insuficiencia de nuestras fuerzas navales, convencerá, á lo

mas que nuestra Esquadra no constaba de tantos buques como la Española, que el acto de evacuar las plazas y el rio, fué engrosada con los buques mercantes armados y tripulados con parte de la artilleria y con las guarniciones de los puestos que abandonaba. Pero si eramos tan inferiores ¿por que no se atrevió á presentarnos batalla? ¿por que en una persecucion de mas de cincüenta leguas no nos esperó, ni nos obligó á desistir de ella? ¿por que huyendo en una dispersion espantosa se dexó apresar una multitud de buques, la mayor parte de ellos armados? El valor y la habilidad, Señor Agente, suplen con ventaja al número. Infelices los hombres si estas virtudes morales no equilibrasen y aun superasen las físicas! El amo del Reyno mas poblado sería bien pronto Señor de toda la tierra. Por fortuna se ha visto con frecuencia un puñado de hombres libres vencer á Imperios poderosos.

Siento que las nuevas luces con que ha querido V. S^a. ilustrar la cuestión sobre las capturas, lexos de desengañarme, como V. S^a. espera, me confirmen mas y mas en mi opinion de su legalidad. No creo que haya ningun argumento bastante fuerte, para que pueda contraponerse ó balancear siquiera la autoridad de las leyes que se han aplicado. Así tengo derecho para esperar que cese la correspondencia de que han sido objeto.

Con sinceros sentimientos de amistad y consideracion tengo el honor de ser

de V. S^a.

el mas atento adicto serv^d.

BOLÍVAR.

*A Premature Celebration*¹

Governor Gomez received us with marked attention and civility, and urged us to accompany him to visit the Governor General, Arismendi, and Admiral Brion at their special request. Remounting our horses we found our retinue augmented by the generals staff officers, two llaneros or lancers preceeding us. Having passed the central mountain ridge, whose top is fortified (near the road) and commands the defiles and valley on both sides, we continued our route towards the village of Pueblo del Norte, (the only one on the island which the Spaniards happened to leave unburned) on this side of which we were met by a detachment of dragoons under Col. Jackson and young Arismendi dispatched by general Arismendi to escort us to the village of Griego. On alighting we found the little neighborhood in commotion, the population all crowding to see us. Yankee Doodle was struck up by the band, and the fort fired a salute. *Such extreme pains to do*

¹ Irvine to J. Q. Adams. June 14, 1818. Griego, Marguerita. Underlinings by Irvine.

us honor embarrassed us not a little, especially as we soon perceived that they were probably occasioned by a false impression viz, that our government had formally recognized the independence of Venezuela and that the Hornet was the herald of the glad tidings. To enquiries on this point I vaguely and cautiously answered that there was a *time for everything*, that our government had *in effect* recognized the South American states as independent powers, as might be seen by the president's message. The disappointment did not abate the friendly hospitality of the Venezuelan chiefs and officers. Indeed the toasts at dinner were principally composed of compliments to the American people and government. "The President of the United States," being first given, though a majority of the company were British and Irish Officers.

Irvine to Bolívar September 26, 1818 Angostura

Probably a re-examination of your letters and mine will convince your Excellency, that all your remarks on retaliation have been answered, when you carry retaliation to the length of atonement, it was not to be expected that I should employ much reasoning, since what is unsupported by law, or color of law, must fall to the ground. The doctrine of expiation may be good theology, according to various religious systems ancient and modern, but it forms no part of the law of nations. *Neutrals cannot be disturbed, much less punished, for the excesses of a belligerent.*—To suppose it, seems monstrous. . . . In truth there is no foundation for your doctrine. No jurist of ancient or modern times ever broached it. Your argument goes to dissolve the bonds of international law. But you ought to consider, that the outrages of A confer no right on B to cancel his obligation to C, or to others. . . . I ought here to apprise you, or rather I ought to have done it long since, that Morillos' paper Blockades, and those of Admiral Brion stand on a par, in relation to us, whose Commerce they unjustly abridged.

The American Book you quote, only proves the ignorance of the writer or compilers. Our Reporters, Cranch, Wheaton etc. would have given you correct information. . . .

Your Excellency's proposition of an Arbitration could only postpone a decision of what we perfectly understand. A delay of justice is sometimes equal to a denial of it. Between Citizens of the same Country and Government, arbitration is a salutary, excellent practice. Between men of different Nations and languages it is almost impracticable—I have no authority for accepting the proposal, nor would if I had—For, were there independent, practical merchants here, the terms

of your proposition being founded on "Spanish Ordinances and usages," and not on the general law of nations, are inapplicable.

I am not a little surprized at being so often presented with the effigies of blockade by sea or land. . . .

To pretend, then, to confiscate one Vessel for the breach of an imaginary blockade, and another for an intention to violate what had not legal existence, and of which he had not regular warning, is to assume a position not tenable by the law of nations.

*Irvine Caustically Describes Bolivar**

Bolivar's proclamation is well calculated to answer the purpose of its author: under a pretense of humility and disinterestedness, he wishes to perpetuate his power by planting himself at the head of the new government. By formally proffering to restore the sovereign power to the people, he insinuates that his dictatorial policy was conferred upon him by the people; which is not the fact. A small faction in the city of Caracas *nominated* him, and subsequently, a few persons in the island of Margarita named him commander in chief. As this occurred when he was in deep disgrace, which further developments confirmed more and more,—as the desertion of his companion by a silent and shameful flight from OCumara etc. Piar, Mariño, and Bermudez, if I am rightly informed, refused at the time to acknowledge it.¹ We have since seen that he took the first opportunity of being avenged of the first. Many do not hesitate to assert that this was P's real offence, the other pretext being a false imputation.

You must not mind the flourishes of this man, if you would extract fact from his speeches; because dissimulation, hardness in assertion, and a spirit of intrigue, a determination to gain his ambitious ends by any means, are the leading traits of his character. He contrives everything *ad captandum vulgus*. It is no exaggeration to say, that he would disregard the perpetration of any crime (perhaps regard it as meritorious) if it favored his designs; provided concealment and im-

* Irvine to John Quincy Adams, Oct. 29, 1818, Angostura.

¹ When Bolivar came to Guiria from Bonaine; after his second—(for he has had more flights than Mahomet) he was almost hissed. He begged however for a hearing from Piar, Mariño and Bermudez: In this they indulged him; but to avoid contempt, he was obliged to reembark. Even Brion was so disgusted with his repeated failures and flights, that he peremptorily swore, he (Bolivar) *must return to the continent and fight it out*. He gave him the Diana to carry him, but not a soul would accompany him except one Perez, then a poor lieutenant and his present aid-de-camp—It was in obeying Brion that he experienced the reception and rebuke at Guiria, already mentioned. (Irvine's footnote.)

punity were certain. Most of his speeches are intended to gain him eclat abroad, the population here being so debased (with few exceptions) as to be scarcely worthy of the dexterous acts of deception. Therefore the "tenders" of B. in this proclamation are like Pollonius's view of Hamlet's profession: "mere springs to catch wood-cocks." By vaulting into the new saddle, he expects to ride over Paez, and others who rendered important service to their country and raised its declining heart whilst he was a fugitive in the islands. How things will eventuate I need not guess. Whatever be the form of government, this population are incapable of self government. In effect, all power and influence must remain in the hands of a very few.

Public pecuniary embarrassment, the apprehension of being rejected by Paez, etc. etc. the moment that public exigency ceases, and a *notion* he imbibed from one of my letters, (though I neither intended nor was authorized to convey it,) that the Government of the United States would never recognize his dictatorial power, are the causes of the present venture.

Seeing that Gen. B.'s renunciation of civil power was unequivocal and absolute, I enquired of Dr. Cadiz whether the intent corresponded to the words. He answered that the Supreme Chief still exercised all his wanted power. I felt humbled as a human being when I was driven to convict a "Supreme Chief" of mendacity. Such was the naked fact. . . .

Without an element of military instruction, he affects the language of Napoleon; without a ray of true political knowledge, or a hint of morality, he apes the style and (it is said) claims the character of a Washington. However he possesses some education, and can surpass all his present competitors by his knack of composition and fluency of speech. A man's superiority is judged by a comparison with those around him—not by a foreign standard.

*An American Democrat Reports on the Congress of Angostura*¹

. . . The members were convened at the palace of the government, (at 11 o'clock a.m.) whither General Bolivar, with his suite and prin-

¹ Irvine to J. A. Adams. Angostura. February 16, 1819. J. P. Hamilton and Irvine were the only foreigners invited to witness this event. Inasmuch as Hamilton represented the important British merchants of Angostura and Irving was the "*Comisionado de los Estados Unidos*," they were given seats of honor according to Felipe Larrazabal, *Vida Del Libertador Simon Bolivar*, Madrid, 1918 (Blanco-Fombona Edition), Vol. II, p. 166. Hamilton apparently was not moved to write anything concerning his impressions of the Congress.

Irvine rhapsodized concerning the Congress in other places too. William White

cial officers repaired thither [*sic*] about the same time.—As soon as the deputies were seated and the assembly composed, General B. addressed them from the chair in a set Discourse of great length.—He appeared to have studied it with no little pains.—It is an essay on government, the scope of which is to prove that, while it is extremely desirable to establish the freest possible, a very free one is impracticable in Venezuela, whose circumstances he painted in colors by no means flattering and took the liberty, whilst pronouncing this part of the discourse, to submit his project of a constitution, laying it on the table before the president's chair.² He ran over the history of republics ancient and modern, to cite instances, it appeared to me, of the perishable nature of free governments; stating several facts, or truisms, as others had stated them.—The people of the United States, cradled in liberty, and enjoying peculiar advantages, he extolled to the skies—but took care to treat of them and their institutions as unusual, an *exception*, in short, from the general character of man, and of ordinary government.—He spoke of England's constitution nearly as De Lolme does, representing it as offering three finished models, of monarchy, (or an executive,) of aristocracy and *democracy*.—I suspect he is not aware, that the people REALLY ELECT only 171 out of 658 members of the house of commons. However, I refrain from criticizing the Discourse at this time.—He represented the wisdom and justice of rewarding public benefactors by public honor and trust; and hinted that the generals of Venezuela had well-founded claims to constitute the major part of the *permanent, hereditary senate* he proposed.

When he had concluded his speech, which he pronounced with great animation, he administered the oath of office to the members, and resigned the chair to Mr. Zea, the president of congress. The latter made a very sensible, extemporaneous speech on the occasion, paying many compliments,—pronouncing indeed an eulogium on General Bolivar, more especially on his recent conduct.—This drew from that gentleman a declaration which excited no little wonder.—Having risen, as Dr. Zea made a finish, to return thanks in the name

wrote Francisco A. Zea that "Mr. Irvine, en una lucida concurrencia, hablo con entusiasmo de la instalacion del Congreso, del discurso de Vd., de los grandes y heroicos sentimientos que todos y U. principalmente habian manifestado, asegurandoles, que ni en el Senado de los Estados Unidos habia visto tanto decoro y tanta dignidad como en la sesion del Congreso aquel dia." *Memorias del General O'Leary*. Simon B. O'Leary (Ed.). Caracas. 1880. Vol. IX, p. 246.

² A federal constitution he decided as utterly unsuitable, being too complicated. (Irvine's footnote.)

of the army or officers, he distinctly and unequivocally proclaimed his determination to retire into private life the moment the war should be terminated. He would not even accept any civil office. The rights and title of citizen from fellow-citizens was all he aspired to. When he retired, *Viva el General Bolivar!* resounded through the house, and his concluding declaration was the common talk.

Congress remained together some time after, and confirmed the military appointment of the *late* Supreme Chief. A motion was made to confirm all anterior acts in a lump, which a person present told me drew from Dr. Roscio, a warm and independent speech; exhorting that body against acting precipitately in any case, and cautioning them not even to pass over light affairs lightly; for, however they might think of themselves, their names and their conduct would form part of the history of Venezuela and be handed down to posterity.

Today, the Congress appointed General Bolivar, president of state and generalissimo of the army, with discretionary power in the latter quality. The former office is to continue until a constitution and laws shall have been formed, and a new government be ready to go into operation—though it is not so expressed. Dr. Zea will act as vice-president (or president of the congress) and in the absence of Bolivar, discharge the duties of president of state.

I received so much gratification from the events of yesterday, that, as we have had our imaginations filled with stories of Pegasus-es and pigeons, and griffins etc. conveying through the air, I wished on the occasion I had command over some thing, bird as Ariel, which would by volitation, convey the news to Washington by next morning. I can not do it with a hundredth part of the celerity I wish. This Congress, I think, will do all that circumstances permit to promote the cause of liberty, but they have a thousand obstacles before them. In their hal-lowed, *legitimate* exertions, they deserve the support of free governments, as far as it can be rendered.—There is some dearth of talents among them but there are 5 or 6 of the 30 (only 27 present) possessed of solid abilities.

The late act of renunciation on the part of Bolivar, serves to veil the vices and errors of his previous career. His failings and virtues, variously represented now, we shall leave to the historians of this revolution to depict. There are many persons here who do not hesitate to assign *necessity*, arising from incapacity and disappointment, as the sole cause of his resignation. To adopt this explanation of motives were to divert his previous conduct of all title to respect or admiration. It is more liberal, just and charitable to attribute good acts to good motives. . . . The account of services and abuses he must settle with his

fellow citizens. Bolivar's ambition has been excessive. There cannot be a more remarkable instance than his reservation of the liberation of New Granada to himself, as we have seen, by his preventing supplies and excluding others. He resolved that the fame of the achievement should be his own. So, as has often been noticed, the famous *Vasco Nuñez de Balboa*, in his expedition to discover the Pacific Ocean, at Darien, made his little army halt at the foot of the great mountain, from whose top as his guide assured him he should descry the *new ocean*, and resolved to climb the sierra alone, "*para no partir con otros el honor de tan importante descubrimiento.*" Such is the vanity, or love of distinction that actuates mankind, though ambition is said to be the disease of noble minds.

. . . I am not inclined . . . I repeat, to derogate from the merits of General Bolivar on this occasion. He must be disinterested, *quo ad hoc*, since he avows his determination to accept no official honors or public spoils—and, admitting that he thought the measure necessary to save the country, and increase confidence at home and abroad, he would still deserve applause for adopting it. His political project, that of a perpetual senate particularly, is weak and vulnerable—an aristocracy of that kind being the worst of all administrations, incurable because unalterable. He recommended freedom of the press and religion, and all practicable encouragement to education. These being the best means of forming capable citizens, unite the approbation of all thinking men.

BOOK REVIEWS

Historia de Cuba en sus relaciones con los Estados Unidos y España.

By HERMINIO PORTELL VILÁ. [Biblioteca de Historia, Filosofía y Sociología, Vols. 3 and 4.] (Habana: Jesus Montero, 1939. 2 vols. Pp. 508 and 560. \$4.00 each.)

The title of this extensive work, *Historia de Cuba en sus relaciones con los Estados Unidos y España*, does not exactly indicate its content. It is in fact a study of the relations of the United States with Cuba and with Spain in reference to Cuba, which covers the period down to 1878. The author, now a professor in the University of Havana, had excellent opportunity in the preparation of the volumes. While in exile during the Machado regime he held a fellowship of the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation which permitted him to carry on his studies without interruption for several years. He examined thoroughly the records of the Department of State, and the work is based principally on these materials. He also used manuscript collections of the Library of Congress and of other places in the United States. For Spanish sources he depended largely upon the volumes of Jerónimo Becker, *Historia de las relaciones exteriores de España durante el siglo XIX* (Madrid, 1924). Since the documents of the office of the Captain General of Cuba were removed from the General Archive of Cuba to the Archive of the Indies in Seville in the 1880's, they were not readily available and use of these papers was confined to photographic copies in the Library of Congress. The utilization of the American sources is predominant and all the quotations are in the original English so that the work is bi-lingual in character, and the reader of necessity must be master of both languages.

According to the author the work is "a thesis which aspires to prove that the history of Cuba is worthy, stimulating, full of educative examples, and sufficient upon which to construct the future of a country admirably endowed to be happy, rich, free, and respectable." It is written from a decidedly pro-Cuban standpoint and is frankly a polemical treatise. The author never loses sight of what he believes to have been the errors of the American Government and its leaders. The acts of omission or commission which he finds were not to the advantage of Cuba are condemned. In general everything the United States or Spain did with reference to Cuba was wrong, and contrari-

wise everything that Cuba did merited praise. Dr. Portell Vilá writes with fervor and emotion, firmly convinced of the righteousness of the Cuban cause at all times. He freely uses adjectives and expressions of a highly critical and disparaging nature in speaking of Americans who had a share in Cuban relations. Presidents, Secretaries of State, members of Congress, and others are characterized adversely if their actions do not find favor. Only rarely is there someone to whom a word of praise is accorded. There is much repetition, especially of characterizations of individuals and statements regarding the injustices which it is believed Cuba suffered. Cuba is repeatedly compared to parts of the United States and to the other American republics, always to the advantage of Cuba. The author is particularly severe toward John Quincy Adams and Hamilton Fish. The former is criticized as the author of "the law of the political gravitation of Cuba to the United States" and of the phrase "most upright and honorable man" as applied to Captain General Vives whose administration of Cuba was so oppressive. Fish is termed a "colorless politician of New York" and an "enemy of the independence of Cuba." Likewise Webster is considered "the persecutor of the Cuban liberators"; Polk, a "mediocre man in talent and culture," but one who had "a high degree of the audacity of a victor, a product of his mental provincialism"; Buchanan, the "eternal partisan of the annexation of Cuba"; and Seward, the "friend of the slave-holders of Cuba." However, for Abraham Lincoln and John Hay there are words of commendation.

Two chapters of the first volume are devoted to background and the English-American and Spanish-Cuban relations down to the end of our war for independence. These are followed by chapters on *The First Phase of American Expansion (1783-1805)*; *Toward Cuba (1805-1820)*; *The Turkey of America (1820-1831)*; *Political Gravitation (1831-1844)*; and *Manifest Destiny (1844-1853)*. The phrasing of these titles indicates something of the trend of treatment. Volume II comprises three lengthy chapters entitled, *The Legend of the Africanization of Cuba (1853-60)*; *Secession in the United States: Reform in Cuba (1860-1868)*; and *The Ten Years' War (1868-1878)*. This last chapter of 338 pages is divided into seven sections treating the successive phases of the relations during that epic struggle of Cuba for independence.

In treating the Spanish-American revolutionary period Dr. Portell Vilá expresses the firm conviction that Cuba was as well prepared as the other Spanish-American colonies to acquire independence, and that it would have done so except for the fact that the United States failed to accord the same aid to Cuba that was given to the other colonies in

their struggle against the mother country. Concluding the chapter on The Turkey of America, which covers the era when John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, and James Monroe directed the policies regarding Cuba, he asserts:

The Cuban incapacity for self-government was but a hypocritical pretext, as false as that of the heterogeneity of the population and the imminent uprising of the African slaves if a Cuban revolution should be initiated. Cuba had a population and a directing class adequate to assure the success of an independent nation on the island, even greater than many of the states of the American Union and of the new [Spanish-American] republics, and it surpassed almost all of them in the volume of its commerce. The direct obstacle for the freedom of Cuba, the cause by which it remained in the hands of Spain, was the ambition of the United States for the annexation of the Turkey of America.

In the chapter on Manifest Destiny, which includes a discussion of the expedition of Narciso López, the author holds the theory that López had no annexationist ideas. He admits that there were Cubans in favor of annexation but does not condemn them as he does the Americans who supported this idea. He adds that the opposition of the United States to López was due to fear that he would prevent annexation.

Under the heading, Secession in the United States, much interesting data on the important relation of Cuba to the Civil War is presented. The author describes the aid to the cause of the Confederacy, which is criticized for the "insincerity and unworthiness" of its policy toward Spain and Cuba. The lengthy chapter on The Ten Years' War gives with great detail the charges against Fish and the others for their attitude towards the struggle. It is asserted that the doctrine of that period was "Cuba, Spanish or American, but not Cuban." Also it is maintained that the United States should have joined the Latin-American states in their recognition of Cuban independence at that time.

Throughout the volumes there is much information as to the commercial relations and the growth of the population of Cuba. Besides this there is little which deals with the general internal history of the island. Extensive notes and references are placed at the end of each volume, and numerous illustrations add to the value of the work.

Dr. Portell Vilá is to be congratulated on the publication of the results of his extensive research. While most Americans will not agree with many of his conclusions and criticisms, yet it will be admitted that the author has presented an interesting and detailed account of the relations of the United States and Cuba down to 1878. Two addi-

tional volumes are announced to carry the story into the period of the Cuban Republic.

ROSCOE R. HILL.

The National Archives.

The Caribbean Danger Zone. By J. FRED RIPPY. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940. Pp. ix, 264. \$3.50.)

Professor Rippy has written a valuable outline of the extensive literature on the Caribbean area. This region has long been familiar to many Americans. Since colonial times, Yankee skippers have taken their cargoes to the islands in the old Spanish Main in order to exchange them for the real wealth of the Indies. After the establishment of the American Government in 1789, successive Secretaries of State looked with acquisitive eyes upon these islands which they were certain would eventually belong to the United States through the operation of that law of political gravitation which was popularly known as the doctrine of Manifest Destiny. But this destiny was long deferred, and it was not until the turn of the twentieth century that American expansion in the Caribbean became an important part of the American way of political life.

American imperialism is a recent chapter in the long history of our foreign relations, but many decades before we entered the international race for colonial empire, the Department of State kept a watchful eye upon European expansion in this hemisphere, and the Monroe Doctrine served as an effective barrier against any attempts to establish new footholds in the Caribbean. After a brief discussion of the Venezuelan incidents of 1895 and 1902, Professor Rippy has a suggestive chapter on the evolution of the Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine. The subsequent application of this Corollary led "to the establishment of the Caribbean protectorates. . . . In order more graciously to regulate the conduct of European states in the Caribbean region, the United States undertook to regulate the conduct of certain nations of the region in respect to Europeans. In that manner a measure of appeasement was mingled with Monrovia defiance of Europe in a vital zone of defense strategy."

The growing interest of the United States in the construction of an isthmian canal, led the Department of State to take an active rôle in preparing the diplomatic front for this important enterprise. In furtherance of this end, James G. Blaine set forth the novel doctrine that conventions like the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty get out of date like last year's clothes, and can be cast aside for new political garments

more suited to the change in diplomatic seasons. But Lord Granville was hopelessly old-fashioned, and thanks to his obduracy, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty remained in vogue in Caribbean fashions until it was finally put on the shelf by the joint labors of Secretary Hay and Lord Pauncefote.

Most Americans have accepted the view that "dollar diplomacy" was the exclusive production of the Taft Administration. Professor Rippy challenges this interpretation and strongly argues that this "new phase was initiated by Theodore Roosevelt, Francis B. Loomis, and Elihu Root. And, more important, it did not terminate on March 4, 1913, when Taft and Knox ceased to control the foreign policies of the United States. It was continued with some reluctance by Woodrow Wilson and William Jennings Bryan and especially by Robert Lansing, . . . and it reached its culmination in the twelve years of Republican rule that followed."

After an interesting discussion of the establishment of American protectorates in the Caribbean, Professor Rippy finally turns to the implications of the Good Neighbor Policy. He inclines towards the view that the "achievements of the totalitarian agitators in Latin America have been exaggerated. . . . Communism has made little progress, and in most countries fascism has recently suffered severe reversals." But despite this slight advance that has been made by fascist agitators, Professor Rippy believes that it would be expedient for the United States to expand the scope of the Good Neighbor Policy and to "make every possible contribution to the productive potentialities of Latin America and take its stand for as fair a distribution of the income of economic activity as can be had." Our national welfare is closely tied to the continued progress of the other nations in this hemisphere, and American hesitation in recognizing this fact would lead to the most grave consequences. The American Government must immediately lay extensive plans for hemispheric defense, and it must be ready "to explore every situation with utmost care in order to reach sound conclusions."

There will be very few students who will dissent from these conclusions of Professor Rippy, and most professors of international relations will welcome this handbook on the Caribbean area.

CHARLES CALLAN TANSILL.

Fordham University.

From Panama to Verdun. My Fight for France. By PHILIPPE BUNAU-VARILLA. (Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company, 1940. Pp. 277. \$2.50.)

Suez and Panama. By ANDRÉ SIEGFRIED. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1940. Pp. 400. \$3.00.)

The first of these volumes, the memoirs of an octogenarian, is decidedly egotistical. *Panama and Verdun* would have been a more accurate title than the one chosen, for the recollections center almost entirely around the author's connection with the Panama Canal and the Verdun phase of World War I. Bunau-Varilla probably is fairly accurate in describing his various activities, but he greatly exaggerates his influence. The bulk of the volume is an account of the now familiar Panama Episode of 1898-1904, with a new detail added here and there. Evidently he wishes the world to know that the Panama Canal would never have been constructed without his intervention. In addition, he claims to have solved the Dreyfus case, introduced a new process of purifying water in France, invented a new type of bridge, and induced the United States to intervene in the Moroccan crisis of 1905-1906. These memoirs, while entertaining, will require caution on the part of the historian. No doubt they will furnish useful material for courses in historical criticism.

Siegfried's work inspires greater confidence. It contains no bibliography and little mention of sources of information; yet one feels that it is based on considerable research. In the main the volume is a study of world shipping, with emphasis upon the Suez and Panama routes and with comparisons of the two. It also includes a brief history of the diplomacy and the construction of the Suez and the Panama canals, and the whole is written in superior style.

J. FRED RIPPY.

University of Chicago.

The Foreign Policy of Thomas F. Bayard. By CHARLES CALLAN TANSILL. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1940. Pp. xxxix. 800. \$5.00.)

Thomas Francis Bayard, secretary of state during President Cleveland's first administration and our first ambassador to Great Britain in his second, has been commonly and mistakenly regarded as merely an adequate head of the Department of State, who became an ineffectual, Anglophile ambassador of the type of Walter Page. Professor Tansill now performs a great service in demonstrating that Bayard was a statesman of high principle and great penetration, that he was,

in fact, one of the rare American secretaries who have combined an intimate knowledge of the scope and traditions of American diplomacy with an acute and prophetic insight into the forces which were playing on those traditions. He was sensitive to opportunities for American business, but made it perfectly clear that "there must be no idea of gunboats in the rear of every contract." He refused to prosecute inadmissible American claims, such as that to sovereignty over the whole Bering Sea; yet American maritime rights have seldom had an abler champion. He was sympathetic to Corean aspirations for independence, while sensibly declining excessive commitments to that remote state. In any accurate sense of the word he was an anti-imperialist; but he foresaw clearly (what Cleveland did not) that the annexation of Hawaii was strategically desirable and probably inevitable. In almost every diplomatic matter with which he dealt, he set important and controlling precedents. As to his good judgment, no more conclusive evidence need be given than that the arbitral awards in the cases of the northeastern fisheries, the fur seal controversy, and the Venezuelan boundary dispute followed substantially the settlements he had attempted to reach by diplomacy. Future historians, however, may consider his chief contribution to American diplomacy to have been his ceaseless efforts to effect a dignified and far-reaching *rapprochement* between Great Britain and the United States. The author has emphasized particularly Bayard's labors in this direction. The dust wrapper, indeed, depicts an instructive cartoon from *Puck* in 1898, paying tribute, in that year of gratitude for English friendship, to his promotion of "good feeling between England and the United States." Certainly nineteen forty is an equally appropriate year for the appearance of Professor Tansill's finished and exhaustive volume about Bayard.

As its title implies, this is more than a biography of Bayard from 1885 to 1897. (The biography will be completed in a forthcoming monograph, *The Political Career of Thomas F. Bayard*, with emphasis on the years from 1865 to 1885.) Professor Tansill has written the authoritative work on Cleveland's whole foreign policy. His knowledge, which is perhaps unrivalled, of the manuscript collections relating to this period in the Library of Congress, the Department of State, and the Canadian archives, is brought fully into play. The use of these sources together with the magnificent Bayard Collection of some two hundred thousand pieces, now first available, render most other treatments of Cleveland's foreign policy obsolete.

On every major issue of diplomacy Professor Tansill alters and enriches previous historical interpretations. The nature of Bayard's

successful sparring with Bismarck in Samoa, the profound interplay of domestic and foreign policy in the Chinese immigration and fisheries issues, the bearing of the Canadian archives on the question of fisheries, sectionalism in American foreign policy, the recrudescence of imperialism in the 1880's, and the respective parts of Bayard and Olney in settling the Venezuelan issue with Great Britain are a few striking examples. The four chapters on Samoa and five on the fisheries are treatises in themselves. Such matters, in addition, as American policy toward Corea, Goldwin Smith and commercial union with Canada, the Cutting case, and the Corinto episode in Nicaragua, hitherto regarded as "minor," are given appropriate and definitive treatment.

Professor Tansill's analysis of the multitude of sources enables him both to amplify general interpretations and to correct specific errors of fact, particularly in the standard biography of Cleveland by Professor Allan Nevins. These amendments have important bearing on both foreign and domestic policy. Professor Tansill has not hesitated, furthermore, to characterize the President and others in vigorous language, describing Cleveland, when the occasion seems to warrant it, as "sophomoric," and Olney as "a Boston barrister who had run berserk on the stage of world politics." Valuable as these opinions are, they are in contrast with the judicial tone of the volume as a whole.

The Fordham University Press is to be complimented on the superb format of this book. Readers may well be grateful for the author's generous quotations from the Bayard Collection and other papers, and for his deft, well-written chapters on complicated issues. Besides elevating Bayard to his just station among American statesmen, Professor Tansill has made one of the important contributions to the history of American diplomacy.

GEORGE YOUNG.

Barnard College.

Guerra del Paraguay. Orígenes y Causas. By RAMÓN J. CÁRCANO de la Academia Nacional de la Historia y Academia Nacional de Letras. Ilustraciones de Luis Seoane. (Buenos Aires: Domingo Viau y Cía., 1939. Pp. 503.)

In this volume a well-known historical writer of Argentina has undertaken to describe in detail the train of events that led to the so-called Paraguayan War which broke out in 1865 between Paraguay, on the one hand, and Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, on the other hand. Señor Cárcano goes back to the disputes between Spain and Portugal in the early days of colonization and traces the tangled his-

tory of the countries lying in the basin of La Plata River from that time to the eve of the Paraguayan War. He considers their rivalries, their internal dissensions, their *caudillos*, and their inter-relations with considerable attention to their boundary problems and to their diplomatic missions. As the reader reaches the latter part of the narrative, the plot thickens and the volume becomes in large part an account of the relations among the four nations that were finally involved in war. Of special interest to North American students is the interpretative account that the author gives of the history of his country during the decade when the important province of Buenos Aires was struggling for domination against the outlying Argentine provinces which were linked together in a loose confederation. In this part of the book special attention is paid to the rôles of Derqui, Mitre, and Urquiza in the critical years that culminated in the battle of Pavón. Clever black-and-white pictures by Luis Seoane of leading personalities in the stirring years that preceded the signing of the Tripartite Alliance illustrate the book.

Although the excellent work by the late Dr. Box on *The Origins of the Paraguayan War* is mentioned in the text and though some citations are made of *La Nación* of Buenos Aires, yet the references to authorities in support of statements are very inadequate. Serious students of this period of South American history will deeply regret that the volume under review contains neither footnotes nor a bibliography. The reviewer hopes that in the companion volume which is in preparation entitled *Guerra del Paraguay. Acción y reacción de la Triple Alianza*, the learned author will remedy these deficiencies.

WILLIAM SPENCE ROBERTSON.

University of Illinois.

Pan America. A Program for the Western Hemisphere. By CARLETON BEALS. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1940. Pp. 517. \$3.00.)

This is a strange volume. More than two thirds of the narrative is extraneous or introductory. Apparently the author's central thesis is that the United States should permit the British Empire to go down, allow Japan to dominate Asia and Germany to dominate all Europe and Africa, and center its efforts on the economic solidification of the Western Hemisphere. This, of course, is not a new viewpoint; but officially the United States had rejected it before Beals's book saw the light. To support his contention, the author seems to have advanced every argument he could assemble, whether sound or unsound.

He gives no sources for the data presented to demonstrate how dependent the United States now is on the Old World tropics for a multitude of raw materials. Apparently he used the publications of the United States Department of Commerce. He quotes hostile criticism of the United States from the Latin-American press, but seldom indicates either the name or the character of the writer or the journal. He complains that the press of the United States has greatly magnified (p. 439) the totalitarian threat in Latin America, forgetting that he was in the vanguard of the journalistic racketeers. He says the population of Russia is 60,000,000 (p. 162), lists the capital investments of the United States in Latin America at six million dollars (p. 501), and confuses Cantilo with Castillo (p. 434). Detailed notice of all the contradictions in the volume would be a waste of space. The reader will readily observe those found on the following pages: 100, 262, 451, 453; 445 and 452; 359 and 515.

Evidently tremendous effort went into the making of this book; it is a pity that the author was so unscientific. The student will desire to read the volume because of the various stimulating suggestions it contains. But the wise will refuse to accept practically every statement or contention without further investigation. The program Beals finally outlines (pp. 495-517) contains little that has not already been suggested by others. In the main it has been followed by the United States for two or three years, but is likely to be slowed down by the newer policy of all-out aid to the nations resisting the aggressors.

J. FRED RIPPY.

University of Chicago.

The Cultural Approach to History. Edited by CAROLINE F. WARE for the American Historical Association. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. Pp. 359. \$3.50.)

There is scarcely a mention of Latin America in this entire volume yet, in reading many of its pages, every student and historian of Hispanic-American history will find stimulation to wider horizons in his special field of interest. This symposium calls upon the professional historian to face up to the fact that his guild has been mainly one of chroniclers basing history on the recoverable documents of literate people only, emphasizing and over-emphasizing the activities of this small element of the whole population. Moreover, the use of this essentially limited evidence is too frequently conditioned by the conscious or unconscious subjective bias of the investigator. And even if, as may be asserted, the extraordinary increase of such material in recent times widens the base of research, this advantage is largely nullified by the

deliberately propagandistic tendencies more and more manifest in such human documents. There is a need, then, of newer and better research tools and some of these can be provided by a different approach to investigation, an approach in which the historian studies the place of his subject in relation to the total structure of the society in which it operates. It becomes essential that the historian examine the mass culture, the patterns of societies, groups, institutions and ideologies with their endless and inextricable interrelationships to his subject. Such is the "cultural approach to history," cultural in the anthropological sense of the word rather than the merely esthetic, and it inevitably demands that the historian turn more and more to other disciplines in his effort to approximate truth so that he may establish the exact relationship between his subject and its background. Obviously, the time is past when the genuine historian is content to interpret the past from official documents, focussing his attention on his subject and subordinating it to its cultural *milieu*. He now finds himself obliged to seek all evidence which illumines the lives and activities of all ranks of society so that he may place his subject in proper perspective through an understanding of the interplay of forces, psychological, philosophical, economic, etc., which conditioned its action.

This symposium consisting of some thirty-five papers seeks to suggest some of the avenues of attack through this newer concept of history by emphasizing the interrelationship that exists between varied disciplines. The book is organized into six parts: I. Techniques of Cultural Analysis; II. Cultural Groups; III. Cultural Institutions; IV. The Cultural Rôle of Ideas; V. The Dynamics of Cultural Change; and VI. Sources and Materials for the Study of Cultural History; with the studies distributed among them ranging over such diverse subjects as "The *Zadruga*, or Communal Joint-Family in the Balkans and its Recent Evolution," to "The Industrial City: Center of Cultural Change" and "Documentary Photographs."

It is customary to describe contributions to such collections as "uneven," but it would be presumptuous for this reviewer to do so since he cannot claim to possess the requisite equipment and knowledge to judge critically such diversified material drawn from such varied disciplines; it is more honest to state that, in his opinion, the collection admirably serves its purpose of indicating a broader approach to historiography.

IRVING A. LEONARD.

Brown University.

Twenty Centuries of Mexican Art. By ALFONSO CASO, MANUEL TOUS-SAINT, MIGUEL COVARRUBIAS, ROBERTO MONTENEGRO. (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1940. Pp. 200. Cloth, \$2.75; paper, \$1.50.)

This book, and the exhibition which it represents, is a remarkable achievement for the directors of the Museum of Modern Art. Both are the products of tremendous expense and many arduous months of hard work, for which the American public has shown itself deeply appreciative and grateful.

From the tone of the book, however, one has the feeling that this was looked upon as something of an innovation, that the public somehow would not be receptive, must be convinced of the important and aesthetic quality of Mexico's artistic heritage. The reverse is true, for the American public has known, appreciated and admired the artistic expression that is Mexico's for more than a decade, and it was practically by popular demand that such a comprehensive exhibition and this publication came to pass.

Considering the vastness of the material to be covered, the text is extremely well done and is organized along the aesthetic principles involved in four great spheres: Pre-Spanish, Colonial, Popular, and Modern Art. The 175 illustrations—20 of them excellent color plates—present a comprehensive survey of the best and most characteristic works of each type and period, so that the book will serve both as an introduction and as a reference book. In fact, every library ought to have it.

Each of these spheres in turn is divided in accordance with the authentic cultural or regional classifications that have become standard through scholarly investigations. In the case of Alfonso Caso's treatment of Pre-Spanish, a tactful balance is maintained between scholarly differences of opinion and the essential permanent qualities that are revealed in the monuments. The discussions of the various Folk Arts and the development of Modern Art are frankly personal and stimulating to read. Common misconceptions still manage to persist however; some of them are unfortunate, such as the characterization of Orozco as a "lone wolf," and the artists Alva de la Canal, Revueltas, Leal, Charlot, and Siqueiros as "followers" of Diego Rivera. The achievement of the entire modern movement rests on the shoulders of precisely these men, and they hardly deserve the classification as followers of one whom they actually taught.

Compared with the rich material reproduced, the text is insignificant. The pictures speak for themselves and from them, indeed,

one cannot help but sense the tremendous and consistent power of those twenty centuries of Mexican art.

LAURENCE SCHMECKEBIER.

University of Minnesota.

El Libro, La Imprenta y el Periodismo en América durante la Dominación Española. By JOSÉ TORRE REVELLO. (Buenos Aires: Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, 1940. Pp. 269, ccxxxviii.)

Los Franciscanos y la Imprenta en México en el Siglo XVI. By ROMAN ZULAICA GARATE. (Mexico: Editorial Pedro Robredo, 1939. Pp. 373. \$12.00 m/n.)

The commemoration in 1939 of the 400th anniversary of the establishment of the first printing firm in the New World occasioned in Spanish America the publication of excellent historical and bibliographical studies. In that magnificent cooperative volume, *IV Centenario de la Imprenta en America* (Mexico, 1939), there is a chapter (pp. 599-606) contributed by the distinguished Mexican scholar, Rafael Heliodoro Valle, which one should read, not only to learn how worthily the afore-mentioned anniversary was signalized in Spanish America but also to become convinced that sound scholarship is still in these lands on a high plane.

This much by way of introduction to a review of two literary contributions to the anniversary that deserve more than a passing notice. Though unequal in scope and different in method of treatment, both volumes under review are thoroughly scientific in character and exceedingly rich in content, a credit to the scholarship of their respective author and a valuable addition to the shelves of historian and bibliophile.

As its title indicates, the volume by José Torre Revello is a survey covering the entire colonial period of Spanish America. It is divided into six chapters (pp. 11-245), followed by a list of the works consulted (pp. 247-269) and by an appendix (pagination in Roman numerals, iii-ccxxxviii) which contains ninety-seven documents from Spanish archives, most of which are here published for the first time.

The first of the six chapters deals with the introduction of the printing press into Spain in the year 1473 and discusses the legislation enacted by the Spanish government till the year 1805 concerning the public press. The second chapter, treating the regulations by which Spain controlled the production and dissemination of books in America, brings out in bold relief the fact, only recently coming to light, that works of fiction found their way across the sea to the colonies in

spite of the royal decrees that sought to prevent it. This fact is then further substantiated in the third chapter, where the author relates what sort of books circulated in colonial Spanish America and thus throws light on the cultural status of Spain's colonies before they achieved their independence. The fourth chapter, certainly one of the best in the volume, traces the establishment of the printing press in the various sections of the colonial empire. As the author observes, the efforts to disseminate the revolutionary ideas of eighteenth-century European "enlightenment" in the colonies, notably by means of periodicals, gave colonial printing a mighty impetus, resulting in the setting up of presses in numerous cities lacking this powerful agency of propaganda. Accordingly periodical literature becomes the subject of the fifth chapter of the volume, showing how remarkably active the colonists were in this regard and how they even made their influence felt in the literary and political circles of Europe. As a contribution to the cultural history of the Spanish colonial empire, the sixth chapter of the volume may be designated as its best. It will certainly prove a startling revelation to such as are still inclined to hold that comparatively few, if any, books and readers of books existed in Spanish America during the sixteenth century. With the aid of this chapter one could answer a question like "What did those people read besides their prayerbook and the lives of the Saints?" or "Were there any libraries worthy of the term?" The reviewer is in full agreement with the author's statement that this sixth chapter "refutes without the help of rhetorical force the old legend of books having been persecuted in America during colonial times" (p. 243). The author succeeds admirably in showing that, despite the restrictive enactments of the Spanish Crown, "the colonists in America, from the standpoint of culture, read as much as they pleased and as much as was deemed suitable reading for the subjects of the Spanish monarchs in the peninsula" (p. 244).

How seriously and painstakingly Torre Revello worked on this volume may be gathered not only from the running footnotes but also and especially from the exhaustive list of books dealing with his subject. Even more impressive as an exhibition of wide and sound scholarship is the collection of documents which takes up, to be exact, 235 pages of the volume. They bear out the truth of the author's specific statements in the text as well as the general conclusions with which he closes each chapter. With these documents so conveniently at hand, the critical reader need not take anything for granted, while their presence in the volume cannot but fill the less critical reader with a feeling of confidence in the author and in what he says.

It should be added that there are scattered through the volume some forty facsimile reproductions of title and specimen pages of books, selected for the purpose of illustrating early printing and engraving or because what the reproduced page contains is of some particular historical interest. There can be no doubt as to the vast amount of time and labor it must have cost the author to produce this timely and scholarly volume. It is a credit to the author and a worthy tribute to the Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas whose interests the author is serving as chief research scholar.

Though it deals only with the sixteenth century and is limited both as to place and person, the volume contributed to the 400th anniversary of the American press by Ramon Zulaica Garate is not less scholarly than the one just reviewed. The fact that the author happens to be himself a Franciscan should not prejudice the reader against what he writes about the Franciscan writers in Mexico during the sixteenth century. Throughout the volume there is an air of thorough and painstaking research that must create confidence to a marked degree. His judgment of Gilberti, for instance, is remarkably fair and objective, recognizing the friar's ability as scholar and writer but censuring the stand he maintained in the unfortunate controversy with Bishop Quiroga.

In the literary field the Franciscans in Mexico during the sixteenth century played the leading rôle, at least in point of quantity. This has been generally known and conceded since the appearance in 1886 of Joaquín García Icazbalceta's *Bibliografía Mexicana* and other works of this kind. It remained for Father Zulaica, however, to prepare a separate volume on the Franciscan writers and to discuss their contributions to sixteenth-century Mexican literature in a really searching and appreciative way. Herein, the reviewer believes, lies the chief value and importance of *Los Franciscanos y la Imprenta en México en el Siglo XVI*.

In content and form it differs from Torre Revello's work in that it is more in the nature of a bibliography, comparable in this regard with García Icazbalceta's celebrated *Bibliografía*. The items are arranged chronologically, to some of which are prefixed a biographical sketch of the friar-author or a discussion of some historical or controversial matter connected with his writings. There is, for instance, a rather detailed treatment of Bishop Zumárraga and a study of the part he took in the establishment and early support of printing activities in Mexico (pp. 15-30); also a life-sketch of Alonso de Molina with a list of his unpublished works (pp. 83-99); similarly, a life-sketch of Maturino Gilberti, followed by a critical study of the controversy occasioned in Michoacán by the appearance of his *Diálogo de Doctrina*

Cristiana (pp. 125-142). Father Zulaica concludes with a brief account of the printing press that functioned in the Franciscan friary of Santiago at Tlateloleo, a suburb of Mexico City, where since 1536 the friars conducted their Colegio de Santa Cruz. In an appendix (pp. 255-331) are reprinted three previously published studies by as many distinguished bibliographers; namely, Joaquín García Icazbalceta, Marcos Jiménez de la Espada, and Henry Harrisse. The studies deal with the beginnings of printing in America. The scarcity of the volumes in which these studies appeared originally seems to justify their inclusion in the present volume.

Father Zulaica describes in this splendid volume sixty-eight works by Franciscans that were printed and published in course of the sixteenth century. This means that, since the arrival of Mexico's first public printer in the person of Juan Pablos, the Franciscans by the end of the century published at least one work every year. Many of these works are still extant and at the end of the volume under review is a list showing the actual whereabouts of these precious volumes. To help complete this list, may the reviewer note here that a copy of Molina's *Vocabulario* (No. 33) is in the Lima Library at the Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C.

One item in the volume is worthy of special notice, since it might be overlooked by bibliographers. This is a work by Alonso de Molina, heretofore unknown, entitled *Sumario de las Indulgencias*. It was discovered by Father Zulaica in a volume of miscellaneous writings, compiled by someone for his own convenience. It is a fragment of seven folios, printed in gothic type. There is no date of publication, but the name of Molina appears on the title page with the notation that the work was published by order of Archbishop Montúfar who succeeded Zumárraga in 1551 and governed his diocese till 1572. Father Zulaica thinks that the work was published between 1568 and 1572.

This volume, like the other, is a credit to the scholarly Franciscan who produced it. It manifests untiring and careful research and will be welcomed by all who delight in bibliographical studies and realize their importance for the cultural history of a people.

FRANCIS BORGIA STECK.

The Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.

Seven Keys to Brazil. By VERA KELSEY. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1940. Pp. xx, 314. Illus.; end-papers from murals by Candido Portinari. \$3.00.)

It is not too much to say that Miss Kelsey's book is the best of recent interpretative writings about the whole of Brazil. Writing with

skill, she contributes a more nearly accurate and proportioned description than usual and one that will be of great value in informing North Americans about Brazil.

Impressed by the differences in the great geographical area of Brazil, Miss Kelsey has attempted to analyze for the English-speaking public the various regions that make up Brazil. Hence, she constructs the elaborate metaphor of seven keys to Brazil—the keys being the Northeast, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Minas Gerais, the Other Northeast (the *sertões* and the São Francisco), the Amazon, and South Brazil. In each key that she examined she discerns the culture, the type of people and, in some cases, the cities that, in her opinion, give each its distinctive character. At times, the metaphor becomes unwieldy as a method of analysis. One wonders, for instance, why Miss Kelsey could not have used, equally metaphorically, what in her Part I she calls The Basic Quadrangle, that is, the Portuguese, the Indian, the Negro, and the Priest and the Padre. Assuming these four sides to the quadrangle, one may interpret Brazil as easily in terms of these people and their mixtures as in terms of geographic and economic regions. Indeed, the trains of thought of the quadrangle continue without break in her Part IV: The Arts. The quadrangle and the arts could be combined to advantage.

But while one may not entirely agree with the method of analysis, one must recognize that Miss Kelsey has brought together an ample supply of material for interpretation. Miss Kelsey's way of collecting information, the prime virtue of her book, was to converse with many eminent and informed Brazilians and to read their books, and to build her chapters from their remarks. Thus she transmits to the general reader what Brazilians of several regions think about those regions. At the same time she elevates her book above those written by the "sociologists of three weeks" whom she so justly derides in her *Palavras necessárias*.

The principal danger to the general reader comes, paradoxically, from just this way of collecting information. Too often Miss Kelsey repeats opinions without any apparent awareness of their comparison with recent critical investigations. Then, a disbalance exists in her evaluation of the various keys because in some cases not even books by Brazilians are available. Her analysis of the Northeast surpasses that of other sections in penetration because it is largely based on Gilberto Freyre's work. The description of Rio is remarkable for detail and anecdotal charm because it rests on the work of Luis Edmundo. The treatment of other regions in comparison appears a little scanty and incomplete.

Taken altogether as a book by a foreign traveller in Brazil, her volume does not compare for closeness of observation and variety of information with, for instance, Kidder and Fletcher (whose book, unfortunately, appears mistitled on p. 111). Offering more an interpretation of Brazil than a record of recent observation, it is not called on to define the Brazil that is to be unlocked by these seven or by other keys. Nevertheless, discussion of elements of the Brazil of today and tomorrow is scattered through the closing pages of each key and elsewhere. The treatment of the republic (1889-1930) on one page is a somewhat breathtaking understatement. Part IV: The Economic Panorama is only a bald summary of the report of the Technical Council of Economy and Finance presented by President Vargas before the Conference of Interventors in 1939. The bibliography (like the rest of the book a miracle of correct transcribing of the Portuguese language) is a list of works used rather than one for the guidance of further reading. There are almost enough pictures; those included are good and generally well chosen.

ALEXANDER MARCHANT.

The Johns Hopkins University.

As minas gerais a aventura portuguesa, a obra paulista, a capitania e a província. By MIRAN M. DE BARROS LATIF. (Rio: Editora S. A. A Noite, [1940]. Pp. 208.)

In this brief study Snr. Latif has touched upon many aspects of Minas Gerais history. His introduction is naturally concerned with Portugal's quest for gold in Africa, with the early placer mines of the São Paulo area. He then devotes attention to the *bandeirante* movement and the discovery of gold in Minas Gerais. The uprising known as the *Guerra dos Emboabas*, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, also comes in for mention. The last part of the book ceases to be chronological in narrative. The author is now concerned with such subjects (discussed with a sociological flavor) as roads, geography, miscegenation, mining methods, housing, urban life, commerce, religion, art, and slavery.

A hasty examination of *As minas gerais* will almost tempt one to judge it harshly. In scope and in method, Snr. Latif's work is not a history in the conservative sense of the word. It is devoid of any critical apparatus and, what is most unusual, of a table of contents. It contributes nothing new to knowledge. Its brevity at once precludes a full presentation of the subject. Nevertheless, a more careful persual of the book will disclose its merits. The author has obviously a fine sense of history. He describes events with vividness. The

pageant of Minas Gerais, unfolding before the reader's eyes, appears as something real and full of meaning. Without distorting fact, Snr. Latif has succeeded in imbuing the past with a vitality not generally possessed by the more conservative scholar. And although the picture the author paints is necessarily not a detailed one, the outlines of this complex period are well drawn.

MANOEL S. CARDOZO.

Lima Library,
The Catholic University of America.

Tristão de Athayde and the Catholic Social Movement in Brazil. By SISTER M. ANCILLA O'NEILL, M.A. (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1939. Pp. x, 156. \$2.00.)

In the national renaissance observed in Brazil since the World War, the revival of Catholicism in many forms, particularly under the form of the Catholic Social Movement, is of profound significance; for it has led not only to a revival of genuine religious thinking, but it has also resulted in a broad and serious revaluation of all aspects of national life in terms of the principles of the Roman Catholic Church.

Its influence on the cultural life of the country is indicated by the fact that some of the greatest thinkers and writers of present-day Brazil, such as Tristão de Athayde, Jorge de Lima, and Murilo Mendes, are leaders in this movement. In politics it may be pointed out that its influence was responsible for the absence of divorce laws in the Constitution of 1934 as well as the inclusion in that charter of a general prohibition of secret societies and of a declaration to the effect that the Christian doctrine should be taught in the public schools of the country. As to foreign relations, its influence may not be so apparent or easily detected; but the observer cannot help noticing that the general sympathy of the present Brazilian government towards the totalitarian nations coincides very closely with the sympathy frankly expressed by the leaders of the Catholic Social Movement of Brazil towards those same nations.

Hence the importance of this movement to all students of Pan-American affairs and particularly, of course, to all students of Brazil.

The book herein reviewed, a dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Social Science of the Catholic University of America in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, is devoted to the study of the Catholic Social Movement in Brazil and its present leader, Alceu Amoroso Lima, better known under the pseudonym of Tristão de Athayde.

The Catholic Social Movement was started in Brazil around 1921

by Jackson de Figueiredo, a converted intellectual who founded a magazine, *A Ordem*, for the propagation of the Catholic doctrine, and later on a society known as *Centro Dom Vital*, for the study of the Catholic doctrine and the spreading of a Christian philosophy, chiefly by a program of personal sanctification and example. After Jackson de Figueiredo's death by drowning in 1928, the leadership of the movement passed to Tristão de Athayde, a young and talented literary critic, converted from Agnosticism and Sybaritism to the religion of his forefathers by the direct influence of Jackson de Figueiredo and the reading of Jacques Maritain's works.

Sister M. Ancilla O'Neill devotes the greatest part of her work to the study of Tristão de Athayde's personality and theories, and the development of the Catholic Social Movement in Brazil. Parts II and III of her book constitute a decidedly valuable contribution to the better understanding of contemporary Brazil.

It is a pity, however, that Part I, devoted to the study of the political and social development of Brazil, was not as carefully prepared. It is not easy to agree, for instance, with the declaration on page 19 that Dom Pedro II failed to accept the inevitable social changes brought about by industrialism, losing the support of the new aristocracy, when it is well known how much he befriended the Viscount of Mauá, the most progressive representative of the new era in Brazil.

Nor will most students of modern Brazil agree that "class distinction, though not nearly as rigid, persists to the present day in Brazil" (page 33). Certainly no one well acquainted with present-day Brazil will hold that there is more class distinction in that nation today than, for instance, in the United States.

It is also to be lamented that no use was made of the very excellent *Historia da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil*, by Father Serafim Leite, and published in 1938, in the preparation of the chapter on the Colonial Church in Brazil.

This work is, nevertheless, very timely and informative. Chapters V, VI, and VII, devoted to the analysis of the social, economic and political theories of Tristão de Athayde, should be interesting to any one desiring to acquaint himself with important trends of thought in modern Brazil.

RAUL D'EÇA.

The George Washington University.

San Martín y Bolívar en la entrevista de Guayaquil, a la luz de nuevos documentos definitivos. By EDUARDO L. COLOMBRES MÁRMOL, ex-Embajador Argentino en el Perú. Prólogo del Doctor Rómulo D. Carbia. (Buenos Aires: Imprenta y Casa Editora "Coni," 1940. Pp. xlix, 460.)

The interview of Bolívar and San Martín at Guayaquil on July 27 and 28, 1822, is one of the most dramatic, significant, and much-discussed events in the history of the New World. This encounter of the two great liberators of South America has long been enveloped in a cloud of mystery, for no third party attended their conferences. The only accounts of their meetings are those which emanated directly or indirectly from one or another of the participants. Soon after they met, each participant recorded his impressions of the personality of the other party. The most detailed contemporary description of the mysterious conferences was contained in a letter sent from Guayaquil to Bogotá by J. G. Pérez, the general secretary of Bolívar, on July 9, 1822—a letter which the Colombian Liberator designated as "*mi memoria*." After the death of Bolívar, San Martín gave to the world a letter which he had written to his rival one month after the conferences. Strange though it may seem, this letter left unmentioned one of the most important matters discussed in the meetings, namely the form of government that should be adopted in emancipated Spanish America.

Until the publication of the work under review, only three authentic documents had been printed which deal directly with the famous interview. 1. The above-mentioned letter of Secretary Pérez dated July 9, 1822. 2. A letter of Bolívar to Santander dated July 29, 1822, which was first used by the Argentine historian Mitre. 3. A letter written by San Martín to Bolívar on August 29, 1822. This being the situation, all serious students of the heroic age of South American history will be delighted to learn that while Señor Colombres Mármol was having a search made for documents concerning a beautiful inkstand of French workmanship alleged to have been the property of the Liberator of Colombia, a Peruvian friend heard of the existence in Lima of certain inedited documents of the revolutionary era. Among these papers was the original of a letter from Bolívar to San Martín dated August 25, 1822, which is the most important of the letters thus discovered. The author of this work maintains that, when studied in connection with other more or less contemporary documents which he prints in this volume, the letter of August 25 substantiates the following views: 1. That on behalf of his government the Protector of Peru accepted the military aid offered by Bolívar for

the prosecution of the war against Spain and resolved to withdraw from Peru. 2. That San Martín disapproved of the annexation of the presidency of Quito to Colombia which had been accomplished by Bolívar but refrained from precipitating a fratricidal war for the purpose of annexing that presidency to Peru. 3. That there was a serious difference of opinion between the two leaders of the revolution concerning the best form of government for emancipated Spanish America; for San Martín advocated a type of government resembling that of England, while Bolívar favored a government resembling that of the United States.

Important documents concerning the theme of this book are printed in the appendix, which is followed by a selected bibliography of three pages. Although specialists in this field of history may not always agree with the author concerning the value of his discovery, yet it is evident that he has made the most important addition to the literature concerning the pivotal interview that has appeared since Goenaga published the Pérez letter.

WILLIAM SPENCE ROBERTSON.

University of Illinois.

Pioneer Black Robes on the West Coast. By PETER MASTEN DUNNE, S. J. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1940. Pp. xiii, 286. Illus. \$3.00.)

The story of the magnificent work of the Jesuits in New France has long been well known. On the other hand, very little has been written about their equally great achievements in New Spain. This book, the work of a twentieth-century confrere, gives an account of their labor from 1591 to 1632 among the primitive people on the west coast of North America. It is the second volume of a series treating the history of the Jesuits in North America, and an illuminating chapter in the history of America.

It was not until 1611 that the first Jesuit missionaries arrived in Canada and the story of their missions was quite different from the history of the west coast missions. According to Professor Bolton in his *Rim of Christendom*: "The Black Robes of New France counted their conversions by hundreds, or at best by thousands; those of New Spain, working in a more propitious vineyard, numbered their baptisms by hundreds of thousands, or even by millions."

The Mexican missions of the Jesuit Order were begun two centuries before the California missions, which were the last link in a long chain of religious and cultural institutions for the North American Indians. Along the west coast missionaries and soldiers, like El

Capitán Hurdaide, worked harmoniously side by side endeavoring to plant Christian civilization on new frontiers. They were not afraid to suffer inconveniences, untold hardships, and even martyrdom in the work of their choice.

The author has brought out of obscurity a number of great missionary pioneers, who deserve to rank with notable men of all countries. For a while Father Gonzalo de Tapia was one of the chief actors in the Sinaloa country until he met death by martyrdom. Andrés Pérez de Ribas, missionary to the Ahomes, Suaquis, and Yaqui, historian, ethnologist, and later provincial of New Spain; Pedro Méndez, missionary to the Tehuecos, teacher, and linguist; the saintly Julio Pascual, apostle to the Chínipas, Témoris, Varohíos, and Guazápares, killed by the Indians he had come to save; and Manuel Martínez, another brave martyr, are herein made known to twentieth-century readers for the first time. These men deserve a place in North American history beside Le Jeune, Jogues, Bréboeuf, and Lallemand, their celebrated black-robed brothers of New France.

The hardships encountered in building churches, the opposition of the elements of nature and of the natives, and the havoc caused by witch doctors are well described; yet in spite of all obstacles steady progress was made in converting the Indians. Human touches are added to make the story more interesting, for example, the honeymoon of Don Bautista, who was honored as a Spaniard. The strategy of the padres was shown when they married the cacique with a girl of the Huite nation and then permitted them to take a honeymoon far up among the canyons. The bride was decked in all the finery that the fathers could collect. As a result, when Don Bautista and his bride returned to the mission, they brought in their train ten or twelve chieftains from the interior. The Indians were given such a great welcome that the mountain tribes soon asked for missionaries. Peace was thus established and Christianity spread.

The great secular hero was Diego Martínez de Hurdaide, called El Capitán. He was a favorite among the missionaries, although he was governor. He worked for the missions, was active in obtaining more friars, never used force against the Indians until he had exhausted all the means of kindness and diplomacy, but when peaceful methods failed, he took speedy and forceful measures to conquer them. No one preserved the peace better than he, and the natives from far and near respected him.

The book is illustrated with photographs taken by the author when he personally traveled over the territory connected with the story, and many places mentioned are graphically described. The work is based

upon an abundance of published and unpublished sources. There is a short essay on sources telling where they were obtained.

This welcome work helps to make the reader realize the vast sweep of Jesuit missions in the eastern and western hemispheres and the rapidity of their extension, for the Black Robes were in Florida, Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia, as well as in Canada, Mexico, South America, and the Orient.

LILLIAN ESTELLE FISHER.

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Diego de Vargas and the Reconquest of New Mexico. 1692-1704. By JESSIE B. BAILEY (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1940. Pp. 290, bibliography, index. \$3.50.)

Occasionally a review, if it is an honest one, has to be unfavorable. Unfortunately the book by Dr. Bailey seems, to this reviewer, to require such disapproval.

We must disagree even with the title and several statements in the brief preface. It is hardly correct to suggest that the story of Vargas has been "hitherto unpublished," for there is no better-known part of Southwestern history than the record of this remarkable man and his achievements. As early as 1889 Bancroft gave a pretty adequate account of him, and this has been amplified by the later work of others.

But evidently the original intent of Dr. Bailey's thesis was to center her study on the reconquest. A glance at her list of sources shows that the manuscript material deals almost wholly with the years 1691 to 1697; it was during this period that the reconquest was accomplished—and recognition of this fact was given Vargas in the honorary title "Reconquistador." Why, then, extend the book title to 1704, the year of his death? Vargas did not, "for twelve years," dominate the northern frontier, because from October 1697 to July 1700 he was a prisoner in Santa Fé—then, released, he went to Mexico and was not back in Santa Fé to begin his second term as governor until November 1703. And that term ended abruptly within five short months, on April 8, 1704.

The author states that the foundation of her study has been the translation and interpretation of about 3,000 pages of facsimile material from the General Archive in Mexico City. Similar copies are in the collections of the Coronado Library which has made it possible to check Dr. Bailey's work; and I am glad to say that no error in citation has been noticed.

But after encountering numerous errors of statement in the author's nine-page introduction, the reviewer decided he must do some

verifying of her translation and interpretation. The very first citation (p. 13) showed two errors in statistical data. Then follow three citations where the reader bogs down—until he figures out that on page 14 the author has reverted to the previous year. Such checking was done at enough places to conclude that where the text is unintelligible or open to question, investigation will show that the source has not been properly understood. One example must suffice, from Vargas' proclamation of September 20, 1693 (pp. 90-91):

... I shall give them in the other kingdom their lands, sites and haciendas which they had and left at the time of the uprising of the nations of the other kingdom, also extending to them the privileges, honors, and prominence which as such conquerors his Majesty (may God spare him) may concede and grant through his royal name, whereupon he declares them to be with the most noble and that they enjoy children somewhat according to the privileges granted by the kings of Castille, by the most serene kings who are and conform our King, Carlos the second, may he long live.

Perhaps there has been carelessness in proofreading here (of which there has been a good deal in this book); but we cannot imagine Vargas failing to "proclaim" intelligibly.

If Dr. Bailey is aware of any connection between the reconquest of New Mexico and world affairs which made that objective desirable, she gives us no intimation of it. Repeatedly she reveals inadequate understanding of Spanish colonial organization and administration; time and again she has failed to take into account the important factors of long distances and lapsed time—else she would have realized that some of her interpretations are impossible.

To say the least, it is strange that a doctoral dissertation could have been prepared, and accepted, which shows so little personal acquaintance with the country in which Vargas campaigned. One result has been to miss in very large part the rich dramatic quality of the narrative—as, for example, the procedure adopted by Vargas in getting his colonists and the herds of livestock past the dread Jornada del Muerto (pp. 91-93). From misreadings of the text and the jumbling of facts the terse graphic account of Vargas has lost all clarity. Yet in a matter of hours, from either Albuquerque or El Paso, one can today cover much of the country in which Vargas and his soldiers campaigned and visualize the events of which he tells.

When in the summer of 1694 Vargas crushed the Pueblo rebels on the high *portrero* five miles north of the modern Jémez, he captured *all but ten of their women*. Here again Dr. Bailey has missed the dramatic element: that, to a matrilineal people, this meant extermination of their pueblo unless they recovered the captives. Vargas

shrewdly restored them only after the men had moved down to the lower point—and after they had helped Vargas conquer the Tewa rebels who had already three times stood off the Spaniards at the Black Mesa north of Santa Fé (pp. 167-174).

To sum up our impressions, this study should have been made more thorough and comprehensive before being put into book form; but it has been published and must stand on its merits, or demerits. The reader who is already informed as to Vargas and his deeds will find here and there in Dr. Bailey's book interesting details; but their value is badly outweighed by the far more numerous defects of which we have given a few examples.

LIANSING B. BLOOM.

University of New Mexico.

The Old Santa Fe Trail. By STANLEY VESTAL. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1939. Pp. xiv, 304. \$3.00.)

In the period before the Civil War, there were three great trails that pierced the mystically unknown land beyond the Missouri. The most northerly one led up the muddy Missouri River, over which the fur traders and trappers paddled to reach the rich fur country at the river's headwaters. They pioneered a line of traffic that extended for two thousand miles to the Continental Divide.

The second, or middle, trail followed the Platte River to South Pass and beyond, even to the alluring valleys along the Pacific Coast. This became the great immigrant trail of western America.

The third was the Santa Fe Trail, stretching from the Missouri River to Santa Fe, still a part of Old Mexico. The Santa Fe Trail was neither the route of immigrant nor trapper, but rather a thoroughfare of international commerce. Over it, in one direction, there flowed the commerce from Mexico—precious metals, rich pelts; and, in the other direction, from the American settlements, there came to the starved settlements of northern Mexico the refinements of life that betokened a growing industrial society.

Opened late in the eighteenth century, the Santa Fe Trail did not become of great importance till the 1820's, when the men from Missouri took the first loads of American goods to Santa Fe. From then on it grew in wealth with every passing month, for traders carried a valuable commercial cargo in either direction, thus greatly increasing the profits of their labors.

In *The Old Santa Fe Trail*, Mr. Vestal has attempted to revive this trail of a century ago and to picture it in all the glory, temptation, hardship, suffering, wealth, and romance that it possessed for the

men and women of that time. In doing so, he takes us over the trail, as though the reader were riding in one of the great prairie schooners of that day, sleeping under the open sky, getting breakfast on a fire of buffalo chips, rounding up and yoking the oxen, and "stretching out" on the day's hard march, through sunshine and dust, or as often through mud and swollen streams. Perhaps the first cry of "Indians" chilled the blood of the party, or perhaps they were pleasurably excited by a warning that the first herd of buffalo had come in sight—and every tenderfoot set out to get his first chunk of "running meat."

Mr. Vestal takes the reader with him, not with the object of writing a monograph of scientific coldness, but with the aim of having his guest ride with him, in imagination, over the famous old trail. "It was a perilous cruise across a boundless sea of grass, over forbidding mountains, among wild beasts and wilder men, ending in an exotic city offering quick riches, friendly foreign women, and a moral holiday." In this adventure, the author has given a step by step description of the route followed, and has, also, recounted the chief historical events that made the Santa Fe Trail famous throughout the country. It is a grand piece of story telling. If more books were able to recapture the spirit of the past as Mr. Vestal has done in this narrative, our history would be richer and better appreciated.

GEORGE P. HAMMOND.

University of New Mexico.

Captain Lee Hall of Texas. By DORA NEILL RAYMOND (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1940. Pp. 350, index. \$2.75.)

In 1869, at the age of 19, Lee Hall came from North Carolina to Texas, hunting for more life. After teaching school for two terms he became marshal of a cow town and then deputy sheriff at a railhead. His reputation is based, however, largely on his career as a Texas Ranger. Six months after he enlisted, in 1876, in Captain McNelly's famous company, he was leading it in wiping out Cortina's Mexican bandits on the Bloody Border, in quelling the wide-spread Taylor-Sutton feud to the east, and then in stopping fence-cutters who arose in various parts of the state to try, futilely, to prevent barbed wire from abolishing free range. The Texas Rangers still operate, but the peak of their activities had passed before Captain Lee Hall resigned—apparently in order to satisfy the lady who became his wife. After this he was manager of a large ranch in the brush country of southern Texas, then agent to the Comanche and other tribes in Oklahoma,

captain of a volunteer company that chased Aguinaldo in the Philippines, and finally, in anti-climax, guard to a mine in Mexico against bandits.

Like any good biography, Dora Neill Raymond's on Captain Lee Hall delineates not only the life of the subject but the figures, times and setting associated with that subject. Here are bad men like bold Ben Thompson, and border-ruling King Fisher, good men like Judge Henry Clay Pleasants, who risked his life again and again in holding court, Quanah Parker of the Comanches, a young man named Sidney Porter now known to the world as O. Henry. While Hall was ranch manager, Porter lived with him and his family and learned intimately a life and land that he later wove into many stories.

Mrs. Raymond did not have a great collection of consecutive letters or an unpublished autobiography on which to base her narrative. As a scholar, she had to search in many fields, and her book is a fine exemplification of the historian's use of detective methods. She is Professor of History and Government in Sweet Briar College, Virginia. Her books on Lord Byron and John Milton have been on the political careers of these poets, but in them, as in the present biography, she has demonstrated that blend of humanism and scholarship requisite for history that is readable. *Captain Lee Hall of Texas* is, partly because it is so skillfully written, more than readable. It adds another chapter to the literature that has been growing up for many years around the Texas Rangers.

J. FRANK DOBIE.

The University of Texas.

The Stewardship of Don Esteban Miró, 1782-1792. A Study of Louisiana Based Largely on the Documents in New Orleans. By CAROLINE MAUDE BURSON. (New Orleans: American Printing Co., 1940. Pp. xiv, 327. \$3.00.)

Louisiana was fortunate in having had a series of capable governors while the province was under Spanish rule. Two of them, Don Bernardo de Gálvez and Don Esteban Miró, left enviable records as administrators. Miró was Acting Governor and Governor from 1782 to the end of 1791, and during that time he was the dominant figure in the lower Mississippi Valley. The governor of Louisiana had an enormous task in promoting the welfare of a frontier province whose total population was under 45,000 in 1790. It was because of the attitude that Miró assumed toward his duties that Dr. Burson chose to write of his incumbency as a "stewardship."

The sixteen chapters into which the book is divided are by no means of equal merit. Those that deal with international matters contain little that has not been known for many years. Dr. Burson gives Miró more than customary credit for his handling of Indian affairs, and presents ample evidence to show that he was not deceived by Wilkinson and other adventurers at the beginning of the Spanish Conspiracy. The governor is also shown as fully appreciating the need for developing Louisiana into an effective barrier to guard the approaches to New Spain. The principal contribution of the book lies in the chapters devoted to internal affairs. The Cabildo of New Orleans is revealed as having played an active part in local government. There is a good chapter on relations between Miró and ecclesiastical authorities and the controversy that involved Sedella and Cirillo. The chapter on "The Majesty of the Law" is an interesting account of the administration of justice, and shows that Spanish "tyranny" was unusually liberal and just in Louisiana. Brief descriptions of New Orleans, household furnishings, personal wealth, and articles of dress are included under "The Art of Living." Other matters of social importance, such as education, flood control, health and sanitation, fire prevention, population growth, and occupations are treated in a chapter called "Assets and Liabilities."

Dr. Burson devoted many hours to laborious research in archival materials. The bibliography lacks only a few important titles and shows wide acquaintance with periodical literature. The most serious limitation of the book is the fact, as stated in the subtitle, that it is based largely on materials in New Orleans. There are several adverse criticisms that must be offered. The format of the book is deplorably unattractive. The proofreading was so careless that several glaring errors were allowed to stand. Authors appear with misspelled names, wrong initials, without initials, and with too many initials. The author's method of footnote citations cannot be recommended. The abbreviation *ibid.* appears scores of times without the period. Occasionally an *op. cit.* is used, but more frequently this abbreviation becomes "already cited." Faults like these abound and could have been eliminated by a competent editor. The heavy style, numerous awkward constructions, and type that is much too small, combine to make the book somewhat difficult to read. Nevertheless, Dr. Burson has made a contribution to early Louisiana history which no serious student of the period can afford to neglect.

HARRIS GAYLORD WARREN.

Louisiana State University.

Cuarenta Años de Mi Vida: 1898-1938. By COSME DE LA TORRIENTE. (La Habana: Imprenta "El Siglo XX," A Muñiz y Hno., 1939. Pp. lii, 470.)

The author and editor of this autobiography and collection of letters, speeches, and articles is the distinguished Cuban lawyer, diplomat, author, and political leader. To know his life for the past forty or more years is to know many important and intimate details of the history of Cuba from the establishment of the Republic to the present. There may be those who will dispute the wisdom of some of the author's acts and opinions, but it is doubtful if anyone will question his love for Cuba or his importance as a maker and witness of recent history.

Cosme de la Torriente begins this volume with a thirty-page introduction in which he traces his life from birth in 1872 through the revolution of the early 1930's. Among other things, he discusses his services as a colonel in the Liberating Army, as secretary of the Provincial Government of Havana in 1899, as magistrate of the *Audiencias* of Santa Clara and Matanzas from 1900 to 1903, as secretary of the Cuban legation in Madrid and later as minister plenipotentiary to Spain during the presidency of Estrada Palma, as an organizer and president of the National Conservative Party and senator from the Province of Matanzas, as president of the Fourth Assembly of the League of Nations, as ambassador to the United States in 1924-25, and as an opponent of dictatorship and an advocate of democratic government during and after the administration of President Machado. Whether in or out of public office he claims that he has ever been motivated by the ideals of Cuba's founding fathers, Céspedes and Martí, and he argues that Cubans must adhere to those ideals if their country is to enjoy the blessings of liberty and peace under constitutional government.

Following the introduction, the author reprints some seventy odd articles, letters, and speeches which were published during the years 1898 to 1938, in various newspapers and magazines in Cuba and the United States. These diverse essays do not appear with the other published works of the author, and they are well documented as to the date, place, circumstances, and medium of original publication. The entries are grouped into six parts: political activities, 1898-1925; social and economic questions, 1917-21; against the dictatorship, 1926-1933; the reestablishment of democracy, 1933-1938; international subjects; and other pages of history; and they include such topics as Cubans and Americans, Manifesto of the Veterans of the Independence of Cuba, Woman Suffrage, Cuba and the League of Nations, Ratifica-

tion of the Isle of Pines Treaty, Immigration Restrictions, The Financial Crisis of 1920, Cuban Problems in 1929, Proposals for Constitutional Reform in 1931, Before and After August 12, 1933, and the Abrogation of the Platt Amendment. The author presents the reader with a carefully edited selection of source materials illustrative of the moderate conservative viewpoint on most all phases of contemporary Cuban history. As ambassador to the United States in 1925, and as secretary of state under President Mendieta, Dr. Torriente played a leading rôle in the settlement of the Isle of Pines dispute and in drawing up the treaty which repealed the Platt Amendment.

This work is timely and will be extremely useful to those students and statesmen who desire to understand Cuban problems and Cuban-United States relations as lived and witnessed by an able and patriotic Cuban. The style and organization of the volume are a credit to the author, but unfortunately a comprehensive index is lacking.

DAVID A. LOCKMILLER.

North Carolina State College.

La Nueva Galicia a través de su viejo Archivo Judicial: índice analítico de los archivos de la Audiencia de la Nueva Galicia o de Guadalajara y del Supremo Tribunal de Justicia del Estado de Jalisco. By LUIS PÁEZ BROTCHE. [No. 18 of Biblioteca histórica mexicana de obras inéditas.] (Mexico City: Antigua Librería Robredo de José Porrúa y Hijos, 1940. Pp. 173.

This is a somewhat unusual and really *interesting* description of an archive, by an individual who is very much of a man and a scholar.

In seeking manuscript sources of Mexican history, one would naturally turn first to Bolton's *Guide to materials for the history of the United States in the principal archives of Mexico* (Washington, 1913). The Páez Brotschie work is a good example of what may well be done to supplement Bolton, when it develops that the archive of the Supreme Tribunal was not even mentioned by Bolton, although he covered other repositories of Guadalajara. To be sure, one would hardly expect much more than mere local incident in papers devoted to the civil and criminal cases of that particular court, and Bolton was seeking material for the history of the United States.

Yet, Páez Brotschie, now head of the archive which he describes, shows that the papers it contains touch many important phases of the history of the frontier regions of New Spain. His volume is not a catalogue, but something of a history of Nueva Galicia, both for colonial and recent times, but always from the standpoint of documents in this archive. These he analyzes and describes. He takes oc-

casion, with references to these documents, to correct statements in the well-known histories of that region by Mota Padilla, Pérez Verdía, and Tello. Many tales are drawn by him from the documents, of riots, licentious priests, the marauding activities of Oñate's soldiers, building of the cathedral at Guadalajara, types of punishment meted out in colonial days, conspiracies against Spain, native superstitions, methods of medical practice; indeed, almost every conceivable phase of life in the Nueva Galicia area is touched upon, from colonial times to the present, in a volume embracing the period from 1537 to 1939.

Páez Brotchie's object is always that of showing the wealth of the archive and its usefulness to the investigator. While unable in this short work (173 pages) to cover all sections in detail, he gives several extracts in that manner, as an example of what might be found elsewhere. The most notable instance of this is his listing of papers dealing entirely with the region of Aguascalientes.

A twelve-page introduction by Alessio Robles amounts to an ample review, including much interesting information about Páez Brotchie (confirmed to me personally by Philip Powell, graduate student at the University of California, who recently worked in the archive). Of part Scotch descent (hence the Brotchie), the author of this work (born in 1893) overcame difficulties to reach his present position in a way that would have done credit to a Horatio Alger hero. It is quite to be expected that such a person would not regard his job as a sinecure, as is all too common in some parts of the Hispanic world. He himself has made worthy contributions as a scholar, and is eager for others to take advantage of the repository under his control. He is (per Powell) "very helpful and generous of his time in aiding students doing research in the Archivo del Tribunal."

A vote of commendation, then, to Páez Brotchie, whose volume is a valuable addition to the as yet far from complete description of resources in local archives of the Mexican republic.

CHARLES E. CHAPMAN.

University of California.
Berkeley.

French Pioneers in the West Indies, 1624-1664. By NELLIS M. CROUSE. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. Pp. 294. \$3.50.)

First of all, let it be stated that this is a very able work filling a striking gap in the literature of European expansion. While the British Caribbean has been thoroughly exploited from the political, economic and social points of view and Spain's tropical American possessions have been capably dealt with in numerous admirable

monographs, the French sugar islands have suffered from general neglect at the hands of research students and far less has been known concerning them than about the neighboring and relatively insignificant Danish West Indies.

Such indifference to the French Antilles is indeed surprising when one recalls that they were long the most treasured portions of France's empire and that they constituted a veritable laboratory in shaping French colonial policy. An explanation can doubtless be found in the fact that their present stagnation has obscured their earlier glory and that New France and Louisiana have appeared to offer greener pastures. Whatever the cause, this neglect has resulted in false perspective and has given birth to many serious misconceptions respecting France's achievements in empire building. A revision of estimates is long past due and such revision must, of necessity, rest upon a thorough study of the French West Indies under the Old Regime. Indeed, no other field within the realm of colonial history offers greater possibilities for constructive pioneering activity today and any study shedding light on the subject is assured a hearty welcome.

The present book is given over to an exposition of the primary colonizing process of dispossessing the natives, establishing alien control, repulsing Spanish attacks and stocking the seized lands with whites from the homeland to direct vast agricultural enterprises and with blacks from Africa to provide the necessary labor. This work was carried on with great vigor by three dynamic personalities, du Parquet, Houël and de Poincy, to whom France, in the final analysis, owed her strong position in the Caribbean.

While such early colonizing activity was at first directed by two weak corporations, the St. Christopher Company and the Company of the Isles, and later by a group of proprietors, both arrangements proved unsatisfactory to the home government because too much of the highly lucrative West Indian trade fell to interloping Dutchmen and, at length, in 1664, the French West India Company was chartered to plug up that leak and to concentrate profits in French hands. The author deals with this pioneer period of four decades in delightful fashion and has made a real contribution in unravelling the tangled skein of intrigue attending the proprietary era.

There are, however, two serious defects. First, Mr. Crouse has drawn his material from only a limited range of printed material—35 works to be exact, most important of which is du Tertre's *Histoire générale des Antilles* (4 vols., Paris, 1667-1671). While certain recent books such as Mims' *Colbert's West India Policy* (New Haven, 1912) have been employed, no use whatsoever has been made of four highly

significant studies in this category—Louis-Philippe May's *Histoire économique de la Martinique, 1635-1763* (Librairie des Sciences Politiques et Sociales, Paris, 1930), Maurice Satineau's *Histoire de la Guadeloupe sous l'ancien régime* (Payot, Paris, 1928), C. A. Banbuck's *Histoire politique, économique et sociale de la Martinique . . . , 1635-1789* (Librairie des Sciences Politiques et Sociales, Paris, 1935) and Abbé Rennard's *Essai bibliographique sur l'histoire religieuse des Antilles françaises* (Secrétariat des Pères du Saint-Esprit, Paris, 1931).

Far more serious is his failure to employ manuscripts of any kind. A fair number of them exist, notably in France, in Holland and in England, in readily accessible form. To mention only the most obvious papers—the Archives Nationales contains several cartons and registers of Colonial Ministry documents embracing Mr. Crouse's period—specifically C 7 A 1, C 8 B 1, C 10 A 1, C 10 B 1, C 10 C 1, C 10 D 1 and C 10 E 1, conveniently inventoried in Pierre de Vaissière and Yvonne Bezard's manuscript *Répertoire numérique des Archives des Colonies*, several copies of which exist here in the United States. Other examples might be given. Surely, in a work of this character it is not unreasonable to expect an author to exhaust the limited amount of material available. There are, unhappily, no footnotes and the index is poorly arranged.

LOWELL J. RAGATZ.

The George Washington University.

Pioneers in American Anthropology. The Bandelier-Morgan Letters, 1873-1883. Edited by LESLIE A. WHITE. (Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 1940. 2 vols. Pp. xii, 275 and 266. \$10.00.)

These two handsomely printed volumes contain a four-page foreword by the General Editor of the Coronado Historical Series, Dean George P. Hammond; a 106-page introduction by Professor Leslie White, 158 letters from Adolph Bandelier to Lewis H. Morgan; five letters from Bandelier to Mrs. Morgan after the death of her husband. When the letters begin, Bandelier, although already tolerably well-read on the pre-conquest cultures of Mexico, is still a cultivated dilettante of wide-roving intellectual curiosity but without systematic scholarly achievements. He had just met Morgan. Before Morgan's death eight years later he had made penetrating explorations, and, in many aspects, both extensive and intensive investigations of the documentary materials bearing on the Indian cultures of Mexico, Middle America, Peru, and New Mexico; published several very

erudite monographs in the reports of the Peabody Museum of Harvard University; made field trips to New and Old Mexico. There is much evidence, both in the letters and from other sources, that it was Morgan's intellectual stimulation, his aid and influence, and (perhaps most of all) his emotional support which made Bandelier's career possible. This is indeed attributing a remarkable influence. But a close study of the letters inclines the reviewer to the belief that, without Morgan, Bandelier would probably have remained a rather learned, somewhat eccentric business man of Highland, Illinois, who might well have published a number of interesting articles in local journals and perhaps a few contributions to national magazines of high standing. While there is much of genuine technical significance¹ for historian and anthropologist in these pages, it strikes the reviewer that their richest meaningfulness is as a case history of a singularly rich and fruitful human relationship.

The letters cover a very critical period in the development of American anthropology—it is indeed the decade during which anthropology was becoming established as an independent discipline with its own aims and methods. For the historian of the subject there are suggestive sidelights on many leading pioneers (Powell, Putnam, and others), source material on the early policies of the Smithsonian Institution, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the Peabody Museum, etc. Especially instructive is it to follow the formulation, development, and modification of leading theoretical issues, some of which have importance to the present moment. While Morgan is once (Vol. I, p. 184) asked to check upon an order of bulbs (involving \$4.47) for a fellow townsman of Bandelier's and is likewise appealed to (II-36) for help on a legal opinion in railroad matters and for advice on a patent (II-86), and while there is space for personal greetings between the families, for a little professional backbiting and for Bandelier's complaints, the overwhelming bulk of the correspondence is devoted to strictly scholarly subjects. It is fascinating to see how Bandelier is gradually weaned from the "romantic" conception of feudal states with "emperors" and "nobles" in the societies of New World high cultures, how eventually he accepts (for a time) Morgan's conceptual scheme almost whole cloth and candidly

¹ There are a number of points in which Bandelier appears to have been one of the first to state explicitly conceptions which have relatively recently become generally accepted: the notion that "use-ownership" was the characteristic form of land tenure among the American Indians (II-26); connection between cultures of Mexico and those of Southeastern United States (I-172): "The securing of casts only, and the maintenance of originals in situ. Establishment of *government parks* wherever interesting ruins of aboriginal art are found." (II-173).

states that his principal aim is to uncover evidence which will "prove" the truth of Morgan's leading ideas. As the editor correctly points out, Morgan and Bandelier went too far in the other direction as a consequence of their revolt against "the romantic school." The whole controversy adds further confirmation to the induction which may be made from the whole history of scholarship: a point of view which holds the field for a time eventually produces a reaction which is invariably more violent than a dispassionate consideration of the facts would warrant.

Bandelier represents a genus of ethnologist which (with a few notable exceptions such as F. W. Hodge) has been all too rare since his time. American ethnologists, as a class, have been scandalously neglectful of library research. To only a very slight extent have they exploited the data on American Indians which is available in historical documents. For young scholars who have had a rigorous training in historical method and who are also well-grounded ethnologically, a promising field is open. Such students could learn much from these letters. They can still serve as a by no means superficial introduction to the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century literature on the Indians of Mexico. And I believe that most historians would agree that Bandelier's conception of what constitutes evidence is essentially sound. His own consistent and scrupulous attention to detail, his adherence to acute canons of inference, his sometimes sadistic pillorying of others who seem careless scholars are reflected in many passages of which I give a few samples:

"But as the vehicle is a purely scientific one, the strictly scientific method ought to be adhered to, which consists in quoting (outside of the text) in the original languages, so as to show to the scholar at once, that he deals with genuine authorities, and not with interpretations subject to the author's defects and whims." (II-12)

"Still, they should be *explained*, as they cannot be absolutely *denied*." (II-41)

"They judge of Bancroft's² monstrous compilation without knowing any of the works forming the basis of it." (II-19)

"I find the greatest enemy of a translator to be his natural desire to produce something elegant. Oftentimes a by-word is omitted for the sake of avoiding repeatales, and this omission disfigures the whole, distorts it, and leads the reader completely astray." (I-212)

"... I have not yet entered deep enough into the immense literature existing, to be able to prove, inch by inch, every point necessary to be proved." (I-241)

"What we want now are facts and not appreciations. The idea of reading

² Scorn and distaste for Bancroft (cf. e. eg. I-259) as responsible for "the great wholesale book manufactory at San Francisco" (I-261) is a note frequently struck, although this attitude seems somewhat tempered in the later years of the correspondence (cf. II-99 and II-125).

these old authors for nothing else than for their descriptions, without examining these very descriptions critically, won't draw any more. A description is not reality itself, it is only the reflected impression of reality upon the describer. It requires a number of such reflections to get as near the truth as possible." (II-20)

Of some of Bandelier's basic theoretical postulates most American anthropologists still urgently need reminding. For instance:

"It is singular how the lack of ethnological thought and discipline affect archaeological and historical works and impairs their value." (II-140)

"... fact is dead without the constant action of thought upon it." (II-207)

"His remarkable tendency to always connect the facts, & never to isolate them, predominates everywhere, & lends a peculiar practical value to all his appreciations." (I-133)

And the following stricture yet applies, unfortunately, in all too many cases: "The gross neglect to study the Spanish language & its documents has led the Americans astray, else the history & ethnography of this country would be further advanced." (II-220)

The task of editing has been carried out magnificently by Dr. White. Identification of persons mentioned in the letters, cross-referencing, filling in of lacunae in the information supplied by the documents themselves—all of these things are covered with uncommon thoroughness and fidelity in the editorial footnotes. The editor's introduction is a model of skillful organization and succinct scholarship. There are brief sketches of the lives of Morgan and Bandelier, a critical setting of anthropological controversies firmly in their context, and a digest and synthesis around various headings of most of what is of interest and value in the letters. A perusal of the introduction will enable students to determine in a brief space of time how fully they will wish to sample or how intensively they will feel the need of studying the letters. So good is the introduction that a review almost necessarily becomes a stale work of supererogation. There is only one topic which this reviewer could have wished Dr. White to have followed out in greater detail.

It has become increasingly apparent that a realistic critical evaluation of a scholar's method or of his theories must bear some determinate relation to what is known of that scholar's life history as an individual and to his "personality." Dr. White's treatment indicates acceptance of this premise, but a more complete assemblage of the data in the letters and a scrutiny of them with the aid of the conceptual tools of contemporary "depth psychology" would, I believe, have been extremely illuminating. A candid and inductive examination into the sources of scholarly energy would assist us scholars

toward a more objective understanding of ourselves and of our scholarly products. Why, for example, did Bandelier eschew social gatherings and a "normal" social life in Highland? To reply that he found Tezozomoc and the Popol-vuh "more interesting" than the small talk of an Illinois town is an idle and sterile displacement of the question. There is in the letters abundant evidence of tremendous personal insecurity, at times almost verging on paranoia. Whenever a correspondent fails to write as soon as Bandelier has anticipated, Bandelier shows acute anxiety, a morbid sense that he is abused and rejected (cf. I-239, II-25, 43, 73, 87, 127, 130, and *many* other places). There are insistent and bitter complaints about his life (cf. e.g. I-247, II-75, 81). He feels that periodicals and friends alike neglect his publications (II-67) and threatens that if American institutions of learning do not give him more support he will henceforth write in Spanish or French or German (II-112). When F. W. Putnam indicates that the Peabody Museum will not continue to publish Bandelier's monographs, Bandelier goes into a complete nervous collapse (II-155 to 160).

In short, one senses a pathological quality in Bandelier's prodigious industry; one suspects that he, like many scholars, worked so hard not entirely—or even mainly—because of an essentially out-going interest in his object matter, nor because of pressure of the need for earning a living, but rather because he *had* to, because an uncompromising internal force of his own individual organism drove him to it. His very thoroughness and discrimination, the high standards of scholarship which he demanded of others have, as so commonly in these matters, somewhat the character of a compulsion neurosis. It seems patent that he thus obtained relief from his inner anxiety and insecurity. Whether these "drives" rest primarily upon physiology, upon early experiences or accidents of the conditioning process, upon an unsatisfactory marriage, or upon some combination of any or all of these factors—the available material does not even permit the hazarding of a guess. But it is evident that such considerations are relevant to the circumstance which puzzles Dr. White so much: how came it about that Bandelier, for all his acuteness, accepted so many notions and guiding principles from Morgan in default of, and sometimes contrary to, the facts? It is by no means so simple as the case of a struggling young scholar who becomes a fawning sycophant to gain the favor and support of a powerful friend. On the contrary, Bandelier is continually arguing with Morgan about details and indeed correcting him, sometimes with a deal of asperity. Bandelier's relationship to his own father strikes me as curious in a number of respects.

He once remarks, rather feelingly, that a certain occasion is the first time that his father (though the father was continually interested in the son's scholarly efforts) has ever *praised* his work. Did Bandelier feel himself rejected in the fundamental emotional dimension by his own father? Was Morgan essentially a father-surrogate—the loving and praising father-person whose affection Bandelier felt gigantically compelled to win? A convincingly documented answer the reviewer cannot give, but he suggests that in this and in other available sources may be found rewarding data for an enlightening study of the relationship between personal-social situation and scholarship.

The University of New Mexico Press is to be congratulated upon a superior piece of workmanship, typographically and in other respects, and upon a noteworthy contribution to the inter-disciplinary field: "history and anthropology."

CLYDE KLUCKHOHN.

Harvard University.

The Chorti Indians of Guatemala. By CHARLES WISDOM. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940. Pp. 490. Pls. 12, figs. 12. \$4.50.)

This competent ethnological study of a little known but important member of the Maya family is a welcome addition to the series of investigations which are steadily adding to our knowledge of the group as a whole. Not only are the Chorti of interest to the student of modern Guatemala, but they are of considerable historical importance as the occupants of the site of Copan and the possible descendants of its builders. Both in language and culture they seem to have been closely related to their former Cholti-speaking neighbors, whose habitat once extended along the base of the Yucatecan peninsula as far as Palenque.

The name Chorti means "milpa language" and is an apt designation of these scattered villagers, as those who do not cultivate a field are still held in little esteem. Mr. Wisdom, who spent several seasons among them, gives us an adequate account of their basic folk culture, covering fully the economic, social and religious aspects of their life, which to this reviewer appears to be essentially Indian in character, in spite of such superimposed foreign innovations as sugar, coffee, rice, chickens, pigs, a few cattle, the use of metals and European cloth, and the veneration of the Christian saints. Their principal subsistence is maize and beans, still cultivated by the methods of their pre-Spanish ancestors; they use no pack animals; and rain, wind and other natural phenomena are ascribed to their native deities, who retain their former moral and sexual duality of aspect although today subject to

the orders of a more remote Christian God. People are usually peaceable and neighborly, but feuds over land or married women sometimes occur, in which sorcery and violence play an important part.

The narrative style and excellent arrangement of the material carry the burden of detail easily, and the result is a most readable and interesting book.

RALPH L. ROYS.

Carnegie Institution of Washington.

BOOK NOTICES

As Our Neighbors See Us. Edited and compiled by T. H. REYNOLDS.
(N. p., c. 1940. Pp. 317. \$2.50.*)

This book is a reflection of the contemporary concern over the relations of Latin America with the United States. It is the intention of the editor to give the American student and layman a comprehensive view of the many complex affairs which have determined those relations during the past quarter century.

To effect this purpose, the editor has presented a selection of illustrative readings. These are arranged in the chronological order of their appearance from 1914 to 1940. However, as the subtitle—“*Readings in the Relations of the United States and Latin America, 1820-1940*”—suggests, they extend, in point of time, to a much earlier date. More than one-third of the sixty-odd items here published are devoted to the Monroe Doctrine. Other subjects covered, directly or indirectly, include: trade relations, Pan Americanism, League of Nations, labor problems, land ownership, economic imperialism, and the “Good Neighbor” policy.

By presenting subjects ranging from historical reviews of Monroe’s position to discussions of contemporary economic problems, the editor has attempted to reveal both the “traditional” and the “reactionary” ideas that, since 1914, have been competing in the Latin-American mind as it has formulated its attitude toward the United States. The various incidents which have in the past stimulated North American intervention in Latin-American affairs are touched upon in an effort to present a “cross-section” of Latin-American opinion toward the United States. From these materials the editor would have the reader perceive the shift in interest from the political to the economic sphere after the World War, and to become aware of the implications of this shift for the Western Hemisphere during the contemporary crisis.

In doing this, the writings of some thirty-odd critics—taken largely from technical and trade journals—have been utilized. Although the express object of the editor is to represent Latin-American opinion as a whole, the items here reprinted pertain chiefly to Mexico, Argentina, Cuba, Chile, and Peru.

* Copies can be had from the author at a twenty per cent discount by writing him at Stillwater, Oklahoma.

The book contains no index and it is not copyrighted. It bears no date or place of publication; which facts suggest that it was privately published.

GEORGE W. AUXIER.

Department of State.

Historical Evolution of Hispanic America. By J. FRED RIPPY. Second Edition. (New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1940. Pp. 543. \$3.75.)

Professor Rippy has issued a second edition of this work that appeared first in 1932. The fundamental purposes of this volume as stated in the preface remain the same. Likewise intact is the distribution of space allotted to the various accepted divisions of Latin-American history. Approximately fifty pages cover the physical, Indian and old-world backgrounds. The chapter devoted to the first of these is clear and readable in spite of the voluminous yet interesting detail on the flora, fauna, and physical characteristics. In some seventy pages Professor Rippy gives a rapid survey of the colonial period. Here he makes the interesting departure of presenting the facts of the invasion in terms of the conquest of the various Indian groups. Distributed throughout this section of the work is evidence of the author's acquaintance with recent monographic studies on the cultural and economic aspects of the colonial era.

For the national period Professor Rippy allots about two hundred pages, some thirty of which concern the movements for Independence. Here the condensation of data becomes extraordinary, although the reader is somewhat prepared by a penetrating analysis of the influences which conditioned nineteenth-century development. However, one is not prepared for the lack of data on Latin America after 1931. Students and colleagues alike would value Professor Rippy's presentation of the Cárdenas reforms in Mexico, those of López in Colombia, the recent history of Brazil, an analysis of the United Front developments in Chile, what happened in Argentina, and the rest of the significant changes that characterized the internal history from 1929 to 1939.

The remainder of the volume, a trifle over two hundred pages, is devoted to the international field in which Professor Rippy is a pre-eminent authority. This part of the work which he explains in his 1932 Preface is made up of "large sections of my recent work entitled *Latin America in World Politics*." To this has been added several pages at the end of the volume. This latter study is so well known that it hardly requires review here. But once again it is disappointing not

to find Professor Rippy's analysis of the expropriation of oil in Mexico and Bolivia, or an account of fascist and Japanese influence in Latin America, or other developments distinctly international in character in the period 1931-1939.

The volume is provided with excellent maps and tables to illustrate the data presented. The bibliography is comprehensive.

ALFRED B. THOMAS.

University of Alabama.

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1925. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940. 2 vols. Pp. cxxi + 957. \$2.00. Pp. lxxviii, 760. \$1.50).

Documents on American Foreign Relations. Vol. II, July 1939-June 1940. Edited by S. SHEPARD JONES and DENYS P. MYERS. (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1940.)

The two volumes in the *Foreign Relations* series for 1925, published by the Department of State, continue to maintain the high standard noticeable in the preceding volumes for the years 1923 and 1924. The organization of the documents, most of which have not been published previously, follows, too, the plan of recent issues in this series.

There is a wealth of material on the relations of the United States with Latin America. Among the principal subjects in this field, on which documents are published, may be mentioned: correspondence on the Tacna-Arica question including the arbitrator's award and the establishment of the plebiscitary commission; correspondence on territorial disputes between Colombia and Nicaragua, between Colombia and Peru, and between Costa Rica and Panama; disapproval by the Department of State of proposed loans by American bankers to the State of São Paulo; recognition of Cuban sovereignty in the Isle of Pines; the recognition policy of the United States relative to the revolutionary regime in Ecuador; withdrawal of United States Marines from Nicaragua, and the status in the canal zone of diplomatic and consular officers accredited to Panama.

The correspondence of Secretary Kellogg opposing Mexican agrarian and petroleum legislation is particularly enlightening. This correspondence concludes with the Secretary's protest to Mexico asserting that the petroleum law of 1925

... violates rights lawfully acquired under Mexican law, provisions of the present Mexican Constitution, recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Mexico, and pledges solemnly given but two years ago by designated representatives of the Mexican Government. (Sec. Kellogg to the American ambassador in Mexico [Sheffield] Dec. 31, 1925, II, 553-4).

The traditional solemnity of diplomatic correspondence finds a happy (indeed, it might be said, a comic-opera) relief in American correspondence with Paraguay. The episode in question relates to the fortunes, and, it would seem, the misfortunes of the "Paraguayan Jewels" which were entrusted to the American minister at Asunción during the war of 1868. With the passage of time, successive inventories, taken in Brazil and in the United States, revealed a modern Pandora's box—there were fewer jewels in 1884 than there were in 1871. The mystery of all this still remains. Nevertheless, diplomacy has its victories. In March of 1926 the American minister at Asunción wrote to the Secretary of State:

I have the honor to report that the Paraguayan jewels have been delivered to the Paraguayan Government, receipt for the same being attached hereto.

Certainly this is a diplomatic triumph, but withal a bit anticlimactic.

The second volume in the new series issued by the World Peace Foundation provides a useful collection of current source materials on American foreign relations for the period July, 1939, to June, 1940. The volume is an improvement over the first in the series issued a year ago. New subjects appear in the table of contents on such topics as: the "Moral Embargo," the "Department of State and the Foreign Service," and the "Treatment of Persons."

The value of this series would be increased substantially if in future volumes the editors would expand in point of specific detail the editorial paragraphs which introduce the various groups of documents, and if they would delete from the documents themselves redundant phrases, sentences and paragraphs which serve no purpose other than to fill space.

PAUL H. CLYDE.

Duke University.

México en la Obra de Marx y Engels. By DOMINGO P. DE TOLEDO. (México, D. F.: Ediciones del Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1939. Pp. 69.)

This interesting material dealing with Mexico has been compiled from the nine-volume Costes edition of *The Correspondence of Marx and Engels* published in Paris between 1931 and 1934, and from the various newspaper articles and works of the two men. The selections, somewhat indiscriminately made, are prefaced with notes by Domingo P. de Toledo which serve to give continuity to subject matter which is often fragmentary and which covers a period of several years.

Of the letters included, those containing the comments Marx made

on Ripley's *Mexican War* which appeared in 1854 and the British Blue Book covering Sir Charles Lennon Wyke's negotiations with the Mexican government following the suspension of payments on the foreign debt in July, 1861, are most valuable. They demonstrate the clarity and accuracy with which Marx could analyze and interpret contemporary problems. His estimate of the war, its leaders, and its effects are quite in accord with those held by the historian today. The generals, notably Scott, whose blunders and bickerings were notorious, are sometimes severely handled. What impressed Marx most, however, was that "Yankee ideals of independence and valor" were most responsible for the victory. Mexico he viewed as the "acme of Spanish degeneracy" where all vice, but especially "grandiloquence and quixotism were raised to the nth degree." In his treatment of the negotiations resulting from Mexico's suspension of payment on its debts, Marx is decidedly partisan. Wyke, the British negotiator, becomes an egotistical "scoundrel" while Zamacona, the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, is the "superior" gentleman.

The articles included in the compilation were written by Marx and Engels individually and in collaboration, appearing in various newspapers in London, New York, Brussels, and Vienna. They deal with many phases of Mexico's history such as the war with the United States, the debt controversy and the French intervention. Engels, in an article published in the *German Gazette*, Brussels, January 23, 1848, viewed the defeat of Mexico in true Hegelian fashion as a progressive step in the evolution of the American continent. The proposed military intervention in Mexico by England, France, and Spain in 1861, on the other hand, was denounced by Marx in a New York *Tribune* article as "one of the most monstrous undertakings ever registered in the annals of international relations." Its conception, he rightly attributes to the "arch imperialist," Palmerston, acting in the interests of holders of Mexican bonds, rather than to Napoleon III. Throughout the article, Mexico is portrayed as the underdog involved in struggles against the reactionary interests of capitalism, a point of view which often leads to exaggerated, if not completely erroneous conclusions.

Apart from their correspondence and articles the gleanings from the writings of Marx and Engels are of little importance and can be suspected of having been included only because of the enthusiasm for Marxian philosophy that has been sweeping Mexico in the last two decades.

LEO J. MEYER.

New York University.

Inflation and Revolution. Mexico's Experience of 1912-1917. By EDWIN WALTER KEMMERER. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940. Pp. xiv, 173. \$2.50.)

This little volume is the work of a noted professor of international finance at Princeton University who gave expert advice during the years 1917 and following to more than half a dozen of the Latin-American countries. It will not easily be understood by those who are not specialists in the subject. "Mexico in the brief period of a dozen years ending in 1916," says the author, "ran almost the entire gamut of the monetary experiences of civilized man." (P. 3.) It is that experience which he describes. The volume contains appendices and a short bibliography as well as a useful index.

J. FRED RIPPY.

University of Chicago.

Textos de las Constituciones de Cuba (1812-1940). Edited by ANTONIO BARRERAS. (Havana: Editorial Minerva, 1940. Pp. xxiii, 622. Paper, \$4.00; cloth, \$5.00.)

This is a most useful and handy collection of the texts of the constitutions which have been, at one time or another, in force in Cuba. Dr. Barreras has not included the texts of various projected constitutions which never entered into force, such as those of Joaquín Infante, Gabriel Claudio Zequeira, Narisco López and others. The absence of these may well be lamented by the student of Cuban constitutional history. However, Dr. Barreras has performed a great service for investigators of Cuban political history by making these texts infinitely more accessible than they have ever been before. A somewhat extensive "spot checking" of other sources has convinced this reviewer that one may turn to the volume under review with confidence in the accuracy with which the texts have been compiled.

The volume is divided into four parts. The first contains texts of the constitutions in force during the Spanish occupation; i.e., 1812, 1834, 1876, 1897 and the amendatory decree of 1898, and the treaty of peace of 1898.

Part two is devoted to the Cuban revolutionary constitutions; namely, the constitutions of Guáimaro (1869), Baraguá (1878), Jimaguayú (1895), and La Yaya (1897).

The third part of the volume is a text of the provisional constitution of Santiago de Cuba, or the Leonard Wood constitution of 1898.

In part four are set forth the constitutional texts of the republican period. These are the constitution of 1901, the 1903 treaties with the

United States and the treaty of 1934 which abrogated the treaty of 1903, the constitution of 1928, the decree of 1933 which reestablished the constitution of 1901 as well as the provisional statute of 1933, the constitution of 1934 with its subsequent *reformas*, the constitution of 1935, and the constitution of 1940.

W. M. G.

Venezuela a Democracy. By HENRY J. ALLEN. (New York: Doubleday, Doran, and Company, 1940. Pp. xix, 289. \$3.50.)

Although the cover of this book labels it a "Complete and Authoritative Book on the Country, its History, and its People," it is primarily a description of Venezuela today, with only incidental reference to the past. As a survey of the political, economic, and social objectives and achievements of the government of López Cortreras, it contains much useful information, presented in a style that will appeal to the general reader. The study includes chapters on the relations of the President to the Congress, the Army, and the Press; the programs of public works, of sanitation and hospitalization, of transportation, and of education; art and art schools; the oil industry, especially its social program; cattle; also on the visits of the author to selected towns and sections—San Cristóbal, Maracaibo, Guayana, Caripito, and Margarita. Proper stress is laid on the programs of sanitation and education, which the government has considered fundamental. The author's treatment of technical and material questions is better than that of cultural. His appreciation of the aims of the government is generous; his estimate of its achievements no doubt optimistic.

The author's easy designation of the Mexican system as communism in comparison with the Venezuelan as a democracy would need definition and qualification with respect to the use of both terms. His statement (p. 16) that Castro might be an example to Cárdenas is hardly fair to Cárdenas, regardless of one's economic philosophy. Incidentally, the writer of this review would like to object to his reference (p. 54) to Alexander Hamilton as "the spiritual founder of our republican form of government."

The book contains a good economic and political map of Venezuela and several illustrations.

MARY WATTERS.

Mary Baldwin College.

Vida y Obra de un Glorioso Fundador. Apuntes para la biografía del Ilustre Prócer de la Independencia doctor José Vicente de Unda, posteriormente Rector del Colegio San Luis de Gonzaga de Guavare y Obispo de Mérida. By HECTOR GARCÍA CHUECOS. (Caracas: Tipografía Americana, 1940. Pp. xvi, 214.)

In relation with his work in cataloguing the documents in the National Archives in Caracas, Doctor García Chuecos has added another book to the three he has had published on the history of Venezuela. The earlier studies dealt with the political and social life of the colonial period. This volume belongs primarily to the history of the Republic. The author modestly disclaims any attempt at critical history or a complete biography. For lack of access to sources, he omits a study of the episcopal work of Unda. The book consists of two divisions and an appendix. Part I gives a sketch of the life of Unda; Part II, the history of the Colegio San Luis de Gonzaga to 1840. A very valuable part of the book is the large content of documents in the body of the study and in the Appendix, which constitutes, in fact, a fairly comprehensive documentary history of the Colegio from the foundation of the Franciscan convent in 1752 to the nationalization of the school in 1837.

The appearance of the study is well timed. The life of this notable, but little known, churchman, statesman, educator should contribute to the broadening and deepening of the sense of nationality, toward which Venezuelan leaders of thought are striving today. Also the history of one of the leading products of the enthusiasm of the young Republic for educational advancement is in line with the present program of educational expansion in Venezuela. The book appeared on the hundredth anniversary of the death of Unda, its publication being sponsored by the State of Portuguesa in memory of this native

SON.

José Vicente de Unda, born in Guavare, 1777, was graduated from the University of Caracas in 1799 as Doctor of Theology, and returned to serve the church in his native city. He was a member of the Congress of 1811 and signed the Declaration of Independence and the first Constitution of the Republic. During the royalist reaction of 1811 under Monteverde he was imprisoned for his support of the revolutionary movement but was released in 1813 and went back to his work as cura of the church in Guavare. He was senator for his province of Barinas in the Venezuelan congresses of 1831 to 1834. From 1825 to 1836 he was Rector of the Colegio de Guavare. In 1836 he was elevated to the episcopate of Mérida, where he died in 1840. As these facts indicate, he gave a labor of more than thirty-five

years to his native city. At the same time he was in the full current of the national life of the period and exhibited an active interest in the political, economic, and cultural progress of his country. Devoted to the church, he was yet able to reconcile its interests with the new currents of thought more effectively than some churchmen of his time.

The Colegio of Guavare, established in 1825 under the government of Gran Colombia and upon the properties of the former Franciscan Convent, suppressed in 1821, was enlarged in 1832 and erected as a national colegio in 1837. Its foundation and progress were largely the work of Unda. The history of this school, given here largely in documentary form, comprises an interesting chapter in the history of education in Venezuela.

MARY WATTERS.

Caracas, Venezuela.

The Correspondence between Benjamin Harrison and James G. Blaine, 1882-1893. Edited by Albert T. Volwiler. (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1940. Pp. xii, 314. \$3.50.)

One would expect the correspondence between a president of the United States and his secretary of state to contain many revelations with respect to foreign policy. In this respect Professor Volwiler's volume is rather disappointing. Yet this is not the fault of the editor. Such letters as have been preserved are for the most part brief, and the relations between president and cabinet chief were not cordial for long. The explanatory footnotes are helpful and the proofreading good, although Uruguay is misspelled (pp. 62, 206.)

The student of the foreign relations of the United States will find information on a number of topics: Haiti, the Nicaragua Canal, Chile, Samoa, the search for coaling stations, and fishery disputes with England. The correspondence throws little light on the Brazilian revolution or the First Pan American Conference. Both Harrison and Blaine desired to improve relations with Latin America but no important achievements were made by them. Perhaps the time was too short, if there had been no other reason. The index is useful but less than adequate.

J. FRED RIPPY.

University of Chicago.

Don Alberto Blest Gana. Biografía y crítica. Por ALONE. (Santiago: Editorial Nascimento, 1940. Pp. 339.)

Those interested in the literature of Chile will welcome this study on Blest Gana (1830-1920), that country's first and best-known

novelist. Broad in scope, it presents Blest Gana's chronology, a well-balanced biographical sketch, a discussion of his literary background and criticism of his novels. An appendix contains additional detailed information, chiefly biographical, which the author has wisely kept separate from his main sections, since its data will interest only a very few readers. The work concludes with an extensive bibliography.

This volume says all that needs to be said about Blest Gana, whose place in literature is due more to his being the first Chilean novelist than to any great social or aesthetic values. In fact only two of his many novels—*Martín Rivas* and *Durante la reconquista*—can be considered worth while. And if future generations outside of Chile read him at all it will be because of the last mentioned work, for *Durante la reconquista*, despite its length, is an excellent historical novel, one of the best ever written in Spanish. Published in 1897 and based on an intensive study of history, it presents a very readable and accurate account of events in Chile between the battles of Rancagua and Chacabuco. In view of this accuracy it is surprising that Alone does not indicate the extent to which the novel is based on historical documents, especially Barros Arana's *Historia jeneral de Chile*, which was Blest Gana's chief source.

Although Alone's statement (p. 224) that nothing worth while on Blest Gana has been done in North America may be true, the reviewer suggests that for the sake of completeness his own article "Blest Gana's Debt to Barros Arana" (*THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW*, XIX, 102-105), and G. W. Umphrey's edition of *Martín Rivas* (D. C. Heath and Co., 1926) be added to the bibliography.

WILLIAM E. WILSON.

University of Washington.

El Capitán Hernando de Soto. By JOSÉ MANUEL PÉREZ CABRERA. (La Habana: Academia de la Historia de Cuba, 1939. Pp. 28.)

This is an address delivered by Dr. Pérez Cabrera in commemoration of the 400th anniversary of the departure of Hernando de Soto from Cuba, where he was governor, to conquer and colonize Florida. The paper, well documented, treats affairs in Cuba during the year De Soto spent there prior to his departure. The incidents related in connection with the preparations De Soto made for the Florida expedition, for which he was commissioned by the Spanish crown, show that the expedition was not a blind and foolhardy venture, as is sometimes thought, but the enterprise of a discreet and brave man of action. At page 22 the trustworthiness of Garcilaso de la Vega's *La Florida*

del Inca, so generally questioned, is clearly vindicated at least as far as the Ponce episode is concerned. This point will interest bibliographers as it interested the present reviewer who discussed the question eight years ago in his paper "Neglected Aspects of the De Soto Expedition." It is interesting to note that throughout his paper Dr. Pérez Cabrera takes the trustworthiness of *La Florida del Inca* for granted.

FRANCIS BORGIA STECK.

The Catholic University of America.

História da polícia do Rio de Janeiro: Aspectos da cidade e da vida carioca, 1565-1831. By MELLO BARRETO FILHO and HERMETO LIMA. (Rio de Janeiro: Editora S. A. A Noite, 1939. Pp. 361. Illus. 25\$000.)

In effect, the authors of this history have written three books in one. One, suggested by the subtitle, is a social history of Rio that to a large extent is a rewriting of Luis Edmundo with the addition of some Newgate flavor. As far as describing the police is concerned, it mainly shows the presence of disorder and the absence of any effective organized body. The second book is a body of anecdotes of the social and political disturbances of the Cariocas during the early days of independence and of the Empire. D. Pedro I is, as usual, the centre around which the incidents swirl.

The third book, a history of the police, begins, strictly speaking, in 1808, when D. João VI created a force and an intendancy on the model of those of Lisbon. Presumably because of the incomplete state of the sources, the treatment is not at all sociological or criminological, and crime and punishment appear in anecdotes rather than in tables of delinquency. According to the preface, the present volume is the first of four. The later ones (of which the first is in preparation) are to cover, respectively, the years 1831-1889, 1889-1930, and 1930-1940. These divisions in time suggest that the volumes will reflect the changes in the theory of criminal law in Brazil from the German and French to the Italian model, with consequent changes in the structures and operation of the police force. While the present volume is as interesting as are all studies of the marvelous city, it is to be hoped that the authors in their later ones will select their material with more regard to its reference to the history of the force.

ALEXANDER MARCHANT.

The Johns Hopkins University.

Notes on the Works of Ferdinand Denis, 1798-1890, Americanist, in the Oliveira Lima Collection, Catholic University, Washington, D. C. By PAUL ALEXANDER McNEIL. (Washington, D. C.: privately printed, 1941. Pp. 6. \$0.75.)

A list, chronological according to date of publication, of twenty-seven titles. As Denis wrote about forty books, not all on America, the Lima collection has probably the largest single body of his works in the United States. The titles missing from the collection that are important to americanists are "Quelques mots sur la deuxième édition de l'Historia Geral do Brasil du vicomte de Porto Seguro," *Actes de la société américaine de France*, tome VIII, 5^e partie (1877); and *Arte plumaria. Les plumes, leur valeur et leur emploi dans les arts au Mexique, au Pérou, au Brésil* (Paris, 1875). Citations are somewhat confused. Denis' edition of Yves d'Évreux is cited for the edition of 1864, though the one of 1861 is referred to in the first paragraph. The two-volume 1844-45 Portuguese translation of *Le Brésil* is not listed. The title for *Le Brahme* is incomplete.

A. M.

Alma Mater. Orígenes de la Universidad de San Marcos, 1551-1759. By LUIS ANTONIO EGUIGUREN. (Lima: privately printed in the Talleres Gráficos "Torres Aguirre," 1939. Pp. 638. \$5.00.)

Reglas y Constituciones. Edited under the auspices of the Instituto de Estudios Americanistas. (Córdoba: Imprenta de la Universidad, 1940. Pp. 173.)

Crónica del muy ilustre Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Señora del Rosario en Santa Fé de Bogotá. (Bogotá: Editorial Centro, 1940. Vol. II. Pp. 376.)

La instrucción primaria durante la dominación española en el territorio que forma actualmente la República Argentina. By LUISA BUREN DE SANGUINETTI. (Buenos Aires, Talleres Gráficos del Consejo N. de Educación, 1940. Pp. 639.)

Latin-American monographs on the history of education appear frequently and are usually both local in point of view and documentation. A work which is both a model of documentation and synthesis will not, perhaps, come from scholars who have so much to gain from local history. The books listed here, some of them approximating the standards of the "scientific historians" as applied to local history, will serve to illustrate. The work of Dr. Luis Antonio Eguiguren on San Marcos de Lima is welcome, because he has demonstrated in his

Catálogo histórico del claustro de la Universidad de San Marcos, 1576-1800 (Lima, 1912), that it is possible to assemble much coherent evidence notwithstanding the tragic dissipation of the great *archivo* of San Marcos during the Chilean occupation of Lima. His book is based largely upon the orthodox printed sources and authorities of Peruvian history—Calancha, Meléndez, Baquíjano, Levillier (*Gobernantes del Perú*), and Mandiburu. Extensive use has been made of *Libros de Cabildos* and occasionally an inedited document of the Archives of the Indies is cited, but there is no way to tell whether the search in Seville has been aimed at finding specific documents or all of them. The unimportant but perennial question of the priority of San Marcos over the University of Mexico is left unsatisfactorily treated. Dr. Eguiguren only states that the university was functioning in 1553 on the foundation laid by the Dominicans and supported by the Cabildo, but it is doubtful whether such a university was anything more than a *colegio* or *seminario* such as perhaps claimed the name of university earlier in Santo Domingo. Dr. Eguiguren has lapsed into a presentation of the Dominican period of the university by the administration of the various rectors, an order which, in my opinion, should have been confined to an appendix. After all, such presentation but copies the fact-reciting style of Plaza's chronicle of the University of Mexico or Fray Cristóbal de Torres's chronicle of San Rosario in Bogotá. But, it must be admitted there is not enough material upon which to base a sound interpretative history of San Marcos. Señor Eguiguren has, therefore, performed a useful service in assembling these data. The shortcomings of proofreading, but not those of the printing, can be explained by the circumstances of Dr. Eguiguren's detention after his contested election to the presidency of Peru. Although only a fragment of this history of a famous institution, this is the most important modern book on San Marcos.

The book, *Reglas y Constituciones*, includes a fifty-page article on the "Erección de centros de enseñanza superior y el espíritu docente durante la Colonia," by Fr. Buenaventura Oro, with footnotes and a short bibliography. Some thirty-eight colleges and universities of the colonial period are dismissed in a few hundred words each. The documents reproduced are the statutes of the "Colegio Real de N. S. Monserrate" (pp. 83-92), Colegio Real de San Juan Bautista of La Plata (95-101), and the "Constituciones y Estatutos de Agandoña para el Colegio de Nuestra Señora de Monserrat," annotated by Luis Roberto Altamira (pp. 102-165). The whole compilation is a limited but useful source in the history of colonial education.

For the second volume of Dr. Hernández de Alba's edition of the

chronicle of the *Colegio del Rosario* it is sufficient to call attention to previous comment on the first volume (THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW, XX, 263-264). The work of Luisa Buren de San-guinetti on primary education in Argentina during the colonial period was one of the publications on that theme which was rewarded in the national contest by official publication. Señor Adolfo Garretón's prize-winning monograph in this series has already been reviewed in this publication (XXI, 91-92).

Challenge to the Americas. By JOHN I. B. McCULLOCH. Illustrated by BUNJI TAGAWA. [Headline books, No. 26.] (New York: The Foreign Policy Association, 1940. Pp. 64. \$0.25.)

Look at Latin America. By JOAN RAUSHENBUSH. Maps and charts by Graphic Associates. [Headline Books, No. 27.] (New York: The Foreign Policy Association, 1940. Pp. 64. \$0.25.)

Democracy Comes to the Cotton Kingdom. The Story of Mexico's La Laguna. By CLARENCE SENIOR. (Mexico: Centro de Estudios Pedagógicos e Hispanoamericanos, 1940. Pp. 56. \$0.15.)

The extraordinary inter-American conditions produced by German methods and possible German triumph have necessitated, or made a market for, a number of compact and informative pamphlets. Mr. McCulloch's *Challenge to the Americas* is a sketch of the problems or challenges thus created, ranging through the whole gamut of Pan-Americanism, European possessions in the Western hemisphere, fifth column in Latin America, and economic problems. The booklet is a good succinct statement of the problems arising under these heads and will be very useful for the purpose for which it was intended. A surprising amount of general information, rendered impressive by maps and charts, is contained in Miss Raushenbush's *Look at Latin America*. Racial distribution of the Latin-American population, resources, transportation, foreign investments, and comparative exports and imports, are some of the topics under which the sections of the pamphlet were written.

Mr. Senior's work on La Laguna, while not the full historical treatise that the historians expect from him or some one else at a later date, is a suggestive and frank exposition of what has been done in this famous settlement since Lázaro Cárdenas came to the helm. The author sympathetically presents La Laguna—and Mr. Senior would evidently be the last to deny it—as a great human triumph. Information useful to the historian lecturing on recent and contemporary

Mexico will be found in this booklet distributed by the League for Industrial Democracy, 112 East 19th Street, New York City.

British Consular Reports on the Trade and Politics of Latin America, 1824-1826. Edited for the Royal Historical Society by R. A. Humphreys. [Camden Third Series. Vol. LXII.] (London: Offices of the Royal Historical Society, 1940. Pp. xxii, 385.)

There is scarcely a single period since the beginning of the Latin-American wars of independence in which British interest in South America was greater than in the critical period, 1824-1826. The interval included the most powerful overtures of George Canning to induce Spain to recognize the revolted colonies as well as the Congress of Panama. Reports from Río de la Plata, Banda Oriental, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, and Mexico are contained in this volume. Such documents as that of Charles Milner Ricketts on Peru contain an extraordinary amount of information useful to the historian for dates other than those given in the title. The notes are exceptionally full and supported by an abundance of authoritative and archival citations. Much value was added through an analytical index. On every score this is a praiseworthy performance.

Bibliography of the Mathematical Works Printed in America Through 1850. By LOUIS C. KARPINSKI. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1940. Pp. xxvi, 697. \$6.00.)

Attention should be called to this elaborate work here because of its value in the study of colonial Hispanic-American culture. The introduction treats of "mathematics in the Americas," the body of the book includes titles chronologically arranged with facsimile reproduction of title pages and other matters, and the index includes a list of books on mathematics in Latin, Spanish, and Portuguese, most of which emanated from Spanish America. There are some eighty-six of these with comment exceedingly beneficial to the provincial student of culture who should appreciate the annotations of a scientist. Professor Karpinski's work was carried on in a large number of American libraries.

Fuentes para la Historia del Trabajo en Nueva España. Vol. IV, 1599-1601. Recopiladas por Silvio Zavala y María Castelo. (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1940. Pp. xxiv, 253-555. \$2.00.)

Since several volumes of this work have already been reviewed by Mr. Lesley Byrd Simpson, and since this volume continues in the

same tradition, attention is here called merely to the previous numbers of the REVIEW in which those critiques can be found: XIX, 549-550; XX, 265-266.

The Great Circle. Further Adventures in Free-lancing. By CARLETON BEALS. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1940. Pp. 358. \$3.00.)

The first part of this readable travel book impinges upon a trip of the author through North Africa and Russia. Approximately the second half of it is devoted to Mexican experiences. The captions of the early chapters, "Murder for Jesus," "Murder [in Mexico] for Machado," and "Kidnapped by a General," indicate that this friend of Mexico had begun to sour on the country near the time of the Obregón assassination and the sourness increased through the administration of Portes Gil. To be captured and virtually manhandled by General Eulogio Ortiz, while Ortiz Rubio was ill, added plenty of passion to Mr. Beals' pen which not even contact with the aspiring villages and rural areas could completely eradicate.

Memoria histórica sobre la Revolución de 16 de Julio de 1809. JOSÉ ROSENDO GUTIÉRREZ. (La Paz: Ediciones pro Cultura Cívica, 1938. Pp. 37.)

Homenaje a Murillo. Refutación a La Historia de Bolivia de Alcides Argüedez. By ISMAEL VÁZQUEZ. (La Paz: Ediciones pro Cultura Cívica, 1938. Pp. 38-127.)

Under the first of these titles one could expect to find a very important contribution to that critical period of American history when Napoleon invaded Spain. The fact that Bolivia produced a declaration of independence in 1809 accentuates the interest. This work, however, is scant and meagerly documented with no formal references to sources. The last title is an obvious polemic.

Antecedentes relativos al hundimiento del acorazado "Admiral Graf Spee" y a la internación del Barco mercante "Tacoma." (Montevideo: Ministerio de las Relaciones Exteriores, 1940.)

The documents published in this compilation are largely the correspondence between the German and British ministers and the Uruguayan Foreign Minister, Dr. Alberto Guani, and the latter's technical advisers.

De algunas glorias de la raza y gente de Santander. By LUIS REYES ROJAS. [Biblioteca Santander. Vol. XI.] (Bucaramanga: Imp. del Departamento, 1939.)

This book is an official publication of the Centro de Historia de Santander sponsored in order to pay homage to General Francisco de Paula Santander on the centenary of his death. It contains anecdotes and biographical sketches, largely of the period of independence, but the most important thing about it is a list of distinguished Colombian figures (pp. 106-134) who were executed for participating in rebellion against Spain.

NOTES AND COMMENT

REVISTA DE INDIAS

Except for occasional visits to the Archives of the Indies most American specialists in Spanish colonial history have lost track of the historical work proceeding there. A few have continued contacts through friendships formed during the sojourn. Now comes an opportunity to have a review proceeding from Spain which seeks to reflect Spanish interest in the history of the Indies. This publication, *Revista de Indias*, was begun last year and is edited by the Instituto Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo. The director is Antonio Ballesteros-Beretta, the editor, Ciriaco Pérez Bustamente, and the editorial secretary, Manuel Ballesteros-Gaibrois. The board of editors is composed of P. Constantino Bayle (S. I.), Cristóbal Bermúdez Plata, Carlos Pereyra, Cayetano Alcázar, Julio Guillén, Santiago Magariños, Raúl Porras Barrenechea, Juan Manzano, P. Atanasio López (O. F. M.), and P. Fidel Lejarza (O. F. M.). Although the main articles are dedicated largely to colonial history, the publication has also given considerable attention to the Consejo de la Hispanidad decree by General Francisco Franco, November 2, 1940. The editors are not exclusively Spanish. To a certain extent, then, it must be considered a publication of Pan-Hispanism under the influence of the current régime in Spain. In the circumstances it would hardly be reasonable to expect the publication to be printed on the finest paper. The bibliographical coverage, also handicapped by the war, is not impressive. The *Revista* has on its board men whose names will insure its increasing usefulness with the passing of the world crisis.

AGRICULTURE IN THE AMERICAS

Since American advocates of Pan-Americanism have at last come to consider concrete factors, we frequently hear talk of solving the problem of competitive agricultural surpluses. That the Department of Agriculture has sought a solution beneficial to both American and Hispanic-American farming interests is vouchsafed in the many activities of the Secretary. But there is the opportunity of stimulating and guiding complementary types of agriculture as well as adjusting the competitive forms. The monthly, *Agriculture in the Americas*,

was begun in February to supply a medium for simple discussion of the inter-American problem of agriculture. It is published and edited by the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. C.

REVISTA ESPEJO

The *Círculo de la Prensa de Quito* commenced a new publication, *Revista Espejo*, in January, 1941. The review is semi-popular, but is evidently designed for the intelligentsia. Thus its articles fall into two categories: those on current questions and those on historical and literary topics. As was to be expected, the first issue carried an article on Dr. Francisco Javier Eugenio de Santa Cruz y Espejo. The purposes of the periodical apparently did not include the regular bibliographical services so common in historical reviews.

UNION INTERAMERICANA DEL CARIBE, BOLETIN

Under the directorship of Guillermo de Zéndegui, the first number of the *Boletín* of the Unión Interamericana del Caribe was issued in March. It is expected that the new periodical will appear quarterly, and will be devoted to significant works of a scientific, historical, or literary nature, which reflect the common interests of the Caribbean area. Subscriptions are \$1.00 a year or \$.30 a number.

REVISTA BIBLIOGRÁFICA

The University of São Paulo has begun publication of a *Revista bibliográfica* with Year I, No. 1, January, 1941. The first number of about 150 pages is devoted almost entirely to book reviews by members of the University faculty. Over thirty books in six languages are reviewed in the fields of history, engineering, physics, zoology, education, ethnography, psychology, geography, philosophy, law, legal medicine, entomology, physico-chemistry, philology, and literature. In addition, two general articles on education and libraries appear, as well as a list of books received and an analyzed list of periodicals received. The *Revista* appears under the auspices of the Rector of the University, Professor Domingos Rubião Alves Meira, assisted by Drs. Murillo Mendes and Rubens Borba de Moraes, at the University de São Paulo, Largo de São Francisco, São Paulo, Brazil. Single numbers cost 4\$000; annual subscription of six numbers a year costs 20\$000.

A. M.

SUMMER INSTITUTE FOR INTENSIVE TRAINING IN
PORTUGUESE AND SPANISH

One of the many indications of a rapidly growing interest in Latin-American life and culture is the Summer Institute for Intensive Training in Portuguese and Spanish to be held on the campus of the University of Wyoming at Laramie from June 23 to August 22, 1941. This offering is made by the American Council of the Learned Societies through a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. The Institute will be under the direction of Dr. William Berrien. Dr. Berrien and Dr. Francis Millet Rogers of the Society of Fellows of Harvard University will conduct the work in Portuguese. Mr. Marion A. Zeitlin of the University of California at Los Angeles and Lic. Andrés Iduarte of Columbia University will carry on the work in Spanish. There will be a tutor for each language, two Brazilian assistants in Portuguese, and two Spanish-American assistants in Spanish. This is an exceptional opportunity to learn these languages rapidly under the very best conditions and instruction. Only early applications for student study-aids are likely to get serious consideration. All inquiries should be addressed to The Administrative Secretary, American Council of Learned Societies, 907 Fifteenth Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

ANOTHER LATIN-AMERICAN BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SERVICE

Since Latin America has no equivalent of the American *The Publishers' Weekly*, any publication which relieves the obscurity and anonymity surrounding the publication of books in South America is most welcome. The Chilean publishers, Casa Zamorano y Caperán, Casilla 362, Compañía 1015 y 1019, Santiago de Chile, have decided to do their part in promoting inter-American solidarity by the publication of the monthly, *Servicio Bibliográfico Chileno*. This publication will be supplied free to those who solicit it. The bulletin will publish the title of the principal Chilean works under various headings with full bibliographical information. The publishers will not, however, undertake the responsibility of a critical bibliography.

THE ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE MEMORIAL FUND

It should be emphasized again, perhaps, that the Beveridge Memorial prize of \$200.00 is offered biennially in the odd-numbered years for a monograph in print or in manuscript on any subject relating to American history. This category includes South America. The Com-

mittee on the Beveridge Memorial Fund will publish such prize essays as fall within the scope of the series it publishes. The Committee is composed of Wm. T. Hutchinson, University of Chicago, Richard O. Cummings, Laurence College, Appleton, Wis., and Colin B. Goodykoontz, University of Colorado, Boulder.

EXCHANGE PROFESSORS IN HISPANIC AMERICA¹

W. Rex Crawford of the University of Pennsylvania is lecturing in Chile on Sociology.

Arthur S. Aiton of the University of Michigan is lecturing in Costa Rica.

Charles C. Griffin of Vassar College is lecturing in Venezuela.

Gordon Ireland of Portia Law School, Boston, is giving courses in the Dominican Republic.

Carroll W. Dodge of Washington University has gone to Guatemala.

John Ashton of the Texas A. and M. College is lecturing in Venezuela.

VISITORS FROM HISPANIC AMERICA

Pedro Aurelio Miró Quesada, professor at San Marcos Unión, was in this country recently.

Domingo Amunátegui y Solar, who for years has been rector of the University of Chile, early this year visited the United States in order to promote the exchange of professors. While in Washington, he was interviewed by Manuel Vega, one of the group of Latin-American newspaper men brought to this country on an exchange basis.

Four prominent educators from Chile and Peru reached New York aboard the Grace Line S. S. *Santa Elena* during January in response to invitations extended by the Department of State to visit the United States. Three of these educators were from Chile: Carlos Humeres, Eugenio Pereira Salas, and Domingo Santa Cruz. The fourth, from Peru, was Luis E. Valcárcel.

Señor Santa Cruz is one of the outstanding musicians and composers of Chile. He studied at Santiago and also in Europe, and is a graduate of the University of Chile. After some years in the Chilean Diplomatic Service he returned to Santiago and became active in the School of Fine Arts.

¹ The notes from this point out were compiled by Mr. Chester L. Guthrie of the National Archives.

Señor Pereira Salas studied in the University of Chile and later in Europe and the United States. He received a Guggenheim fellowship in 1933 and studied Chilean-United States relations in the Bancroft Library, Berkeley, in the Library of Congress, and elsewhere. He is now Professor of American History in the Instituto Pedagógico, University of Chile. He is also secretary of the Chile-United States Cultural Institute, has recently been elected secretary of the Sociedad Chilena de Historia y Geografía, and is a member of the Academia Chilena de Historia.

Señor Humeres has been director of the School of Fine Arts in Santiago, Chile, since 1935. He is a graduate of the University of Chile.

Señor Valcárcel has had a long and distinguished career in Peru as a lawyer, historian, and educator. In addition to his duties as a professor at the universities of Cuzco and Lima and the Colegio Nacional de Ciencias, he founded the Archeological Museum of the University of Cuzco and the *Revista del Museo Nacional*.

Father Aurelio Espinosa Polit, S.J., Director of the Colegio de Cotacollao of Quito, and a distinguished Latinist and Hellenist of Ecuador, reached New York in December.

Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi, prominent historian and recently named Director of the National Archives of the Dominican Republic, visited United States during January and February. Señor Rodríguez Demorizi is a lawyer as well as an historian and is Secretary of the National Academy of History of the Dominican Republic. While in the United States he spent considerable time in Washington conferring with officials of The National Archives and of the Library of Congress.

José María Restrepo-Millan, an outstanding leader in the field of education in Colombia, arrived in New York in March. He is the National Inspector of Secondary Education in the Ministry of Education of Colombia.

Maurice Dartigue of Port-au-Prince arrived in New York in January on an invitation extended by the Department of State. He is a specialist in rural education.

A group of eighty-five students, teachers, and professional men and women from Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia arrived in New York in January to attend a special winter session of the University of North Carolina. Coöperation between the University and the Grace Lines and other organizations made the trip possible.

RATIFICATION OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE PROMOTION OF INTER-AMERICAN CULTURAL RELATIONS

The announcement that Mexico has ratified and deposited the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations signed at Buenos Aires December 23, 1936, brings to fifteen the number of American republics which have agreed to carry out the terms of the Convention, the provisions of which are administered by the Department of State. The Convention provides for the annual exchange of two graduate students or teachers and the biennial exchange of professors by the United States and each of the other ratifying republics. Up to the present time Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United States, and Venezuela have ratified it. The Convention was originally signed at Buenos Aires by each of the twenty-one American republics.

Graduate students and teachers are chosen for nomination by a Committee on Exchange Fellowships and Professorships working in connection with the Department of State. The lists of nominations are then submitted to the governments of the countries which have ratified the Convention for final selection by them. The expenses involved in the exchange of students and teachers are shared by the participating governments. The nominating governments pay the round trip travel costs together with other incidental expenses. The receiving government pays for tuition, subsidiary expenses, board and lodging at the institutions in which the visiting students are enrolled.

Exchange professorships are administered by a different method. From the applications received a complete list of professors available for exchange services from the outstanding universities, scientific institutions, and technological schools of the country is prepared by the Department of State and communicated to each of the other ratifying governments each alternating year. From this list each of the other countries arranges to select a visiting professor who is then assigned to give lectures in various centers and to conduct regular courses of instruction or pursue special research in some designated institution. It is further expected that these professors will, in other appropriate ways, promote better understanding between the cooperating nations. All expenses incident to the exchange of professors are met by the sending government. Such expenses include travel to and from the country to which exchange professors are sent as well as maintenance and local travel costs during the period of residence in the foreign country.

During the past eight years the number of students in the United States from the other American republics has increased steadily. The most important single agency in this country for the encouragement of student interchange is the Institute of International Education. During the academic year 1933-34, fifteen students from the other American republics came to the United States under the auspices of this organization. By 1940-41 this number had increased to eighty-three students, all of them studying on fellowships administered by the Institute. In 1933-34 the total number of all students from the other American republics studying in the United States was 675. By 1940-41 this number had increased to approximately 1400.

OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR OF COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS

The program of the Office of the Coördinator, headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller, has recently become more clearly defined. In coöperation with the Department of State, and by effective use of governmental and private facilities in such fields as the arts and sciences, education and travel, the radio, the press, and the cinema, it is proposed to further national defense and to strengthen the bonds between the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

With \$3,425,000 from the President's emergency fund, of which \$325,000 was marked for administration and the remainder for activities in the non-commercial fields, work began early last September. As reflected in the organization of the Office, the program is divided into four principal spheres. In the Cultural Relations Division, art, music, publications, literature, and education are treated. The Communications Division devotes its time to radio, news, movies, travel, and sports. Another portion of the program is conducted by the Commercial Development Division, which is concerned with raw materials, commodities, transportation (including maritime, aviation, and highway) and, in general, industrial and commercial development. A fourth part of the organization, the Trade and Financial Division, is given over to problems of government finance, export-import banking, private finance and trade, and special projects.

In all four fields plans are being executed which consider both the emergency and the long-range aspects of the problems of the hemisphere. It is felt that unless consideration is given to the post-war effect of the emergency program on the commercial and cultural life of the American republics, measures might be taken which would

result in an adverse reaction after the crisis, thereby doing more harm than good to long-term relations.

The emergency program for cultural relations calls, in the first instance, for an analysis of propaganda and its effects on the peoples of the Americas. With such data in hand, the Office proceeds to the immediate coördination and improvement of the mechanics of communication in the hemisphere—radio, motion pictures, news, and travel.

The long-term objectives of the Office concerning cultural relations are summed up under the following heads: education, exchange professorships, art and music, and literature and publications. Coöperation is accorded the leading educators and institutions in the Americas in the development of textbook and curricula material for schools, colleges, and universities, to provide more adequate instruction in the language, history, jurisprudence, art, and the economic and social backgrounds of the various countries. Additional assistance will be given to certain universities which are developing special departments for the study of the Hispanic-American republics. The Office has under consideration steps which would result in the creation of a special institute in Washington for post-graduate instruction to those in government, cultural, and commercial activities who will be working in the Hispanic-American field.

The Office has fostered the exchange of professors, of graduate students, and of creative workers of recognized ability to achieve a wider exchange of knowledge among the influential thinkers of the American republics. Projects aiming at a wider mutual appreciation of the arts of the peoples of the two continents are under way. Exhibitions of fine, industrial, and graphic arts, interchanges of artists, concerts, and plays are being promoted. Steps are being taken to overcome the language handicap which has kept the literature of the peoples of the Americas from one another. The Office is fostering the translation of the best classical and contemporary literature of America into the three basic languages of the Western Hemisphere. It is also encouraging the translation of popular publications, promoting inter-American book fairs to stimulate bookcraft, and providing for personal appearances of authors and publicists. Interchanges of books, magazines, technical, and scientific journals are also being arranged.

A specific example of the work being done by the Office headed by Mr. Rockefeller is the extensive program for the collection, distribution, and production of informative and educational non-theatrical motion pictures for use in the Latin-American republics. Films made available as a result of this program, which is being carried out

in conjunction with the Department of State, would be offered for showing before schools, universities, cultural institutions, and other appropriate organizations and groups. Kenneth MacGowan, stage and motion picture producer, has been named Director of Production, which comes under the general supervision of the Motion Pictures Section of the Division of Communications of the Coördinator's Office. John Hay Whitney is chairman of the Motion Pictures Section. The Film Library, Inc., of the Museum of Modern Art in New York, also under the direction of the Coördinator, will carry out the program of gathering, reviewing, soundtracking, editing, and, if necessary, producing new motion pictures suitable for distribution in Hispanic America.

LECTURES SPONSORED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF CULTURAL RELATIONS

Mr. Herbert E. Bolton has been giving a series of lectures at various universities concerning relations with Hispanic America. He has also been active in many other projects of the Department of State. President Isaiah Bowman, of The Johns Hopkins University; John Erskine, author; and Thornton N. Wilder, novelist and playwright, have been chosen to visit various countries in South America to lecture and to establish contacts with persons in the field of letters. Mr. Wilder plans to visit Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Mr. Erskine will spend three months in Argentina and Uruguay. Dr. Bowman will travel and lecture in Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia.

THIRD GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PAN AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY

The Third General Assembly of the Pan American Institute of Geography and History was held in Lima from March 30 to April 8. The Institute was established pursuant to a resolution of the Sixth International Conference of American States held in Habana in 1928 and maintains permanent headquarters in Mexico City. The United States entered by joint resolution of Congress, approved August 2, 1935. Two citizens of the United States, Wallace W. Atwood, President-Emeritus of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, and John C. Merriam, have served as presidents. With the approval of the President of the United States, the following delegates were chosen: R. Henry Norweb, American Ambassador, Lima, Peru, chairman; Clarence H. Haring, Professor of Latin-American History, Harvard

University, vice-chairman; John C. Merriam, President of the Pan American Institute of Geography and History, President-Emeritus of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, vice-chairman; Herbert E. Bolton, Emeritus Professor of History, University of California, delegate; S. Whittemore Boggs, Department of State, delegate; Charles W. Hackett, Professor of Latin-American History, University of Texas, delegate; Charles B. Hitchcock, Head of the Department of Hispanic-American Research, American Geographical Society, delegate; Elliot Grinnell Mears, Professor of Geography and International Trade, Stanford University, delegate; James T. Shotwell, Professor of History, Columbia University, delegate; T. Dale Stewart, Assistant Curator, United States National Museum, delegate; Arthur P. Whitaker, Professor of Latin-American History, University of Pennsylvania, delegate; Albert A. Giesecke, American Embassy, Lima, Peru, secretary. General subjects were announced but considerable latitude was left to the delegates in the matter of papers.

COMMITTEE ON LIBRARY COÖPERATION WITH LATIN AMERICA

As part of the activities of the American Library Association, a Committee on Library Coöperation with Latin America has been established. This committee has been very active in assisting and advising librarians of Hispanic America. An example of its work was the aid given to Sr. Ernesto Gietz, Librarian of the Faculty of Exact, Physical, and Natural Sciences of the University of Buenos Aires and Secretary of the Argentine Committee of Librarians of Scientific and Technical Institutions. Routine problems were handled, interviews were arranged, and even clerical help was extended. Among the interviews arranged for Mr. Gietz was one with Vernon Tate, of The National Archives, who offered information on the equipment necessary for, and the organization of, a proposed microfilm laboratory for the University of Buenos Aires. The National Archives of the Dominican Republic will be provided with a microfilm reader, which the Committee is obtaining in coöperation with the Committee on Aids to Scientific Research, and with Dr. Tate of The National Archives.

With the assistance of Acting President Paul M. Herbert of Louisiana State University, the Committee has procured two fellowships in the School of Library Science at Baton Rouge for members of the staff of the Municipal Library of São Paulo, Brazil. The recipients